CASE OF TSAAVA AND OTHERS v. GEORGIA

GRAND CHAMBER

CASE OF TSAAVA AND OTHERS v. GEORGIA

(Applications nos. 13186/20 and 4 others)

JUDGMENT

Art 34 • No valid basis and reason allowing the Court to refrain from examining part of the case • Complaints under Art 3 (substantive), 10 and 11 neither overlapping or peripheral but central to the case • Adjournment of the complaints not appropriate on the basis of the case-file, the alleged breaches and the substantive issues at stake • No basis for striking out the complaints under Art 37 § 1

Art 3 (substantive) • Inhuman or degrading treatment • Use of kinetic impact projectiles by the police to disperse a demonstration in front of the Parliament building after its escalation injuring twenty of the applicants, neither strictly necessary nor proportionate • Need for strict regulation by Contracting States of the use of kinetic impact projectiles during demonstrations in view of their technical characteristics and their potential health risks, including serious injury and death • Enunciation of minimum requirements to be provided by Contracting States’ domestic legal frameworks as to the use of such projectiles • Deficient domestic legal framework and application

Art 3 (substantive) • Inhuman or degrading treatment • Physical ill-treatment by the police, during the dispersal of the demonstration, resulting in injuries to four of the applicants, neither strictly necessary nor proportionate

Art 3 (procedural) • Ineffective criminal investigation, still ongoing for more than five and a half years, into injuries sustained by the applicants from the firing of kinetic impact projectiles and physical ill‑treatment by the police

Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Use of force by firing kinetic impact projectiles against the applicant journalists and removing an applicant journalist from the Parliament building’s courtyard neither justified nor proportionate • Contracting States under a duty to have in place an effective system of protection of journalists • Interference not “necessary in a democratic society”

Art 11 • Freedom of peaceful assembly • Art 11 applicable • Use of force against eleven of the applicants neither justified or proportionate • Although the dispersal decision was justified and proportionate in view of the fundamental interest of ensuring the effective functioning of Parliament in a democracy, the way it was put into effect was not • Interference not “necessary in a democratic society”

Art 38 • Respondent State’s compliance with its obligation to furnish all necessary facilities

Art 46 • Execution of judgment • Respondent State required to take both individual and general measures • Effective investigation to be carried out in compliance with Art 3 requirements, without delay and be concluded as quickly as possible • Adequate safeguards to be put in place regulating the deployment of kinetic impact projectiles to minimise the risks of death and injury stemming from their use

Art 41 • Just satisfaction • Mechanisms to prevent applicants from deriving double compensation from the Court’s judgments • Principles for estimating sums necessary to make full reparation for future loss of income due to diminished earning capacity resulting from an injury • Awards for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage

Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.

STRASBOURG

11 December 2025

This judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

PROCEDURE

THE FACTS

I. DEMONSTRATION OF 20-21 JUNE 2019

A. Background

B. Initial phase of the demonstration

C. First episode involving tensions

D. Interim period

E. Second episode involving tensions and the dispersal of the demonstration

II. THE APPLICANTS’ INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20)

1. Video material depicting the applicants’ circumstances

2. Medical documents relating to the applicants’ injuries

B. Svanadze (no. 16757/20)

1. Video material depicting the applicant’s circumstances

2. Medical documents relating to the applicant’s injuries

C. Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21)

1. Video and photo material depicting the applicants’ circumstances

2. Medical documents relating to the applicants’ injuries

D. Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21)

1. Video and other material depicting the applicants’ circumstances

2. Medical documents relating to the applicants’ injuries

E. Berikashvili (no. 39382/21)

1. Video and photo material depicting the applicant’s circumstances

2. Medical documents relating to the applicant’s injuries

III. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

A. Opening of the investigation and granting of victim status

B. Monitoring of the investigation by the Public Defender’s Office

C. Retrieval of information from non-governmental organisations

D. Examination of weapons and shells used to disperse the demonstration

E. Requests to the MIA

F. Questioning of victims and witnesses

G. Obtaining video and other material

H. Retrieval of medical documentation

I. Ordering of forensic medical examinations

J. Officers charged as part of the criminal investigation

K. Current status of the investigation

IV. DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION BY THE MIA

V. COMPENSATION CLAIMS BY SOME OF THE APPLICANTS

VI. OTHER RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES

VII. OTHER MATERIAL

A. Plan for measures aimed at safeguarding and restoring public order in Tbilisi

B. Reports about the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019

1. Special report by the PDO

2. General report by the PDO

3. Report by Human Rights Watch

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

I. CRIMINAL CODE

II. TERMINATION OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE

A. Assemblies and Demonstrations Act 1997

B. Police Act 2013

C. Ministerial Order no. 1002 of 2015 approving instructions for the conduct of MIA personnel during assemblies and demonstrations

D. Ministerial Order no. 1006 of 2013 on the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police

III. AMNESTY ACT OF 7 SEPTEMBER 2021

IV. CIVIL CODE AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL

I. ON KINETIC IMPACT PROJECTILES

A. United Nations

1. Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement

2. General Comment No. 37 of the Human Rights Committee

B. Council of Europe

1. Resolution CM/Res(2016)2116 of the Parliamentary Assembly

2. Venice Commission Guidelines on Peaceful Assembly

C. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

D. Organization of American States

II. ON THE PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA ACTORS IN THE COURSE OF DEMONSTRATIONS

A. Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe

B. Resolution 2532 (2024) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

C. Venice Commission Guidelines on Peaceful Assembly

THE LAW

I. SCOPE OF THE CASE BEFORE THE GRAND CHAMBER

II. PRELIMINARY REMARKS: WHETHER IT IS OPEN TO THE COURT TO REFRAIN FROM DECIDING PARTS OF THE CASE

A. General principle

B. Non-examination of overlapping or peripheral complaints

C. Partial adjournment or partial striking out of the case

1. Adjournment

2. Striking out

D. Conclusion

III. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

A. The Chamber judgment

B. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

1. The Government

2. The applicants

C. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

1. Possibility for the applicants to seek compensation

(a) General principles

(b) The complaints under Article 3

(c) The complaints under Articles 10 and 11

(i) Relevant practice

(ii) Analysis in the present case

2. Ongoing nature of the investigation

IV. PROCEDURAL LIMB OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

A. The Chamber judgment

B. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

1. The applicants

2. The Government

C. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

V. SUBSTANTIVE LIMB OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

A. The Chamber judgment

B. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

1. The applicants

2. The Government

3. The first third-party intervener (nine members of INCLO)

C. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

1. General principles

(a) Use of force to disperse demonstrations or rallies

(b) Proof in relation to such matters

2. Application in the present case

(a) Injuries caused by kinetic impact projectiles (20 applicants)

(i) Source and nature of the injuries

(ii) Duty to account for the use of force resulting in the injuries

(iii) Regulation of use by the police of kinetic impact projectiles in the course of demonstrations

(α) Relevant case-law of the Court

(β) Considerations arising from the technical characteristics of kinetic impact projectiles and their potential effects on human health

(γ) Assessment of the Georgian legal framework and its application in the present case in the light of those considerations

(iv) Conclusion

(b) Alleged physical ill-treatment (four applicants)

(i) Source and nature of the injuries

(ii) Duty to account for the use of force resulting in the injuries

(iii) Conclusion

VI. COMPLAINTS UNDER ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION

A. The Chamber judgment

B. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

1. The applicants

2. The Government

3. The second third-party intervener (PEN International, PEN Georgia and English PEN)

C. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

1. The complaint in Berikashvili (no. 39382/21)

2. Analysis of the admissibility and merits of the complaints

(a) Admissibility

(b) Merits

(i) Existence of an interference

(α) General principles

(β) Application of those principles

(ii) Justification for the interference

(α) “Prescribed by law”

(β) Legitimate aim(s)

(γ) “Necessary in a democratic society”

VII. COMPLAINTS UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION

A. The Chamber judgment

B. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

1. The applicants

2. The Government

C. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

1. Admissibility

2. Merits

(a) Applicability of Article 11 of the Convention

(i) General principles

(ii) Relevant case-law with respect to Georgia

(iii) Application of the general principles in the present case

(b) Existence of an interference

(c) Justification for the interference

(i) “Prescribed by law”

(ii) Legitimate aim(s)

(iii) “Necessary in a democratic society”

(α) General principles on the necessity of the use of force by the authorities to contain or disperse an assembly

(β) Application of those principles

VIII. COMPLAINTS UNDER ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

A. The Chamber judgment

B. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

C. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

IX. ALLEGED BREACH OF ARTICLE 38 OF THE CONVENTION

A. The Chamber judgment

B. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

1. The applicants

2. The Government

C. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

1. General principles

2. Application of those principles

X. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION

A. Individual measures

B. General measures

XI. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

A. Damage

1. The applicants’ claims

2. The Government’s comments on those claims

3. The Chamber’s decision on those claims

4. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

(a) Whether an award is called for

(b) Analysis of the applicants’ claims

(i) In respect of pecuniary damage

(α) Relevant principles

(β) Application of those principles

(ii) In respect of non-pecuniary damage

(α) The 24 applicants who obtained awards under this head in the Chamber proceedings

(β) The two applicants who obtained no award under this head in the Chamber proceedings

B. Costs and expenses

1. Claims before the Chamber

2. The Chamber’s decision on those claims

3. Claim before the Grand Chamber

4. The Government’s comments on the claims

5. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

(a) Costs and expenses in the Chamber proceedings

(b) Costs and expenses in the Grand Chamber proceedings

(c) Manner of payment

OPERATIVE PROVISIONS

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGHIDES

STATEMENT OF PARTIAL DISSENT BY JUDGE EICKE

APPENDIX – TABLE OF THE TWENTY-SIX APPLICANTS

In the case of Tsaava and Others v. Georgia,

The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:

Arnfinn Bårdsen, President,
Ivana Jelić,
Lado Chanturia,
Ioannis Ktistakis,
Armen Harutyunyan,
Georgios A. Serghides,
Tim Eicke,
Lətif Hüseynov,
Jovan Ilievski,
Péter Paczolay,
Gilberto Felici,
Frédéric Krenc,
Davor Derenčinović,
Anne Louise Bormann,
Diana Kovatcheva,
Stéphane Pisani,
Mateja Đurović, judges,

and John Darcy, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 26 February and 8 October 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

INTRODUCTION

1. The case arose out of the dispersal of a demonstration in front of the Georgian Parliament in June 2019. The applicants – most of whom were participants in that demonstration or journalists covering it – were all injured in the course of that dispersal. All of them took part in the ensuing criminal investigation, which is still ongoing, into the force used by the police to disperse the demonstration. The applicants raised complaints under the substantive and procedural limbs of Article 3 of the Convention. Most of them also relied on Article 10, and the others relied on Article 11. In addition, they raised complaints under Article 13, and some of them also alleged a breach of Article 38.

PROCEDURE

2. The case originated in five applications (nos. 13186/20, 16757/20, 20129/21, 20175/21 and 39382/21) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by twenty-six Georgian nationals whose names are set out in the table appended to this judgment (“the applicants”) on the dates set out therein.

3. The applicants in three of the applications (nos. 13186/20, 16757/20 and 39382/21) were represented by Ms N. Londaridze, a lawyer practising in Tbilisi. The applicants in the remaining two applications (nos. 20129/21 and 20175/21) were initially represented by Ms T. Oniani, from the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), and Mr T. Collis and Ms J. Gavron (a barrister practising in London), from the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (EHRAC). Before the Grand Chamber, those applicants were represented by Mr D. Javakhishvili, a lawyer practising in Tbilisi, and Mr A. Pataraia and Ms S. Tsiklauri, also from GYLA, and Mr Collis, Ms Gavron and Ms C. Alonzo (a solicitor practising in London), also from EHRAC.

4. The Georgian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr B. Dzamashvili, Deputy Minister of Justice.

5. The five applications were allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court, pursuant to Rule 52 § 1.

6. On various dates between October 2020 and September 2021 the (then) President of the Fifth Section (a) gave the Government notice of the respective applicants’ complaints under Articles 3, 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention, and (b) declared the complaints of the applicants in applications nos. 13186/20 and 16757/20 under Article 11 of the Convention inadmissible in the exercise of her powers under Rule 54 § 3.

7. On 7 May 2024 a Chamber of the Fifth Section, composed of Georges Ravarani, President, Lado Chanturia, Carlo Ranzoni, María Elósegui, Mattias Guyomar, Kateřina Šimáčková and Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges, and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar, delivered a judgment in which it (a) joined the applications; (b) declared, unanimously, the complaints of twenty-four applicants under Article 3 of the Convention admissible (and the complaints of the other two applicants under that Article inadmissible); (c) found, unanimously, a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3; (d) refrained, by six votes to one, from taking a decision regarding the merits of the complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3; (e) refrained, by six votes to one, from taking a decision regarding the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention; (f) held, unanimously, that Georgia had complied with its obligations under Article 38 of the Convention; and (g) held, unanimously, that there was no need to examine the complaints under Article 13 of the Convention. The partly dissenting opinion of Judge Gnatovskyy was appended to the judgment.

8. On 1 August 2024 the applicants in four of the applications requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention. On 23 September 2024 a panel of the Grand Chamber accepted that request.

9. The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. Marko Bošnjak, who was initially the president of the formation, withdrew from the case after the hearing, upon the termination of his term of office at the Court. As president of the formation he was replaced by Arnfinn Bårdsen, and as a member of the composition he was replaced by the first substitute judge, Armen Harutyunyan (Rule 24 § 3).

10. The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the admissibility and merits of the applications. In addition, third-party comments were received from (a) nine members of the International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations (INCLO) (“the first third-party intervener”), and (b) PEN International, PEN Georgia and English PEN (“the second third-party intervener”), who had been given leave to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3 (a)).

11. A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 26 February 2025.

There appeared before the Court:

(a) for the Government
Mr B. Dzamashvili, Agent,
Ms N. Nikolaishvili,
Mr B. Surmava,
Mr N. Darchashvili,
Mr P. Kereselidze, Advisers;

(b) for the applicants
Mr D. Javakhishvili,
Mr T. Collis, Counsel,
Ms C. Alonzo,
Ms J. Gavron,
Mr A. Pataraia,
Ms S. Tsiklauri, Advisers.

12. One of the applicants, Ms Maia Gomuri, was also present. The Court heard addresses by Mr Javakhishvili, Mr Collis and Mr Dzamashvili, and their replies to questions put by judges.

THE FACTS

13. The applicants’ years of birth and places of residence are set out in the table appended to this judgment.

14. DEMONSTRATION OF 20-21 JUNE 2019

    1. Background

15. On 20 June 2019 a session of the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy (Διακοινοβουλευτική Συνέλευση Ορθοδοξίας – “the IAO”), an interparliamentary body based in Athens that was established in 1994 on the initiative of the Hellenic Parliament to foster relations between Orthodox Christian lawmakers, was held in the Georgian Parliament building in Tbilisi. Mr Sergei Gavrilov, a member of the Russian State Duma and, at that time, President of the IAO’s General Assembly, sat in the Speaker’s chair and gave a speech in Russian. This sparked widespread civil and political protest in Georgia (see Melia v. Georgia, no. 13668/21, §§ 6-8, 7 September 2023).

16. Initial phase of the demonstration

17. Civil-society activists started gathering in front of the Parliament building in Tbilisi immediately after the above events. Some were allowed to come inside with visitors’ passes issued by opposition members of parliament. A demonstration to protest about the events of the day was apparently announced in the afternoon, and people began gathering in front of the Parliament building soon afterwards. By 7 p.m. the demonstration had got underway and the people taking part – politicians, civil-society activists and ordinary citizens – occupied the entire space in front of the Parliament building and the avenue alongside it (Rustaveli Avenue). According to media accounts, the demonstration was initially peaceful, with approximately 12 thousand people gathered at the site.

18. The police formed a cordon above the steps leading to the Parliament building, blocking access to the main entrance. In addition, many ordinary police officers, riot police officers and officers of the Special Assignments Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (“the MIA”) were stationed in the courtyard of the Parliament building, behind the main entrance.

19. At 8.53 p.m. an opposition politician addressed the protestors and presented the main demand directed at the ruling party: the resignations of the Speaker of Parliament, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the head of the State Security Service. Another demand voiced during the demonstration was for snap parliamentary elections and a transition to a system of proportional representation. The ruling party was given until the end of the day to comply with those demands. At 9 p.m. another opposition politician addressed the protestors and stated that civil disobedience would be inevitable if the authorities failed to heed the protestors’ demands. In a video-recording of a discussion among opposition politicians who were at the site, an unknown person could be heard stating “A revolution is about to begin”.

20. At 9.09 p.m. one of the leaders of the opposition stated that if the demonstrators’ demands were not met within the hour, they would enter the Parliament building peacefully and stay there until the relevant officials had resigned. Apparently, at 9.17 p.m. the same politician addressed the protestors again. He asked why it was that Mr Gavrilov had had the right to sit in the Speaker’s seat, yet Georgian people could not even stand in the courtyard of the Parliament building. He stated that if the authorities failed to respond within ten minutes, those protesting would “enter the courtyard of the Parliament building peacefully and very constructively, with raised hands”. The speech was followed by cheers from the protestors in the immediate vicinity.

21. First episode involving tensions

22. The events were filmed by various journalists, including some who provided uninterrupted live coverage of the demonstration and its subsequent dispersal. The summary below is primarily based on the media coverage of the events.

23. By 9.49 p.m. several hundred people who had gathered immediately below the stairs leading to the main entrance of the Parliament building started pushing their way towards the gate. They tried to break through the police cordon located just above the stairs. Footage of the events shows that several participants cried out that there was a risk of people in the crowd being crushed, and that police officers shielded some journalists standing there, warning them about the risk of crushing.

24. Several protestors threw plastic bottles at the officers. Others started dismantling metal barriers which had been placed at the building’s entrances to keep protestors out. Multiple demonstrators managed to seize police officers’ protective shields and rubber batons and passed them back along the line of protestors. Several officers were split off from the cordon by the demonstrators and led away, apparently in a calm manner. The video material relating to the incident shows the police telling the demonstrators to back off and not push forward.

25. The police cordon was briefly broken but was then reinforced by riot police officers stationed inside the Parliament courtyard. They used batons and shields to contain the demonstrators.

26. Around 10 p.m. the Minister of Internal Affairs gave a brief interview to journalists as he was entering the Parliament building. According to him, the events unfolding there amounted to an attempted storming of State institutions, and the demonstrators should obey the demands of the police or face consequences. At 10.07 p.m. the MIA circulated the following statement via media outlets and its website:

“The [MIA] calls on the demonstrators gathered in front of the Parliament building to stop [their] unlawful and violent actions, not yield to provocation, [and] comply with the lawful request[s] of the police and leave the premises. Otherwise, the police will take necessary measures provided for by the law.”

24. Eventually, at about 10.30 p.m., the tension was defused somewhat and the police managed to push the demonstrators back to the bottom of the stairs.

25. During this first incident involving tensions, most journalists gathered near the building were located behind the police cordon, and they appear to have left the area with the help of police officers.

26. As is apparent from the material in the case file, including reports by non-governmental organisations relating to the events, a large number of demonstrators gathered in the area in front of the Parliament building, away from the stairs, may have been unaware of the developments at the main entrance.

27. Interim period

28. At 10.30 p.m. the mayor of Tbilisi issued a televised warning against escalating the situation on the ground. Around the same time, the Minister of Internal Affairs gave a brief interview to journalists who were inside the Parliament building. He said that even where there were grounds for protest, an assault on State institutions, including police officers and Parliament, was an unacceptable act and would entail strict consequences under the law. He called on citizens to respect the orders of the police officers who had been trying to uphold public order. Other leading figures of the ruling party, including the Prime Minister, also condemned the demonstrators’ actions (via the media) and called on them to respect the law and thus avoid lawful sanctions.

29. Between approximately 10.30 and 11.22 p.m., the situation was tense but somewhat calmer, with some politicians making statements to condemn the events earlier that day (see paragraph 14 above) and criticising the ruling party. On several occasions during that period, some participants in the demonstration tried to push through the police cordon, asking to be let inside the Parliament building and/or its courtyard. They were pushed back by police officers using shields and batons.

30. Second episode involving tensions and the dispersal of the demonstration

31. The situation escalated again from 11.22 p.m., when many people in the front rows of the demonstration again attempted to break through the police cordon.

32. Various accounts estimated that between 300 and 1,000 people tried to break through the police cordon and behaved aggressively.

33. The scuffle between the demonstrators in the front rows and the police officers forming the cordon on the stairs of the Parliament building continued until 11.55 p.m. During this time, there were incidents of police equipment being taken away, various items (water bottles, but apparently stones as well) being thrown at the police, and individual officers being split off from the cordon and led away. Some of those officers appear to have been physically assaulted. According to journalists’ reports, politicians present at the scene told the demonstrators not to use force against the police. Some protestors managed to get past the police cordon and the metal barriers located in front of the Parliament building. The people who were gathered in the middle and back areas of the demonstration appear to have behaved relatively calmly.

34. At 11.55 p.m. sounds of shooting were heard during the live broadcast of the events. Smoke started to rise on Rustaveli Avenue, with journalists reporting that it was tear gas or pepper spray. Many demonstrators and journalists moved away from the area towards the nearby Freedom Square but the people standing in front of the police cordon remained there. The shooting was not preceded by a warning.

35. At midnight some demonstrators began returning to the area in front of the Parliament building. Tensions and scuffles around the police cordon continued. Water bottles and other items were thrown at the officers. Minutes later, additional tear gas projectiles were fired. People in the middle and at the back of the crowd started leaving the area. Paramedics helped those who felt unwell. Apart from the demonstrators standing in front of the police cordon, who remained there and continued with their attempts to break through, the area in front of the Parliament building was largely cleared, with a few demonstrators trying to return.

36. At 12.11 a.m. a journalist reporting on the events commented that “rubber bullets” (hereinafter referred to as “kinetic impact projectiles”)[1] were being fired. A moment later, another journalist showed small plastic projectiles which he had apparently picked up from the ground. Around the same time, several officers holding guns (apparently loaded with kinetic impact projectiles and/or tear-gas projectiles) were seen being stationed above the steps leading to the Parliament building – behind the police cordon – overlooking the cordon and the demonstrators.

37. By 12.21 a.m. many demonstrators who had left for Freedom Square had returned to the front of the Parliament building. People in the front rows kept asking to be let into the building. People at the back appear to have stood around calmly. By then, it appears that a number of demonstrators and police officers had been injured. Soon after that, more tear gas was fired and many demonstrators left again for Freedom Square. During that period, tear gas and kinetic impact projectiles were fired simultaneously or in close sequence. The live broadcast of the events showed injured people being helped by paramedics. The demonstrators kept returning to the protest site in front of the Parliament building. Sounds of shooting were heard again, and there were signs of tear gas being fired each time that happened. Throughout that whole period, a small group of people remained in front of the police cordon and kept trying to break through it, using shields and batons previously seized from the police.

38. By 12.43 a.m. the area in front of the police cordon had been cleared of demonstrators, and the officers had moved several steps down the stairs.

39. At 12.45 a.m. the officers standing above the stairs, behind the police cordon, fired projectiles towards the demonstrators who had been located further away from that area.

40. The demonstrators’ attempts to return to the protest area continued. At 1.02 a.m. the majority of them returned, followed by some minutes of calm until another attempt to break through the police cordon was made and the police used tear gas. At 1.27 a.m., while the police were trying to disperse the demonstrators again, at least one officer, whose face was clearly identifiable, was shown by journalists loading his gun and aiming at the crowd. Some demonstrators were seen with bloodstains. Around that same time, efforts to break through the police cordon became particularly intense in the front rows of the demonstration, and the sounds of shooting also intensified.

41. By 1.42 a.m. sirens could be heard and riot police, with a water cannon behind them, started moving from the Freedom Square area towards Rustaveli Avenue. They began clearing the area using tear gas and the water cannon. At 1.47 a.m., while the water cannon and tear gas were being used, reporters commented that kinetic impact projectiles were also being fired.

42. Once the protestors had fallen back, the water cannon was used to drive them away from the Parliament building. Several protestors continued throwing various items at the police. Others tried to return to Rustaveli Avenue area with protective equipment seized from officers.

43. A warning to disperse was issued at 2.59 a.m., while tear gas and the water cannon were still being used. The following message was transmitted via sound amplifying equipment: “Please disperse, otherwise measures provided for by the law will be used to restore public order and peace. Please take children, women and the elderly away from the areas of unrest.” The message was repeated several times as the police proceeded to clear Rustaveli Avenue, and the remaining demonstrators retreated while throwing various items at the police. Journalists continued filming and reporting on the events as they unfolded, mostly from the pavements of Rustaveli Avenue.

44. While retreating, some people engaged in acts of vandalism. The dispersal and clashes continued until approximately 6.45 a.m. on 21 June 2019. In total, 342 people were arrested.

45. Over 200 people were injured during the event, including approximately 80 police officers and 40 journalists. In early March 2020, approximately 15 people admitted to having committed violent acts against the police. They accepted plea agreements. It appears that other people were also convicted in respect of violent behaviour towards the police.

46. THE APPLICANTS’ INDIVIDUAL CIRCUMSTANCES

47. The two applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov v. Georgia (no. 13186/20), the applicant in Svanadze v. Georgia (no. 16757/20) and the 11 applicants in Baghashvili and Others v. Georgia (no. 20129/21) were reporting on the demonstration in their capacity as journalists, camera operators and/or photographers.

48. At the material time, one of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Mr Diasamidze, was wearing a badge showing that he was a Parliament-accredited journalist.

49. The 11 applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others v. Georgia (no. 20175/21), with the exception of Mr Didberashvili, and the applicant in Berikashvili v. Georgia (no. 39382/21) were participants in the demonstration. Medical and non-medical expenses (such as transportation and accommodation costs) related to the treatment (including outside Georgia) of injuries which they had sustained during the demonstration were covered by the State.

50. Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20)

    1. Video material depicting the applicants’ circumstances

51. On 10 and 11 March 2021 the investigation unit of the Prosecutor General’s Office (“the PGO”) assessed video material which it had obtained on various dates in July 2019. The resulting report described the behaviour of Mr Tsaava and Mr Kmuzov and the moment when they had received their injuries in the following terms:

“It has been established, on the basis of the analysis of the video file, that Merab Tsaava was standing in front of the administrative building of the Georgian Parliament, on the pavement ... [He was] standing calmly and posed no danger to the individuals located there. [He had] his hands pointing towards the Parliament [building] and [was] presumably taking a photo/recording a video, at which point ... his right hand [was] presumably hit with the so-called ‘rubber bullet’, following which he [went up] to the individuals located next to the fountain and within seconds it appeared that he [was] looking for something, [and then] he disappear[ed] from view. ...

It has been established, on the basis of the analysis of the video file, that Beslan Kmuzov was moving from the pavement towards the stairs of the administrative building of the Georgian Parliament ... [He was] holding [what was] presumably a tablet in his right hand, [w]ith his left hand held out, presumably in the direction of the law-enforcement officers stationed at the entrance of the ... Parliament building, addressing them[.] Beslan Kmuzov [was] moving calmly and posed no danger to the individuals located [in that area]. [He was] standing facing the ... Parliament building when ... he [was] presumably hit in the head with the so-called ‘rubber bullet’, following which he join[ed] the mass of people [and] disappear[ed] from view. ...”

48. The reports did not specify the exact point in time during the events when Mr Tsaava and Mr Kmuzov had been hit by kinetic impact projectiles. According to the applicants, Mr Tsaava had been wearing a badge identifying him as a journalist.

49. Medical documents relating to the applicants’ injuries

50. According to medical documents obtained by the authorities in June and July 2019, Mr Tsaava had received an open wound to one of his fingers and to his chest. The medical note also mentioned the “toxic effect of an unspecified substance”. On 4 March 2021 the National Forensic Bureau (“the NFB”) classified the wound on his finger as a minor bodily injury entailing a short‑term deterioration in his health. The other injury was classified as a minor bodily injury entailing no deterioration in his health.

51. According to the medical documents obtained by the authorities in June and July 2019, Mr Kmuzov had sustained an open wound to the upper right side of his head, requiring stitches. On 4 March 2021 the NFB classified it as a minor bodily injury entailing a short-term deterioration in his health.

52. Svanadze (no. 16757/20)

    1. Video material depicting the applicant’s circumstances

53. On 9 March 2021 the PGO assessed video material which it had obtained in June and July 2019. Mr Svanadze’s behaviour and the moment when he had received his injury were described as follows:

“It has been established, on the basis of the analysis of the video file, that Zaza Svanadze [was standing] in front of the administrative building of the Georgian Parliament ..., he [was] moving calmly and posed no danger, as is apparent from the video; he raised his hands in the air (and, on the basis of his gesticulation, [it would appear that] he attempted to call on the law-enforcement officials and the demonstrators to remain calm), at which point he was hit in the area of the left thigh, presumably with a so-called ‘rubber bullet’. He put his hand on his left leg and disappeared from view.”

52. The applicants also submitted that before he had been injured, about an hour after the beginning of the demonstration, Mr Svanadze had delivered a speech expressing his commitment to peaceful protest.

53. Medical documents relating to the applicant’s injuries

54. According to the medical documents obtained by the authorities in June and July 2019, Mr Svanadze had sustained four open wounds to the inner left thigh and two open wounds to the inner right thigh. On 23 July 2020 the NFB classified them as a minor bodily injury entailing no deterioration in his health.

55. Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21)

    1. Video and photo material depicting the applicants’ circumstances

56. Ms Baghashvili: according to the PGO’s report of 15 December 2022 concerning the video material available in respect of her, she had been injured while standing on the right-hand side of the stairs leading to the Parliament’s entrance. It was noted that at that time, some demonstrators had been clashing with the police. According to the report, Ms Baghashvili had posed no threat to the law-enforcement officers or other people when she had been injured. According to the applicants, she had been holding an orange microphone with the logo of Rustavi 2 TV on it and had been accompanied by a camera operator with a large professional video-camera and a live-broadcast camera. She had allegedly been shot at deliberately, since she had been easily identifiable as a journalist because she had been holding a microphone and had been in the company of other journalists.

57. Ms Nemsadze: the video material available in the domestic criminal case file showed her filming the events. The related report of 2 September 2021 by the PGO described the moment when Ms Nemsadze had moved her left leg in an unusual manner and grabbed it suddenly. During the official examination of that video-recording, Ms Nemsadze explained that her movements had been caused by a kinetic impact projectile which had ricocheted, hitting her shin. According to the applicants, she had been taking photos with a large Canon professional camera, and had allegedly been shot at for carrying out her journalistic duties.

58. Ms Vakhtangadze: although she appeared in some videos from the demonstration, they did not appear to depict the moment she had been injured. According to the applicants, she had been wearing a black T-shirt with “Press” printed on it in orange and a badge identifying her as a journalist.

59. Ms Khozrevanidze and Mr Grigalashvili: these two applicants were reporting on the events together. According to them, they had been, respectively, holding a microphone with the logo of Adjara TV and a shoulder-mounted Sony professional camera. The video material available in relation to them showed that Ms Khozrevanidze had filmed the moment when a kinetic impact projectile hit Mr Grigalashvili, with the latter picking it up and showing it to the camera. Mr Grigalashvili was then heard saying that the bullet had also hit Ms Khozrevanidze. Ms Khozrevanidze took photographs of herself with round bruises on her body.

60. Mr Muradov: an examination report produced by a prosecutor on 25 June 2019 in respect of media coverage of the events noted that according to that material, Mr Muradov had been injured by kinetic impact projectiles. He also presented the authorities with photos of his back showing open wounds. In addition, he submitted video material filmed by him from the area where other journalists had also been located, showing the tensions on the stairs of the Parliament building and what appeared to be the firing of kinetic impact projectiles. The video ended with Mr Muradov yelling, apparently in pain. The material assessed by the PGO in 2019 and later on 28 February 2023 showed that he had been standing near the stairs leading to the entrance of the Parliament building, taking photos and making video-recordings of the events, while wearing a press card. He had posed no threat to the law‑enforcement officers or other demonstrators when he had been injured, “presumably with a [kinetic impact projectile]”. He had been located several metres away from the police cordon. According to the applicants, he had been wearing two badges identifying him as a journalist around his neck and holding a large professional camera.

61. Mr Koshkadze: the video material available in respect of him showed him filming the events, including the firing of kinetic impact projectiles during the demonstration. At the end he was heard saying “Something hit me”. According to the applicants, he had been wearing a badge identifying him as a journalist on his chest.

62. Mr Tchumburidze: a photo featuring him showed him with a round haematoma on his stomach. He also submitted video material showing a masked officer standing at the entrance of the Parliament building while a scuffle was going on just below it, who was aiming a rifle in the applicant’s direction (it does not appear from the case file material that the officer actually shot at the applicant). Mr Tchumburidze was standing in an area where people were either standing calmly or walking away from the Parliament building. According to the applicants, he had been recording the events with a shoulder-mounted professional video-camera. The video recorded by him allegedly showed a police officer appearing to aim at him and then shooting.

63. Mr Bochikashvili: in a video file uploaded by him online, he was heard saying “presumably they fired [kinetic impact projectiles], because two have hit me personally”. After the sound of shooting, he was also heard to say:

“We are journalists, what are you doing? ... Despite the fact that I am showing you the T-shirt I am wearing [with the word Press printed on it], ... I was hit in the chest, just several minutes ago, [and] it can be said that I was shot on purpose. This was not a random shooting, because I will now show you that [no civilians were] standing there [Mr Bochikashvili turned the camera around to show that no one was standing at the memorial known as the 9 April Memorial], and I was standing there with a journalist from Netgazeti when they shot in my direction.”

62. According to the applicants, Mr Bochikashvili had been wearing a T‑shirt with “Press” printed on it, and when he had seen a police officer apparently aiming at him, had begun shouting that he was a journalist and pointing at the inscription on his T-shirt.

63. Ms Abashidze: a report by the PGO dated 17 March 2021 regarding the video material available in respect of her noted the following:

“It has been established, on the basis of the analysis of the video file, that ... Ekaterine Abashidze was presumably standing at the stairs in front of the administrative building of the Georgian Parliament, [and] presumably posed no danger to the individuals gathered there. She was presumably ... making a video-recording and/or taking photographs when her left hand was hit, presumably by a so-called ‘rubber bullet’.”

64. Another recording was said to contain a statement by Ms Abashidze, made after she had been injured:

“I have also been hit by a bullet, I can show you ..., it [was] a stray bullet, but still.”

65. According to the applicants, Ms Abashidze had been fired at a second time while standing alongside a fellow journalist carrying a professional camera.

66. Mr Diasamidze: a video taken by him and submitted to the PGO in 2019 showed that he had been livestreaming the events via his mobile phone from the inner courtyard of the Parliament building, where riot police had been positioned. The sounds of shooting, possibly from guns containing kinetic impact projectiles and/or tear gas, could be heard coming from outside the area. Mr Diasamidze was heard coughing. The video contained images of police officers moving around in the courtyard and his running commentary stating that journalists had been stationed outside the entrance when tear gas had been used by the police, and that he had been helped by a police officer and led into that courtyard. At that moment he was addressed by a man not visible on the video, demanding to know his identity and asking what he was doing there. Mr Diasamidze responded that he was a journalist, instructing the said individual to look at his badge, at which moment it appeared that a scuffle broke out, with the applicant shouting “What are you doing? I was live ...”, the phone being lowered and movements suggesting that he was being pushed out of the inner courtyard. Mr Diasamidze shouted “Why are you breaking my equipment?”, and the same male voice replied “What am I breaking? I will break it over you (დაგალეწავ)”. He then shouted “Kick him out” and “Take him out” and told the applicant to leave. Mr Diasamidze repeated that he was a journalist and that it had been a police officer who had let him inside. The incident lasted just over a minute.

67. According to the applicants, Mr Diasamidze had not engaged in any violence towards the police, but had been subjected to violence by a number of officers, some of whom had grabbed him, while others had kicked and hit him when he was being dragged past them, and had sworn at him.

68. Medical documents relating to the applicants’ injuries

69. No medical documents were made available in respect of Mr Bochikashvili. He refused to undergo a forensic examination by the NFB.

70. As regards the remaining applicants, the content of the available medical documents relating to them can be summarised as follows.

71. Ms Baghashvili: a medical certificate dated 21 June 2019 confirming that she was taken to hospital by paramedics. It described the injuries she had sustained as “a wound to the [top] part of the left shoulder” and “an open fracture of the left shoulder bone”. A discharge certificate indicated that the injuries had required surgery, and Ms Baghashvili had been discharged from hospital two days later. An NFB report dated 27 January 2023 noted that the injuries were to be classified as grave and life‑threatening. According to the NFB report, it could not be excluded that they had been inflicted by some sort of projectile, but that determining the type of weapon used to inflict the injury went beyond the NFB’s remit. On the basis of the documents presented for examination, the expert was unable to determine from what distance the shot had been fired.

72. Ms Nemsadze: according to the medical documents from June 2019, and subsequently an NFB report dated 4 August 2021, she had received a bruise on her left shin inflicted by a blunt object, and it could have been received on the date indicated by the PGO (20-21 June 2019).

73. Ms Vakhtangadze: according to medical documents from June 2019, and subsequently an NFB report of 26 October 2021, she had “suffered from the toxic effect of an unspecified substance”. It was also noted that she had bruises on her right shin which had to have been inflicted by a blunt object. The injuries were classified as minor, entailing no deterioration in her health.

74. Ms Khozrevanidze: according to a medical certificate issued on 21 June 2019, she had suffered from the toxic effect of an unspecified substance and sustained bruises on her lower back and thigh. The NFB report obtained on 7 September 2022 confirmed those findings.

75. Mr Grigalashvili: on 6 July 2019 the NFB expert examined him and found no signs of injuries. No other medical documents are available in relation to him.

76. Mr Muradov: a medical certificate dated 21 June 2019 noted that he had 11 open wounds on his back and “one open wound on the left shoulder, inflicted by a [kinetic impact projectile]”. The NFB report of 21 December 2022 concluded that each injury, taken in isolation, could be classified as minor injuries entailing no deterioration in his health. On the basis of the documents presented for examination, the expert was unable to determine from what distance the shot had been fired.

77. Mr Koshkadze: a medical note produced by paramedics on 21 June 2019 described open wounds received by him on his cheek and temple. An NFB report of 26 July 2021 found that these injuries could have been inflicted by a blunt object, potentially on the date indicated by him, and that they were to be classified as minor injuries.

78. Mr Tchumburidze: an NFB report of 19 August 2021 stated that on the basis of photographs taken by him on 22 June 2019, he did not have a “mechanical injury”, but he had a pinkish area on his stomach.

79. Ms Abashidze: medical documents of 21 June 2019 and an NFB report of 26 October 2021 described her injury as “a superficial wound with burnt borders to the middle section of the upper left shoulder, measuring 1 centimetre in diameter, and a superficial wound measuring 1 centimetre in diameter to the middle (upper) section of the ... front part of the shoulder”. The NFB classified the injuries as minor, entailing “some or no” deterioration in her health. It was noted that it had been impossible to determine the possible cause of the injuries and when they had been sustained, because the description of them in the medical certificates was incomplete.

80. Mr Diasamidze: on 21 June 2019 he applied to the NFB to have his injuries recorded. It was established that he had sustained bruises on his right and left forearms, right shoulder, and between the shoulder blades. On 4 August 2021 the NFB found that the injuries recorded in respect of Mr Diasamidze could have been inflicted by a blunt object, potentially on the date indicated by him, and that they were to be classified as minor injuries entailing no deterioration in his health.

81. Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21)

82. All of the applicants in this application, with the exception of Mr Didberashvili, were demonstrators. Mr Didberashvili went to the site of the events to search for his brother-in-law, and was injured soon thereafter.

83. All of the applicants sustained injuries. Mr Pochkhidze, Mr Khvadagiani and Mr Sharvashidze alleged that they had been physically ill-treated. The remaining applicants alleged that their injuries had been inflicted by kinetic impact projectiles.

84. Mr Pochkhidze, Mr Khvadagiani and Mr Sharvashidze were arrested and charged with the administrative offences of disorderly conduct and failing to obey lawful police orders. Mr Pochkhidze and Mr Sharvashidze were acquitted for lack of evidence. Mr Khvadagiani was convicted as charged. It was established that he had been arrested at 5 a.m. on 21 June 2019 for swearing and disobeying a police order to leave the area. He was sentenced to three days’ administrative detention.

85. Video and other material depicting the applicants’ circumstances

86. Mr Kurdovanidze: an examination report produced by a prosecutor on 24 June 2019 in respect of some of the media coverage of the events noted that he appeared to have been injured by a kinetic impact projectile. A report on an examination of the video material carried out with his participation noted the location where he had been injured and the fact that, at that moment, he had posed no threat to anyone.

87. Mr Shekiladze: a photo of his injuries was made available at the domestic level. He was hit by a kinetic impact projectile (see paragraph 95 below).

88. Mr Pochkhidze: an examination report produced by a prosecutor on 14 November 2019 in respect of a video-recording noted that Mr Pochkhidze’s wife had confirmed that the recording depicted the moment he had been arrested and ill-treated. The report did not give any details of the ill-treatment described by Mr Pochkhidze’s wife. According to the applicants, who referred to video evidence on the point, Mr Pochkhidze had been attacked by five to seven police officers while leaving the demonstration with his wife and getting into his car. The officers had allegedly knocked him face down and kicked and punched him in the abdomen, chest, back and legs. One of them had then allegedly grabbed him by the neck, and another one by his foot and they had dragged him for 1 to 2 metres with his back against the tarmac. The beating had allegedly lasted five minutes, and then the officers had handcuffed Mr Pochkhidze and taken him to a police station.

89. Mr Giorgadze: one video-recording was identified at domestic level in 2019. It apparently showed Mr Giorgadze after he had been injured.

90. Mr Khvadagiani: a report produced by a prosecutor on 18 November 2022 noted that video and photo material depicting Mr Khvadagiani’s arrest existed. It apparently showed him lying handcuffed on the ground, face down, and later being escorted to a police car. According to the applicants, Mr Khvadagiani, who had been a peaceful protestor, had been assaulted by five officers, who had first struck him with a truncheon in the area of his right eye and then kicked him in the face and stomach for two to three minutes while he was lying on the ground, offering no resistance. He had then been handcuffed, face down on the ground, before being put into a police car.

91. Ms Gomuri: a report produced by a prosecutor on 24 June 2019 in respect of some of the media coverage of the events noted that Ms Gomuri had lost an eye during the events of 20-21 June 2019. A report produced on 6 November 2019 noted that she had been led away from near the left side of the stairs leading to the Parliament building with a bleeding injury to her left eye, which she had been covering with her hand.

92. Mr Sharvashidze: an examination report produced by a prosecutor on 28 June 2019 in respect of a video-recording of Mr Sharvashidze’s arrest noted that he had stated that he had been ill‑treated, apparently when the camera had been directed elsewhere. According to the applicants, who referred to video evidence on the point, Mr Sharvashidze had been peacefully distributing water and face masks to injured protestors. Five or six officers had allegedly knocked him down, kicked him and hit him with a truncheon, and punched him in the face, chest, back and abdomen. The episode had lasted one or two minutes, and he had provided no resistance. He had then been handcuffed and arrested without explanation.

93. Mr Didberashvili: video material featuring Mr Didberashvili appears to have been made available at the domestic level. It is unclear what that material showed. He was hit by a kinetic impact projectile (see paragraph 101 below).

94. Mr Sulashvili: an examination report produced by a prosecutor on 24 June 2019 in respect of some of the media coverage of the events noted that Mr Sulashvili had lost an eye during the events, without elaborating on the matter.

95. Mr Chikviladze: an official report produced on 28 December 2021 in respect of video and photo material noted that Mr Chikviladze had actually been injured at 12.16 a.m., rather than at 1 a.m. as he had indicated. At one point, prior to being injured, he could be observed standing in front of the police cordon holding a shield which had apparently been seized from a police officer. It was noted that in one of the incidents caught on camera, Mr Chikviladze had been “actively resisting, using hand movements,” the police officers located on the stairs leading to the Parliament building. He had then turned around and gone down the stairs, “presumably owing to the effect of the tear gas”. In another video it appeared that Mr Chikviladze had kicked a police officer’s shield and waved his own shield in the direction of the officer. Photo material obtained from a witness showed that Mr Chikviladze had been kneeling down either when he had been injured or immediately thereafter.

96. Mr Chankseliani: an official report produced on 25 June 2019 in respect of video material, with Mr Chankseliani’s participation, noted that he had indicated to an investigator the segments in the video material in which he could be identified, and that they substantiated the circumstances described in his witness statements produced at the domestic level. An examination report of 17 November 2022 noted that Mr Chankseliani had been standing in front of police officers near people who had been behaving violently, but that he had posed no danger to the officers or other people. He had been hit in the back by a kinetic impact projectile when he had leaned down to help an injured individual to his feet. He had been standing on the stairs leading to the Parliament’s entrance. He had been approximately 3 metres away from the first row of the police cordon. In another incident, Mr Chankseliani could be seen suddenly putting his hand to the area of his right eye, and then being helped by two demonstrators and led away.

97. Medical documents relating to the applicants’ injuries

98. Mr Kurdovanidze: a medical certificate issued on 27 June 2019 indicated that he had been taken to hospital by paramedics at 4.42 a.m. on 21 June 2019 with an open wound in the area of his left eye, concussion and other traumatic injuries of the facial bones. Mr Kurdovanidze had stated that he had been injured by a kinetic impact projectile. The document indicated that he had undergone two operations and received inpatient care, and had been discharged on the date the certificate had been issued. It also noted that, owing to his injuries, he had been unable to work for a month. Numerous subsequent medical documents issued on various dates in 2019 and 2020 indicated that Mr Kurdovanidze had undergone multiple surgical interventions and other treatment in respect of his injuries sustained on 21 June 2019, and that he had virtually lost his sight in the injured eye. An NFB report of 29 April 2021 classified his injuries as serious and life-threatening, on the basis of an assessment of the medical documents.

99. Mr Shekiladze: a medical certificate issued on 22 June 2019 indicated that he had been taken to hospital at 12.45 a.m. on 21 June 2019. He had been diagnosed with a broken jaw. He had stated that he had been injured by a kinetic impact projectile. The document indicated that he had undergone an operation and received inpatient care, and that he had been discharged on the date the certificate had been issued.

100. Mr Pochkhidze: a medical certificate issued on 21 June 2019 indicated that he had sustained superficial trauma to the chest wall. He had stated that he had been injured as a result of physical ill‑treatment by a police officer. He had been discharged the same day.

101. Mr Giorgadze: a medical certificate issued on 21 June 2019 indicated that he had sustained an open wound in the area of his stomach, requiring surgery. He had been discharged the same day. An NFB report of 21 September 2021 noted that the injury could be categorised as a minor bodily injury entailing a short-term deterioration in his health.

102. Mr Khvadagiani: a medical certificate issued on 23 June 2019 indicated that he had been admitted to hospital on that date. He had pain in the right eye, redness and swelling. He had stated that the injury had been sustained at a demonstration (“presumably [inflicted] by a truncheon”). On 24 June 2019 Mr Khvadagiani returned to hospital, complaining of pain in the face and head area. Medical imaging revealed traumatic injury to the facial bones. Surgery was recommended, but he refused it.

103. Ms Gomuri: medical certificates issued upon her admission to hospital inpatient care at 1.53 a.m. on 21 June 2019, and in relation to her subsequent care, indicated that she had sustained injuries to her left eye and around the eye, resulting in open wounds, rupture of the eyeball and fragmented fractures of the eye socket and nose. Ms Gomuri had stated that she had been injured by a kinetic impact projectile at the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019. She underwent operations. Her left eyeball was eventually removed and an artificial one inserted. An NFB report of 8 November 2019 classified Ms Gomuri’s injuries as grave, entailing the permanent loss of more than one-third of her ability to work.

104. Mr Sharvashidze: a medical certificate issued on 21 June 2019 indicated that he had been diagnosed with closed trauma to the chest, superficial trauma to the scalp, and a contusion on an eyelid and in the eye area. He had stated that the injury had been sustained as a result of being beaten at a demonstration. A medical certificate issued on 12 August 2019 indicated that he had a linear fracture of the eighth and ninth ribs on the left side.

105. Mr Didberashvili: a medical certificate issued on 21 June 2019 indicated that he had been diagnosed with an open wound to the cheek requiring stitches. He had stated that he had received the wound after a foreign object had been fired at him at the demonstration.

106. Mr Sulashvili: medical certificates issued upon his admission to hospital inpatient care at 1.12 a.m. on 21 June 2019, and in relation to his subsequent care, indicated that he had sustained injuries to his left eye and around the eye resulting in open wounds, rupture of the eyeball and fractures of the facial bones. He had stated that he had been injured by a foreign object at the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019. He underwent operations. His left eyeball was eventually removed and an artificial one inserted. An NFB report of 19 November 2019 classified the injuries as grave, resulting in the permanent loss of 35% of his capacity to work.

107. Mr Chikviladze: a medical certificate issued on 28 June 2019 indicated that he had been admitted to hospital at 1.11 a.m. on 21 June 2019. He had been diagnosed with an open wound of the posterior chest wall. Three black round objects identified as “rubber bullets or rubber bullet fragments” had been retrieved from the wound. An NFB report of 26 October 2021 established that his injury should be categorised as a minor bodily injury entailing a short-term deterioration in his health, and that it could have been caused by impact from some type of projectile.

108. Mr Chankseliani: a medical certificate issued on 21 June 2019 indicated that he had been admitted to hospital at 4 a.m. on that date. He had been diagnosed with trauma to his right eyeball, superficial trauma to the face and, later on, a detached retina. Several surgical and other procedures were subsequently carried out. His eyesight in the injured eye remained impaired. An NFB report of 9 June 2022 concluded that his injuries had been caused by trauma and could be classified as less severe but resulting in the permanent loss of 15-25% of his capacity to work.

109. Berikashvili (no. 39382/21)

     1. Video and photo material depicting the applicant’s circumstances

110. An examination report produced by a prosecutor on 24 June 2019 in respect of media coverage of the events noted that, according to that material, Mr Berikashvili had sustained an arm injury caused by a kinetic impact projectile. The video material submitted by him at domestic level and before the Court revealed that he had been shot while filming the events on his mobile phone, to the right of the stairs leading to the Parliament building. At that moment some demonstrators located in the central area in front of the police cordon had been throwing items at the officers stationed there, while several officers had been standing above the stairs, behind the police cordon, and firing tear gas projectiles and/or kinetic impact projectiles.

111. Medical documents relating to the applicant’s injuries

112. Medical documents dated 21 June and 1 July 2019 indicated that Mr Berikashvili had been treated at 1.56 a.m. on 21 June 2019. He had an open wound to the left lower shoulder, and a kinetic impact projectile had been retrieved from it. An NFB report of 25 October 2021 noted that the injury sustained by Mr Berikashvili had constituted a minor bodily injury entailing a short-term deterioration in his health.

113. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

     1. Opening of the investigation and granting of victim status

114. On 22 June 2019 the PGO, formally acting on its own initiative, opened a criminal investigation into the events of 20-21 June 2019. The decision to open the investigation referred to Article 333 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 176 below) in the context of “the alleged exceeding, by means of violence or weapons, of the official authority of individual officers of the [MIA], during the dispersal of the participants in the assembly and demonstration held on Rustaveli Avenue” on 20-21 June 2019. The investigation covered all incidents which had taken place during those events.

115. On an unspecified date the investigation was extended to cover alleged unlawful interference with journalists’ professional activities, an offence under Article 154 of the Criminal Code (ibid.).

116. In June and July 2019, all of the applicants were questioned as part of that investigation (see paragraph 121 below).

117. On various dates in 2019 and 2020, three of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) – Ms Grigalashvili, Mr Bochikashvili and Mr Diasamidze – and four of the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) – Mr Giorgadze, Mr Sharvashidze, Mr Didberashvili and Mr Chikviladze – requested the granting of the procedural status of victim in the investigation. Their applications were rejected, first by the prosecutor, and subsequently by the domestic courts, on the grounds that the investigation had not yet determined whether it was possible that a criminal offence had been committed against them. They were, however, informed that the investigation into the matter was ongoing. According to the case-file material, the applicants in question have not been granted victim status to date.

118. The remaining applicants obtained victim status on various dates in 2020-23.

119. Monitoring of the investigation by the Public Defender’s Office

120. On 2 July 2019 the PGO authorised the Public Defender’s Office (“the PDO”) to monitor the ongoing criminal investigation and to have full access to the material in the criminal case file.

121. On various dates in July 2019, the PDO made several recommendations for the PGO to follow. Among other points, the PDO stressed the importance of investigating the actions and omissions of mid- to high-level officials of the MIA in relation to the contested events, including as regards supervision of the use of kinetic impact projectiles during the dispersal. Noting the statements of individual officers that they had been unaware of whether any individual had been hurt as a result of their use of kinetic impact projectiles, the PDO noted the importance of investigating whether any MIA officials had produced a report concerning the use of kinetic impact projectiles and their impact on various people. These and other recommendations were subsequently reiterated in public reports by the PDO (see also paragraph 174 below), and included exploring possible omissions of senior MIA personnel and a systematic legal analysis of the events (ibid.).

122. On 29 July 2021, in its correspondence with the Ministry of Justice, and apparently in respect of the recommendations made by the PDO (see the previous paragraph), the PGO noted the following:

“On the basis of the material in the case file, the decision to use non-lethal projectiles was taken by individual police officers, [acting] independently. Additionally, the material does not confirm that the police officers used non-lethal projectiles in excess of their authority in absolutely all circumstances. There [were] individual, independent incidents where non-lethal projectiles were used. Accordingly, the link between [any possible omission of the former director of the Special Assignments Department of the MIA] and the outcome [of such use of projectiles] must be determined in respect of [each] individual incident, taking into account the specific situation and factual circumstances.

In addressing the question of criminal liability, the investigation must determine a specific incident where the immediate and direct link between the omission of the director and the exceeding of authority/outcome of a police officer’s action is incontrovertibly proven. Failure to observe this will create a risk of an individual being held criminally liable for a specific action which he could not have foreseen and put a stop to, also taking into account the scope of the present police operation.

However, it is to be noted that the investigation regarding the case is ongoing, [and] the obtaining/assessment of evidence and the above-noted position [are] not final. The position is based on the information available thus far, and depends on the final outcome of the investigation.”

3. Retrieval of information from non-governmental organisations

4. On 29 June and 1 July 2019, the PGO asked various non‑governmental organisations to provide any information, documents or reports regarding possible violations of human rights by law-enforcement officers during the dispersal of the demonstration. It appears that the information was obtained soon thereafter.

5. Examination of weapons and shells used to disperse the demonstration

6. On various dates in June 2019, the PGO commissioned ballistic and chemical forensic examinations regarding the weapons and ammunition used during the dispersal of the 20-21 June demonstration. The results of the examinations, obtained on various dates in September 2019, determined that the shells belonged to either “non-lethal” kinetic impact projectiles in the “category of non-combat material, aimed to be trauma-inducing with limited injurious effect”, or “non-lethal” tear gas shells in the “category of non-combat material, with limited injurious effect”. With respect to orange-coloured kinetic impact projectiles, it was noted that precision as regards hitting a target was reduced beyond a radius of 5 metres. As to the remaining types of kinetic impact projectiles, it was noted that the way that they scattered would depend on the range at which they were shot from. It was stated that the shells presented to the experts had an overall range of 50 metres at most.

7. The PGO also obtained information from the manufacturers of the relevant projectiles. According to the documents provided, the projectiles were non-lethal.

8. Requests to the MIA

9. On various dates in June and July 2019, the PGO asked the MIA – the authority in charge of securing public order during demonstrations – for information regarding: (a) the strategy and methods used to terminate the demonstration and the legal basis for such decisions; (b) the use of special means by the police officers involved in the process, and the type of weapons involved; and (c) the professional preparation and training of the officers. The PGO also applied to various State agencies for information regarding their employees’ alleged participation in the events of 20-21 June 2019. The information requested was received at some point in 2019.

10. On 23 August 2019 the PGO asked the MIA whether any of the officers involved in the dispersal of the demonstration had informed their superiors of any injuries inflicted on individuals. The MIA replied on the same day that the purpose of the obligation to inform superiors of any injuries inflicted on individuals as a result of the use of force had been to ensure that such acts were followed up by a proper investigation to determine if the officers had complied with the law. In this regard, the dispersal had been widely covered by the media, which had shown that both the law-enforcement personnel and the people present at the demonstration had suffered injuries. The superiors of officers who had used non-lethal force during the dispersal had become aware of such use of force on the ground. Additionally, senior officials of the MIA and the PGO had also become aware of those developments, leading to the PGO opening a criminal investigation. Accordingly, the purpose of the notification obligation provided for in Ministerial Order no. 1002 (see paragraph 192 below) had been complied with.

11. The investigating authorities also obtained various pieces of classified material, such as recordings from the portable radio equipment of mid- and high-ranking MIA officials which had been made during the demonstration and its dispersal.

12. Questioning of victims and witnesses

13. All of the applicants were questioned in June and July 2019. They provided their account of the events and submitted video and photo material which they had obtained. Among other points, one of the applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Mr Tsaava, noted that two police officers had aided him in his attempts to find his mobile phone, which he had dropped on the ground because of his injuries. One of the applicants in Bagashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Ms Nemsadze, stated that she had been hit by a kinetic impact projectile which had ricocheted, and that the protestors standing on the stairs had been the actual target. Several applicants stated that, in their opinion, the injuries which they had sustained could only have been inflicted by their having been directly targeted. Some applicants stated that they had seen police officers targeting individual demonstrators and/or journalists. None could identify any of the officers.

14. In total, 625 people were questioned in 2019.

15. Among other witnesses, the Minister of Internal Affairs gave statements, in July and November 2019, regarding the planning, management and supervision of the dispersal of the demonstration. He noted that the demonstration had initially been peaceful, but the situation on the ground had deteriorated following the statements made by some politicians and attempts by one aggressive group of people to storm the Parliament building. He noted that he had explained the unlawful nature of the developments in his statements, and the MIA had circulated warnings about the possible use of special means to disperse the demonstration in the event that violent actions were committed. In view of those warnings, and owing to the tense nature of the circumstances on the ground, it had not been possible to issue a warning to the demonstrators gathered there prior to starting to use special means, such as tear gas. Such a warning had, however, been issued prior to the use of the water cannon. As concerned the use of kinetic impact projectiles, no order to use them had been issued by any of the senior officials and the police had to have acted in circumstances of force majeure, aiming to avert an immediate risk to the lives and health of police officers and/or other people. All of the officers had been properly trained to use such means (the content of such training was not specified). He stated that no special authorisation to use kinetic impact projectiles was required in such situations, and in the circumstances of the massive breach of public order which had taken place, it had not been necessary to give a prior warning to the demonstrators and to accord them a reasonable period of time to leave the area. The Minister also stated that the police measures had been proportionate, slowly increasing in severity, and that the various means used to disperse the demonstration had been used only after the police had been deprived of most of their protective equipment after hours of resisting the violence carried out by a group of demonstrators. Therefore, around midnight, he had decided to authorise the termination of the violent demonstration with the use of tear gas. He stated that the special means had not been used simultaneously in respect of the same group of people. In reply to a question from the prosecutor as to whether it had been possible to separate the group of people behaving aggressively from the peaceful demonstrators, the Minister stated that this had not been feasible, given that the people concerned had been occupying the space immediately adjacent to the police cordon located on the stairs of the Parliament building, and had been surrounded by other people. In the Minister’s submission, the people gathered in front of the Parliament building had had every opportunity to leave the area once the dispersal had commenced, as no street had been blocked by the authorities. The Minister also noted that there had been efforts to negotiate with the leaders of the political parties who had been at the forefront of the demonstration, but they had failed to make any specific moves to de-escalate the situation. As the degree of violence had intensified, any negotiation attempts had become futile.

16. Other senior officials were also questioned about their role in the events and whether they had ordered or authorised the use of kinetic impact projectiles. Their account was similar to that given by the Minister (see the previous paragraph).

17. Individual officers involved in the dispersal of the demonstration stated that they had withstood several hours of repeated attempts by one group of protestors to break through the police cordon and storm the Parliament building. They stated that people in the front rows of the demonstration had acted aggressively, violently pushing the officers, throwing stones, bottles and other items at them, grabbing their helmets and items of defensive equipment, and assaulting some of them. Some officers stated that the violent individuals had made attempts to take away their non-lethal ammunition which, if successful, would have been used against the officers. Others also noted that it had become impossible to use batons to control the crowd as any such movement by them would have allowed the crowd to break through the cordon. The dispersal had started only after the violent group of demonstrators had breached the 3 metre perimeter around the entrance of the Parliament building and the police cordon had been unable to contain them any longer. It was noted that at first only tear gas had been used, as a measure of last resort and when it became clear to the officers that their life and health had become seriously endangered. The relevant officers noted that they had duly observed the rules on using tear gas projectiles in densely populated demonstrations by firing them in the direction further away from the crowd. The immediate effect with the crowd receding had lasted only a couple of minutes and, according to the officers, the aggressive group of demonstrators had started assaulting the officers stationed in the police cordon with even greater hostility.

18. With the use of tear gas yielding no lasting results and the violent behaviour of a number of people becoming particularly intense, the officers had been compelled, in their submission, to use kinetic impact projectiles. In this connection, they stated that the decision to use the projectiles had been taken individually, with no order having been issued, on the basis of the specific circumstances on the ground, namely, the existence of a real and imminent danger to the lives and health of officers and other people. Some officers specified that they had acted in accordance with the law, as in cases such as the one at hand, it was unnecessary to obtain an order or an instruction on the use of kinetic impact projectiles. The relevant officers noted that they had received “general permission” before their deployment to be ready for any situation which could necessitate the use of special means, including kinetic impact projectiles. According to the officers, only those who had undergone specific training on the use of non-lethal ammunition had been given such means. Some also stated that their commanders had been present when non-lethal shells had been used and that there had been no order to stop firing kinetic impact projectiles. The officers had not been aware of whether specific people had been injured by their use of tear gas projectiles or kinetic impact projectiles.

19. The officers who had used special means during the dispersal of the demonstration also indicated that the allocation and use of non-lethal weapons and projectiles had been subject to strict control, that is, such equipment was recorded and kept at a special storage facility. Each time any of this equipment was allocated to an officer, and subsequently returned to the storage unit, an appropriate record was to be made, with the relevant officer’s signature. This procedure had also been followed on 20-21 June 2019, both at the allocation and the return stages. Thus, alongside the non‑lethal rifles, all non‑lethal projectiles which had not been used during the dispersal had been counted and returned to the designated storage facility.

20. The officers in question also noted that they had not been wearing body cameras and that their protective uniforms did not have insignia enabling them to be identified personally. They also stated that many officers had worn protective helmets and it had been difficult to recognise each other.

21. A number of witnesses noted that the demonstration had not had any designated organisers, but some protestors located in the front rows of the demonstration had appeared to resort to violent behaviour after hearing speeches made there in the evening. A number of items, including pieces of metal, sticks and bottles, had been thrown at the officers standing in the police cordon, and protestors located in the front rows had become particularly violent just before the dispersal had begun. Some people, including at least one applicant, mentioned that the use of kinetic impact projectiles had appeared to further provoke the demonstrators. A photographer (not an applicant in the present case) located in the front rows of the demonstration stated that individual officers in the police cordon had been shouting phrases like “What are you doing? Step back” as some of the protestors had been attempting to break through the cordon.

22. Several witnesses noted that it had been impossible to identify the shooters, as they had worn masks. Some indicated that tensions had started in response to the repeated attempts by a group of people to enter the Parliament building, while others noted that they had not been aware of this, as they had been standing away from the stairs leading to the building. Some people confessed to having attempted to break through the cordon even as the tear gas had been used. Others stated that they had not been violent, but had been injured nonetheless. Injuries were reported by people who had been standing relatively close to the stairs leading to Parliament and those who had been located further away from the area. Some witnesses and victims alleged that kinetic impact projectiles had been deliberately aimed at them, while others noted that they had been shot indiscriminately at the crowd, without regard for whether the people being shot at had been behaving violently or not.

23. On 29 July 2021, in its correspondence with the Ministry of Justice, the PGO stated that “certain impediments existed in the process of identifying officers allegedly involved in criminal offences”, apparently because of the constant rotation of the officers on the ground, the poor quality of the videos available and/or the shifting angles of the video-recordings. It was noted that efforts to address the issue were ongoing but were taking time, given the sheer amount of material to be analysed.

24. Obtaining video and other material

25. On 20 June 2019, 40 minutes after the incident involving one of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Mr Diasamidze (see paragraph 66 above), complained to the General Inspectorate of the MIA and requested that the video material be obtained from the cameras positioned inside the courtyard of the Parliament building. It appears that no reply was received. No such material was obtained.

26. On various dates in June, July and November 2019, the PGO obtained various pieces of video and photo material from media organisations, the applicants and various agencies of the MIA depicting the events of 20-21 June 2019 (recordings from police body cameras, video‑cameras installed in police vehicles, cameras installed in the buildings where detainees had been taken, and cameras installed in the premises of the MIA). This material was examined, and relevant reports describing its content were produced on various dates in 2019 and 2021.

27. In June and July 2019, the PGO also inspected the scene of the incident, obtained information regarding the persons arrested during the demonstration, and identified the ambulances and emergency crews which had been on duty or called to Rustaveli Avenue on 20-21 June 2019.

28. Retrieval of medical documentation

29. On various dates in June and July 2019, the prosecution obtained a judicial warrant to retrieve, from various medical establishments, documents and other material (such as kinetic impact projectiles and bloodstained clothing) relating to 318 people, including the applicants, in relation to the events of 20‑21 June 2019. The warrant was executed, and the requested material was obtained within that same period.

30. Ordering of forensic medical examinations

31. On 2 July 2019 the PGO forwarded the medical documents obtained in respect of 337 people to the NFB, with a view to carrying out forensic medical examinations. The NFB was asked to determine the existence of any injuries, when and how they had been inflicted, and their gravity.

32. The resulting reports involving the majority of the applicants were received on various dates in 2019-22. The NFB report regarding one of the applicants in Bagashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Ms Bagashvili, was received on 27 January 2023.

33. The NFB reports relating to the applicants and other people noted that determining the type of weapons used to inflict the injuries in question had been beyond the competence of the NFB. The reports also noted that the information available in the documents presented to the NFB had not been sufficient to determine the distance or direction from which the shots had been fired.

34. Officers charged as part of the criminal investigation

35. On 16-17 July and 27 August 2019 three officers of the Special Assignments Department of the MIA who had been engaged in restoring public order during the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019 were charged with the offence of exceeding official authority. L.I. was charged with allegedly using excessive force and physical violence against a demonstrator who had been arrested; G.E. with allegedly firing kinetic impact projectiles at two protestors at close range, without just cause; and M.A. with allegedly using physical violence against a demonstrator who had been arrested.

36. On an unspecified date in 2021, the criminal proceedings against the three officers were terminated, as they had accepted the application of an amnesty to their cases under the Amnesty Act of 7 September 2021 (see paragraph 197 below).

37. Current status of the investigation

38. The investigation is ongoing. In June 2024 it was assigned to the Special Investigation Service (“the SIS”), an independent investigative body set up to carry out impartial and effective investigations of alleged ill‑treatment and abuse of authority committed by law-enforcement personnel or other officials. The SIS is also competent to investigate, among other matters, all criminal offences relating to any breach of the Convention the Court may establish.

39. In late November 2024 the SIS told the applicants, following an enquiry by their lawyers, that it would reply by mid-December 2024 to their questions regarding (a) the provisions of the Criminal Code under which the investigation was being conducted; (b) the number of investigators and prosecutors involved; and (c) the most recent investigative steps. The parties have not provided the Court with any information about the follow-up to that enquiry.

40. At the hearing, the Government stated that, after receiving the case, the SIS had started examining the material in it, with a view to forming its own views about it, and had granted victim status to one person.

41. In a decision of 12 June 2025 on the supervision of the group of cases “Tsintsabadze group v. Georgia” (CM/Del/Dec(2025)1531/H46-18), the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe “noted with regret the legislative package envisaging [the] abolition [of the SIS], passed recently in the second reading” and “urged the [Georgian] authorities to refrain from its final adoption and called upon them to proceed with the outstanding measures for ensuring the independence and effectiveness of this body”.

42. DISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION BY THE MIA

43. On 24 June 2019 the MIA suspended ten officers pending the outcome of the criminal investigation into a possible misuse of authority (Article 333 of the Criminal Code – see paragraph 176 below) during the dispersal of the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019. At some point in July 2019, the head of the Special Assignments Department was also suspended.

44. It appears from the material in the case file that at some point in 2019 the General Inspectorate of the MIA carried out an investigation and disciplinary measures were taken against 11 employees. One was severely reprimanded, eight were reprimanded, and a formal notice was issued against two officers. The case file does not contain any of the relevant reports. The identity of the relevant officers is unclear, as is the substance of the findings in respect of them. It is unclear whether these were the same officers as those who had been suspended on 24 June 2019 (see the preceding paragraph).

45. COMPENSATION CLAIMS BY SOME OF THE APPLICANTS

46. On various dates between June 2020 and December 2021, ten of the applicants (four of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others, no. 20129/20: Ms Baghashvili, Ms Khozrevanidze, Mr Koshkadze and Ms Abashidze; and six of the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others, no. 20175/20: Mr Kurdovanidze, Mr Shekiladze, Mr Khvadagiani, Ms Gomuri, Mr Sulashvili and Mr Chankseliani) brought civil proceedings against the MIA under Article 1005 § 1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 198 below). All ten of them sought compensation in respect of the non-pecuniary damage caused by the injuries that they had sustained during the dispersal of the demonstration. Four of them (those who had lost their eyesight as a result of being hit by kinetic impact projectiles: Mr Kurdovanidze, Ms Gomuri, Mr Sulashvili and Mr Chankseliani – see paragraphs 94, 99, 102 and 104 above) also sought compensation in respect of the pecuniary damage (loss of earning capacity) resulting from that loss of eyesight. At the time of the injury in June 2019, Mr Kurdovanidze was studying and working as a street courier, Ms Gomuri was employed as a supermarket cashier, Mr Sulashvili was employed as a security guard, and Mr Chankseliani was a construction worker.

47. The applicants made the following claims:

(i) Ms Baghashvili: 50,000 Georgian laris (GEL) (equivalent to 14,500 euros (EUR))[2] in respect of non-pecuniary damage (claim filed on 18 June 2020);

(ii) Ms Khozrevanidze: GEL 50,000 (EUR 14,250) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage (claim filed on 21 December 2021);

(iii) Mr Koshkadze: GEL 10,000 (EUR 2,550) in respect of non-pecuniary damage (claim filed on 25 March 2021);

(iv) Ms Abashidze: GEL 25,000 (EUR 6,250) in respect of non-pecuniary damage (claim filed on 25 December 2020);

(v) Mr Kurdovanidze: GEL 300,000 (EUR 79,500) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, and GEL 1,155 (EUR 306) per month, from the time of the injury until the end of his life, in respect of pecuniary damage (claim filed on 29 October 2020);

(vi) Mr Shekiladze: GEL 50,000 (EUR 14,500) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage (claim filed on 18 June 2020);

(vii) Mr Khvadagiani: GEL 25,000 (EUR 6,125) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage (claim filed on 7 April 2021);

(viii) Ms Gomuri: GEL 500,000 (EUR 142,500) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, and GEL 831.31 (EUR 236.92) per month, from the time of the injury until the end of her life, in respect of pecuniary damage (claim filed on 2 December 2021);

(ix) Mr Sulashvili: GEL 400,000 (EUR 116,000) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, and GEL 794.41 (EUR 230.38) per month, from the time of the injury until the end of his life, in respect of pecuniary damage (claim filed on 17 December 2020); and

(x) Mr Chankseliani: GEL 200,000 (EUR 59,000) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, and GEL 2,740 (EUR 808.30) per month, from the time of the injury until the end of his life, in respect of pecuniary damage (claim filed on 18 June 2020).

149. According to the latest information provided by the parties, the Tbilisi City Court has so far given judgment in seven of those ten cases, on various dates between December 2022 and July 2024 (all of which were appealed against and, according to the information available to the Court, four have so far been upheld by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal – see paragraphs 152‑153 below). In all of them, the Tbilisi City Court referred to the relevant domestic law and practice, to Articles 3 and 11 of the Convention, and to international materials relating to the protection of human rights in the dispersal of demonstrations. The court affirmed in particular that the use of physical force against an individual during a demonstration in the absence of any evident necessity constituted ill-treatment in breach of Article 3. It also stated that the use of proportionate force by the police during demonstrations was permissible only in limited circumstances for the purpose of maintaining public order, and only against individuals who posed a threat. It acknowledged that some demonstrators had become violent and that the police had been compelled to resort to force against them. However, the court found that the police had used unnecessary and disproportionate force against the seven applicants who were claimants in the proceedings before it – on account of the undisputed fact that they had remained peaceful throughout the demonstration. In the cases of Mr Kurdovanidze, Mr Shekiladze and Mr Chankseliani, the court added that the use of force by the police needed to be circumscribed clearly and to comply strictly with international legal instruments and practice and with the standards laid down in Georgian legislation. In the cases of Ms Abashidze and Mr Koshkadze – journalists who had been covering the events – the court added that their injuries had made it impossible for them to carry on performing their professional duties at the demonstration.

150. On that basis, the Tbilisi City Court allowed all seven claims, but not to the full extent sought by the applicants. It made the following awards:

(i) GEL 2,000 (EUR 710) to Mr Koshkadze, in respect of non-pecuniary damage (judgment given on 19 December 2022);

(ii) GEL 3,000 (EUR 1,065) to Ms Abashidze, in respect of non-pecuniary damage (judgment given on 5 October 2023);

(iii) GEL 30,000 (EUR 10,950) to Mr Kurdovanidze, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus GEL 1,155 (EUR 421.58) per month, from the time of the injury until the end of his life, in respect of pecuniary damage (accepting, based on expert evidence, a 35% loss of capacity to work) (judgment given on 20 April 2023);

(iv) GEL 5,000 (EUR 1,775) to Mr Shekiladze, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage (judgment given on 14 February 2024);

(v) GEL 50,000 (EUR 17,500) to Ms Gomuri, in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus GEL 831.31 (EUR 290.96) per month, from the time of the injury until the end of her life, in respect of pecuniary damage (again accepting, based on expert evidence, a 35% loss of capacity to work) (judgment given on 26 April 2024);

(vi) GEL 20,000 (EUR 7,000) to Mr Sulashvili, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage (judgment given on 8 August 2023); and

(vii) GEL 50,000 (EUR 16,750) to Mr Chankseliani, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage, plus GEL 1,440.60 (EUR 482.60) per month, from the time of the injury until the end of his life, in respect of pecuniary damage (accepting, based on expert evidence, a loss of capacity to work of between 15 and 25%) (judgment given on 11 July 2024).

151. The awards in respect of pecuniary damage were made by way of monthly payments by the MIA in line with the requirements of Article 408 § 2 of Georgia’s Civil Code (see paragraph 199 below).

152. The MIA appealed in all seven cases. It argued, among other points, that the police had used lawful and proportionate force to protect the life and health of the officers in the police cordon and to stop the violent behaviour of a sizeable number of demonstrators who had tried to break through the police cordon by force and storm the Parliament building. Four of the seven applicants appealed (Mr Koshkadze, Mr Kurdovanidze, Mr Shekiladze and Mr Sulashvili), challenging the quantum of the awards.

153. According to the latest information from the parties, the Tbilisi Court of Appeal has so far given judgment in four of those seven cases, on various dates between October 2023 and June 2024. The Court does not have before it the appellate judgment in Mr Koshkadze’s case (given on 3 October 2023). According to his submissions, it fully upheld the first-instance judgment. As to the remaining three appellate judgments, in all of them the Tbilisi Court of Appeal held, in particular, that (a) the applicants had been injured as a result of unnecessary and disproportionate use of force by the police, on account of the undisputed fact that they had not presented any danger, and that (b) the awards made by the lower court had not sufficed to compensate the non-pecuniary damage suffered by them. It accordingly increased the awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage as follows:

(i) GEL 50,000 (EUR 17,000) to Mr Kurdovanidze (judgment given on 26 December 2023);

(ii) GEL 15,000 (EUR 4,875) to Mr Shekiladze (judgment given on 10 June 2024); and

(iii) GEL 50,000 (EUR 17,000) to Mr Sulashvili (judgment given on 26 December 2023).

154. The Tbilisi Court of Appeal also awarded Mr Sulashvili GEL 794.41 (EUR 270.10) per month, from the time of the injury until the end of his life, in respect of pecuniary damage. It accepted, based on expert evidence, a 35% loss of capacity to work. (It appears that Mr Sulashvili had not produced the relevant evidence before the lower court, and only submitted it before the Court of Appeal.)

155. It seems that all four applicants who obtained judgments by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal appealed on points of law, again challenging the quantum of the awards. The MIA appealed in all cases as well, reiterating its arguments (see paragraph 152 above).

156. According to the latest information from the parties, the Supreme Court of Georgia has so far refused to admit two of those sets of appeals for examination. Consequently, two of the above judgments of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal became final. The parties did not produce copies of the relevant decisions. Two of them – those in the cases of Mr Sulashvili and Mr Kurdovanidze, dated respectively 18 and 19 February 2025 – are, however, available on the Supreme Court’s website. In those decisions, the court refused to admit the appeals on points of law in the two cases for examination. In doing so, it fully agreed with the reasons given by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, with regard to both the liability of the State (see paragraph 153 (a) above) and the quantum of the awards made (see paragraphs 153 (i) and (iii) and 154 above).

157. The Court has not been informed whether the awards of compensation made in the above proceedings have been paid to the applicants yet.

158. OTHER RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES

159. On 12 March 2020 the Georgian Government adopted special measures to counter the global outbreak of COVID-19. On 21 March 2020, it made a derogation under Article 15 of the Convention in relation to some of Georgia’s obligations under Articles 5, 8 and 11 of the Convention, Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4, which it ultimately withdrew in December 2022. The measures adopted domestically included public institutions switching to a remote working regime. The measures were lifted on 22 March 2022.

160. OTHER MATERIAL

     1. Plan for measures aimed at safeguarding and restoring public order in Tbilisi

161. The Government provided the Court with a redacted copy of a classified document entitled “the Plan for measures aimed at safeguarding and restoring public order in Tbilisi” (“the Plan”). The Plan was approved by the Minister of Internal Affairs on 20 June 2019, at some point before the start of the demonstration at 7 p.m. on that day. Its content is summarised below.

162. The Plan indicated that its legal basis included the Constitution of Georgia, the Police Act, the Assemblies and Demonstrations Act, Ministerial Order no. 1002 on instructions for the conduct of MIA personnel during assemblies and demonstrations, and Ministerial Order no. 1006 on the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police.

163. The Plan noted citizens’ “high degree of dissatisfaction” with the events preceding the demonstration (see paragraph 14 above), and referred to a “risk of escalation” on account of the number of people expected at the demonstration and the fact that opposition political parties were also planning to participate in it. The Plan noted that it was thus being adopted with a view to “determining the measures to be taken by the MIA in order to safeguard and, if necessary, restore public order”. It provided that special means were to be used in the event of mass violations of public order by the demonstrators, with a view to putting an end to violent and aggressive unlawful acts, and restoring order and protecting, in so far as possible, the lives and health of citizens. A section in the document entitled “Additional instructions” specified that personnel present at the event were to be given “instructions”; that in order to avoid incidents, any risks or dangers were to be “identified and reported or dealt with in a timely manner”; and that groups with aggressive intentions were to be neutralised.

164. The identity of the leader of the police operation was redacted in the Plan. The number of officers to be mobilised was set at 5,110. In total, nineteen different agencies of the MIA were mobilised, including the Special Assignments Department (tasked with maintaining and, if necessary, restoring public order and security). According to the Plan, the Special Assignments Department was entitled “to use special means, if necessary, to ensure the implementation of measures aimed at restoring public order”. The Security Police Department was tasked with preventing, through the use of special means, the invasion of the Parliament building. The Facilities Protection Department was asked to “clear, through the use of special means, Rustaveli Avenue from the [area of] Freedom Square metro station towards First Republic Square”. The remaining agencies were also asked to ensure that their personnel were stationed where the events were taking place, as needed, and to follow any indications by the leaders of the police operation, with a view to “maintaining public order”.

165. The Plan contained a list of special means commissioned for the police operation and provided that the personnel involved in the police operation were to be equipped with special means and weapons as provided for in section 33 of the Police Act and Ministerial Order no. 1006 on the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police (see paragraphs 180 and 193 below).

166. Three pages of the section entitled “Assignments for the subordinate units in the event of a need to restore public order” were blank, apparently redacted. Pages four to six contained the following assignments:

“Carrying out [officially designated] tasks during the restoration of public order[;]

If necessary, supporting, through the use of special means, the movement of the main group [of officers] on Rustaveli Avenue ..., with the aim of preventing demonstrators from returning to Rustaveli Avenue and invading the Parliament building[;]

Deploying [personnel] in the waiting area and, if necessary, [becoming] involved in measures aimed at restoring public order, through the use of special means ...”

165. Sections regarding how the various agencies were to communicate with each other were redacted.

166. Reports about the demonstration of 20-21 June 2019

     1. Special report by the PDO

167. On 31 March 2020 the PDO published the “Interim report on the investigation into the events of 20-21 June”. It contained a summary of the investigation material, including in relation to the classified documents, and recommendations made by the PDO to ensure the effectiveness of the investigation.

168. According to the report, the investigating officials of the PGO had started questioning officers of the Special Assignments Department of the MIA in mid-July 2019. The individuals who had been questioned had revealed that at the material time, the Special Assignments Department had been comprised of (a) military conscripts whose function had been to secure the perimeter of the Parliament building using passive special means; (b) officers designated as shooters who had used tear gas and/or kinetic impact projectiles (the exact number of such officers was not specified, but on one occasion it was referred to as “more than a hundred”); and (c) other officers (also referred to as riot police) who had been stationed in the police cordon once tensions had arisen at the demonstration.

169. The report contained, among other elements, a summary of the statements given by officers of the Special Assignments Department (see paragraphs 125-127 above). According to the report, the statements had contained “virtually identical information”, and only when questioned a second time (following the proposal by the PDO), had the officers explained that their use of special means had been regulated by the Police Act 2013 and the relevant ministerial order concerning the use of such means.

170. As regards whether an official order regarding the use of kinetic impact projectiles had been issued, the report concluded:

“[A]ccording to the case material, the high-level officials of the Ministry (the Minister and his deputies) did not order the use of [kinetic impact projectiles]. It is clear from the recordings from the hand-held radios of the Minister and his deputies ... that they categorically ruled out the use of [kinetic impact projectiles]. Nevertheless, officers from the Special [Assignments] Department, who were led by the director of the department ... fired about 800 [such projectiles], and the director of the department did not take any action to prevent that happening. At the same time, he was obliged to carry out the orders of his immediate superiors – the Minister and the Deputy Minister in charge of the operation.

It is noteworthy that the Minister and his deputies point out in their statements that they learned quickly about the use of [kinetic impact projectiles], although they do not specify [when]. Nevertheless, no action was taken to ensure that the order issued by them was fulfilled, especially given that the use of [kinetic impact projectiles] was not [a] one-off [occurrence lasting] a short time ...”

170. As regards the weapons used during the dispersal, the report noted that three types of non-lethal weapons had been used: 12 mm-calibre guns designed only for kinetic impact projectiles; 38 mm‑calibre guns designed for kinetic impact and tear gas projectiles; and 40 mm‑calibre guns that could only fire tear gas projectiles. According to the summary of the investigation material contained in the report, “[t]he effective distance for accurately hitting a target [was] about 5 metres for orange kinetic impact projectiles. The chances of hitting the target decrease[d] as the distance increase[d]. In the case of pellets, the scattering [range] increase[d] with distance.”

171. The PDO’s report noted that on 9 January 2020 it had recommended that “a criminal prosecution be launched against G.K., former Director of the Special [Assignments] Department of the [MIA] of Georgia”. In particular, according to the report:

“The examination of the case material made it clear that the Director of the Special [Assignments] Department had a legal obligation to prevent illegal actions by his subordinates (the disproportionate use of special [means]) and had the capacity to do so. His unjustified failure to perform his obligation resulted in dozens of citizens [suffering] severe physical injuries.

In particular, G.K. was instructed by high-level officials not to use [kinetic impact projectiles]. He was personally involved in the operation and, according to him, he was informed about the use of [kinetic impact projectiles]. However, according to the case material, he did not take any measures to prevent [such use], and[, in addition] , the case material does not prove that he provided information to the Minister or his deputies. Moreover, he provided incorrect information to [those leading the operation]. The recordings from hand-held radios make it clear that he provided false information to [them] about guns not being used ... Despite receiving repeated warning[s] through [his] hand-held radio not to use bullets (at 12.36 a.m.), the shooting continued. Later, the Director of the Special [Assignments] Department asked for permission to use bullets, and despite the refusal of [his] immediate supervisor (at 2.34 a.m.), the frequent use of [kinetic impact projectiles] continued.”

172. The PDO’s report of 31 March 2020 concluded, among other points, that the criminal investigation had been focused “only on identifying the criminal actions of individual law-enforcement officers and assessing their individual roles”, and that it had “not aimed to make [a] complete systematic legal analysis of the events of the night of [20-21 June 2019], and consequently to determine the scope of the responsibility of high-level officials”. It was stated that the ongoing investigation was not attempting to “identify or rule out alleged offences resulting from the inaction of officials who had been in charge during the dispersal of the demonstration”, and that it “was not critical [in its approach] when questioning high-level officials”.

173. General report by the PDO

174. A report of 2 April 2020 by the PDO entitled “The Situation Regarding the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia in 2019” made several references to the events of 20-21 June 2019 and the related criminal investigation. The relevant parts of the section entitled “Cases involving the use of force against demonstration participants” read as follows:

“[A] protest gathering which started peacefully in front of the Parliament [building] on 20 June 2019 ended with the use of force and rather serious consequences. Within several hours of the demonstration beginning, the actions of some of the demonstrators went beyond the scope of a peaceful assembly and turned into a serious confrontation with officers ... In the end the police terminated the assembly by force, following which more than two hundred individuals were injured. The law-enforcement officers used, among other means, tear gas, [kinetic impact projectiles] and a water cannon against the participants in the demonstration.

In the Public Defender’s assessment, the force used during the termination of the 20‑21 June assembly, especially the use of non-lethal projectiles, cannot be assessed as a proportionate ... measure, considering the absence of an order provided for in law, the number of shells [used] (several hundred) and [the number] of shooters [present] (several dozen), the area [in which the shooting took place] (immediately in front of the Parliament building and in other parts of Rustaveli Avenue), the duration [of the operation] (a period of several hours), the number of injured demonstrators and the extent of the injuries. ...

As regards the warnings given by the [MIA] in respect of the participants in the assembly by means of the emergency statement disseminated publicly, and the calls [on the participants] made by the Minister ... and the mayor ... [which] were disseminated by the media, such measures cannot ensure that the participants in a demonstration are fully informed and do not comply with the ... standard[s relating to] warning[s]. ...”

174. The relevant parts of the section entitled “Investigation into the events of 20-21 June” read as follows:

“Representatives of the [PDO] personally observed the events unfolding at the demonstration ... They met and talked to doctors, the administrative [teams] from clinics, and citizens injured during the dispersal of the demonstration. ...

The PDO suggested [to the PGO] that the former director of the Special Assignments Department of the MIA should be charged because it had been his legal obligation to prevent unlawful actions by [his] subordinates (the disproportionate use of special means) and, as revealed by the case material, he had had the opportunity to do so. Additionally, as the material obtained so far reveals, on several occasions he received direct orders not to use [kinetic impact projectiles]. ...

On the basis of the video material available in the case file, at the time when the police resorted to the use of [non-lethal] weapons, no massive attack by the participants in the demonstration on the representatives of the police or on other individuals had been imminent, and there had been [no such attack] such as to give the police officers grounds to decide to use non-lethal shells without an order from the leader [of the police operation] and in order to protect their own lives and health (self-defence). By contrast, in accordance with the existing legislative framework, an order regarding the use of non-lethal weapons (including non-lethal projectiles) must be made by the leader of the unit participating in the [police operation] with the consent of a person responsible for the conduct of such an operation, taking into account the principles of lawfulness and proportionality and the [relevant] risks. Where a delay may pose a real risk to a person’s life and/or health, an order made by the leader of the unit will suffice. ...

At the time the present report was published, the [PGO] had not managed to carry out a full systematic legal analysis of the events of the night of 20-21 June. ...”

3. Report by Human Rights Watch

4. In 2020 Human Rights Watch published its World Report concerning the year 2019. The relevant excerpt from that report reads as follows:

“On the night of June 20, riot police fired rubber bullets and used tear gas against thousands of protesters outside the parliament building in Tbilisi. The protest was sparked by the presence of a delegation from the Russian Duma in the parliament’s plenary chamber, as part of the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of Orthodoxy.

Some protesters repeatedly tried to break through the police cordon, grabbing and damaging some riot gear. Otherwise the crowd was largely nonviolent. While riot police showed restraint initially, around midnight, without prior warning, they opened fire on the crowd with tear gas and rubber bullets, chasing and arresting people who tried to gather.

Some 240 people, including 80 police officers and 32 journalists, sustained injuries and sought medical attention. Many civilians sustained rubber bullet injuries to the head, legs, and back; two people each lost an eye.”

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1. CRIMINAL CODE

2. The relevant provisions of Georgia’s 1999 Criminal Code read as follows:

Article 1441 – Torture

“1. Torture, meaning the creation of conditions or treatment for a person or a third party that, by its nature, intensity, or duration, causes severe physical pain or psychological or moral suffering, and which aims to obtain information, evidence, or confession, to intimidate or coerce a person, or to punish a person for an act committed or allegedly committed by them or a third party, shall be punished by seven to ten years’ imprisonment, [and] a fine, with or without restrictions on rights related to weapons.

2. The same act committed:

(a) by a [public] official or a person equal to a [public] official;

(b) using an official position;

(c) repeatedly;

(d) against two or more persons;

(e) by a group;

(f) in violation of [the principle of] equality of persons, based on race, skin colour, language, gender, religious attitude, belief, political or other views, national, ethnic, or social affiliation, origin, place of residence, property or social status;

(g) with prior knowledge of the offender[:] against a pregnant woman, minor, a person who is detained or otherwise deprived of liberty, in a helpless condition, or materially or otherwise dependent on the offender;

(h) at the request of another;

(i) in connection with hostage-taking;

(k) using medical procedures, drugs, or special instruments (tools);

(l) for personal gain;

(m) with the purpose of coercing the confession of a particularly serious crime or a false testimony against a third party,

shall be punished by nine to fifteen years’ imprisonment, [and] deprivation of the right to hold office or engage in certain activities for up to five years, with or without restrictions on rights related to weapons.

3. The same act, committed:

(a) with the use of sexual violence;

(b) by an organised group;

(c) resulting in the death of the victim or other serious consequences,

shall be punished by twelve to twenty years’ imprisonment or life imprisonment, [and] deprivation of the right to hold office or engage in certain activities for up to five years, with or without restrictions on rights related to weapons.”

Article 1443 – Degrading or inhuman treatment

“1. The humiliation or coercion of a person, placing them in an inhuman and degrading situation that causes them severe physical or psychological pain or moral suffering, shall be punished by a fine or three to seven years’ imprisonment, with or without restrictions on rights related to weapons.

2. The same act, committed:

(a) by a [public] official or a person equal to a [public] official;

(b) using an official position;

(c) repeatedly;

(d) against two or more persons;

(e) by a group;

(f) in violation of [the principle of] equality of persons, based on race, skin colour, language, gender, religious attitude, belief, political or other views, national, ethnic, or social affiliation, origin, place of residence, property or social status;

(g) with prior knowledge of the offender[:] against a pregnant woman, minor, a person who is detained or otherwise deprived of liberty, in a helpless condition, or materially or otherwise dependent on the offender;

(h) at the request of another;

(i) in connection with hostage-taking,

shall be punished by five to ten years’ imprisonment, [and] a fine, with or without deprivation of the right to hold office or engage in certain activities for up to five years, [and] with or without restrictions on rights related to weapons.”

Article 154 – Unlawful interference with a journalist’s professional activities

“1. Unlawful interference with a journalist’s professional activities, that is, coercing a journalist into disseminating or not disseminating information, shall be punished by a fine or 120 to 140 hours of community service, or up to two years of corrective labour, or six months to two years of house arrest.

2. The same act committed using the threat of violence or an official position shall be punished by a fine or up to two years’ imprisonment, with or without [the perpetrator] being deprived of the right to hold office or carry out activities for up to three years.”

Article 333 – Misuse of authority

“1. Misuse of authority by a public official ... which substantially [and] adversely affects the rights of a natural person or legal entity, or the [legitimate] interests of society or of the State ..., shall be punishable by a fine or six months to two years of house arrest, or by up to three years’ imprisonment, with up to three years’ disqualification from holding public office ...

...

3. The offence specified in paragraphs 1 [and] 2 of this Article, when committed:

(a) repeatedly;

(b) with the use of violence or a weapon; [and/or]

(c) by offending the personal dignity of the victim,

shall be punishable by five to eight years’ imprisonment, with up to three years’ disqualification from holding public office ...”

2. TERMINATION OF DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE

   1. Assemblies and Demonstrations Act 1997

3. Section 11(1) of Georgia’s Assemblies and Demonstrations Act 1997 provides that “when organising and holding an assembly or demonstration, it shall be prohibited to call for the overthrow of or a violent change in the constitutional order of Georgia, or for encroachment on the independence or territorial integrity of the country, or to make any calls propagandising armed conflict or violence or inciting national, regional, religious or social hostility [which] create a clear, direct and real risk [of such actions being carried out]”. Section 11(2)(b) provides, among other points, that participants in a demonstration are prohibited from carrying any items which endanger or could be used to endanger the life or health of the participants in the demonstration or other people.

4. Section 13(1) of the Act provides that “[i]f the requirements of section 11(1) and (2)(a-c) of this Act are massively violated, the assembly or demonstration shall be terminated immediately at the request of an authorised representative. If the assembly or demonstration is not terminated, law‑enforcement bodies shall take measures under international law and the legislation of Georgia to terminate the assembly or demonstration and disperse the participants”.

5. Police Act 2013

6. Under section 17(2)(i) of Georgia’s Police Act 2013, the police must “ensure, in circumstances provided for under the laws of Georgia, the termination of an assembly or demonstration and the dispersal of the participants in [such events]”.

7. The use of force during such events is regulated as follows:

Section 30 – Coercive measures

“Coercive measures shall include the use, by the police, of physical force, special means and firearms in order to perform police functions.”

Section 31 – Right to use coercive measures

“(1) To perform police functions, a police officer may use appropriate and proportionate coercive measures only where this is necessary, and to an extent which shall ensure the achievement of legitimate objectives.

(2) A police officer shall be authorised to use firearms and special means only if he or she has undergone special training.

(3) Before using physical force [and/or] special means and firearms, a police officer shall warn a person and give [him or her] a reasonable period of time to comply with the lawful order, except in situations where [such a] delay may pose a risk to the life and health of a person and/or a police officer, or other severe consequences, or if such a warning is unjustifiable or impossible in a given situation.

(4) The type and intensity of a coercive measure shall be defined on the basis of a given situation, the nature of the offence and the individual particularities of the offender. Additionally, a police officer shall try to cause minimal and proportionate damage when resorting to a coercive measure.

(5) A police officer shall be obliged to provide first aid to a person injured by coercive measures.

(6) A police officer shall not use means that could cause a person severe injury, may pose an unjustifiable risk, or are prohibited by the laws of Georgia.”

Section 33 – Use of special means

“(1) A police officer shall use passive and active special means to ensure public security and legal order.

(2) Passive special means shall ensure the protection of the life and health of a police officer and/or a person being protected by a police officer. Passive special means are: bulletproof vests, helmets, riot shields, gas masks and other special protective equipment for the body.

(3) Active special means disable, for a short period of time, an individual’s resistance to a police officer and/or assist a police officer in performing police functions. Such special means are: handcuffs and other means of restraint, rubber batons, tear gas, pepper spray, sonic weapons, non-lethal weapons (including non-lethal projectiles), stun grenades, devices to stop vehicles by force, barrier demolition equipment, water cannons, armoured cars and other special transport vehicles, special paints, police dogs and horses, electroshock devices and nets. The above-mentioned special means shall be used in the following cases:

...

(c) Tear gas, pepper spray, sonic weapons and non-lethal weapons (including non-lethal projectiles) may be used to repel an attack on a person, a police officer and/or a protected facility; to suppress a massive breach of legal order by a group; when detaining a person who has committed a crime or an act posing a threat to the public, or when forcing such a person to leave an occupied territory, vehicle or building that the person is using as a shelter;

...

(g) water cannons, armoured cars and other special transport [vehicles] may be used to suppress mass violations of legal order; to repel a group attack on the State and/or public facilities; to stop a vehicle by force if the driver does not obey a police officer’s demand to stop; to detain an armed offender; ...

(4) A police officer shall inform [his or her] immediate superior and the [relevant] prosecutor about causing a person damage or wounding [him or her] as a result of using special means, apart from when it is impossible to inform the immediate superior and the prosecutor, [where this involves] exceptional difficulties, or [where this] impedes the performance of police functions.

(5) If special means are used against an unspecified number of people, a senior leader [of the operation] shall inform his or her immediate superior and the prosecutor.

(6) Rules concerning the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police ... are defined by [legal instruments adopted by] the Minister [of Internal Affairs].”

3. Ministerial Order no. 1002 of 2015 approving instructions for the conduct of MIA personnel during assemblies and demonstrations

4. The relevant parts of section 3 of Ministerial Order no. 1002 of 2015 approving instructions for the conduct of MIA personnel during assemblies and demonstrations provides the following definitions of terms:

“(h) A warning – a verbal warning [given] by technical means regarding the use of special measures, [and] given by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies to the participants in an assembly/demonstration;

(i) Special measures – the totality of measures provided for by the laws of Georgia [to be] used by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies to disperse an assembly/demonstration;

...

(k) Use of special means – the use of special means as defined by the Police Act ... and the laws of Georgia by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies in respect of the participants in an assembly/demonstration.”

182. Under section 4(1), “assemblies/demonstrations may be terminated and dispersed by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies when the participants violate the rules set out in the law regarding the holding [of such events] and there are lawful grounds for dispersing [them] as provided for in the law”.

183. Under section 4(2), the representatives of law-enforcement agencies must ensure:

“(a) negotiation with the organisers of or participants [in an assembly or demonstration], in order to avoid, as far as possible, a forceful intervention and to manage the situation in a peaceful manner;

(b) that peaceful protestors are distinguished or separated from potential lawbreakers, in respect of whom measures provided for in the law can be applied;

(c) that individuals who [have] allegedly breached public order are separated [from the rest of the group] and removed from the area, so that their actions do not lead to the termination or dispersal of a peaceful assembly or demonstration;

...

(f) during the termination or dispersal of an assembly or demonstration, the peaceful exit of the participants on the basis of a pre-defined plan (as regards exits, passageways), in order to avoid unrest;

...”

184. Under section 4(4), “the use of physical force and/or special means by the representatives of law-enforcement agencies must be in conformity with the principle of proportionality [and must be employed] only in cases of absolute necessity, and to the minimum extent necessary in specific circumstances (the principle on the proportionate use of force)”.

185. Section 4(6) reads:

“The representatives of law-enforcement agencies are under an obligation not to impede the professional activities of journalists who are covering an assembly or demonstration [and] have insignia identifying them as such.”

186. Section 5 provides for the authorities having an obligation to adopt a security action plan in respect of an assembly or demonstration.

187. Section 7 provides that an authorised person must give a warning to the participants in a demonstration before resorting to force and the use of special means, and “give them a reasonable period of time (at least 30 minutes) to comply with the lawful instructions”. This obligation does not apply in circumstances where a delay could pose a danger to the life and/or health of an individual and/or a law-enforcement officer, or result in other serious consequences, or if such a warning is unjustified or impossible in a given situation.

188. Section 8(1)(a) provides that a decision to use tear gas can be taken by an individual law-enforcement officer. Section 8(1)(d) provides that “an order to use non-lethal weapons, including non-lethal projectiles, shall be issued by the leader of the unit participating in the [dispersal] measure, with the consent of the supervisor”. In cases where a delay “could pose a real danger to the life and/or health of an individual, [such an order can be issued] by the leader of the unit [alone]”.

189. Section 9(1)(c) prohibits “the use of non-lethal weapons and projectiles in respect of an individual [who is] less than 20 metres away, and in respect of the areas of the body [where an injury would] pose a threat to health and life (the head, neck, stomach, genitals), except in cases where a delay may result in damage to the health and life of an individual or a group of individuals, or another serious outcome”.

190. Under section 9(1)(p), “it is prohibited [for a representative of a law‑enforcement agency] to use water cannons, rubber bullets and tear gas in respect of the participants in an assembly or demonstration simultaneously, or in parallel with one another”.

191. Under section 9(2), “the use of force and special means [by individuals] without professional or special training shall be prohibited”.

192. Under section 10(1)(d), a law-enforcement officer participating in the dispersal of a demonstration should inform his or her immediate supervisor and a prosecutor of any injuries caused by the use of force or special means, unless this is impossible. Once the circumstance precluding such notification no longer persists, the officer should notify the relevant persons immediately.

193. Ministerial Order no. 1006 of 2013 on the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police

194. Section 2(2)(c) and (g) of Ministerial Order no. 1006 of 2013 on the storage, carrying and use of special means available to the police provides that the police can use the following special means: tear gas, pepper spray, sonic weapons, non-lethal weapons (including non-lethal projectiles), water cannons, armoured cars and other special transport vehicles.

195. Section 4 regulates the use of special means by the police. It provides that any use of such means should be guided by the principle of necessity, if other means are considered to be ineffective to attain the relevant objectives. Under section 4(2), an officer should first issue a warning about the potential use of special means and afford sufficient time for compliance with the lawful order, “except in circumstances where a delay could result in damage to the life and health of a citizen and/or [an officer], another serious outcome, or where, in a given situation, it is impossible to issue a warning”.

196. Section 4(4) reads as follows:

“Taking into account the principle of proportionality, the type of special means [and] the intensity of the physical force [to be employed] are determined in a specific situation, depending on the nature of the breach of the law and its individual particularities.”

196. Section 5 concerns the “outcome of the use of special means” and reads:

“(1) After using special means, an individual authorised [to use force] is obliged to:

(a) ensure that individuals who have suffered harm as a result of the use of special means are provided with first aid;

(b) immediately notify his or her supervisor and a prosecutor about the injury or damage caused to an individual as a result of the use of special means, and inform a family member of that individual (if this is feasible), except where [such notification] is impossible, poses particular difficulties or will impede the performance of police functions;

(c) if special means are used in respect of an indeterminate group of individuals, the leader [of the operation] should inform [his or her] immediate supervisor and a prosecutor.

(2) When topical and widely publicised issues in society are linked to the use of special means by authorised personnel, the MIA is obliged to disseminate information regarding the appropriateness and lawfulness of such use of special means, by means of the mass media.”

3. AMNESTY ACT OF 7 SEPTEMBER 2021

4. The Amnesty Act of 7 September 2021 (see Melia, cited above, §§ 62 and 67) reads as follows:

Section 1

“(1) All individuals who committed a criminal offence relating to the events of 20‑21 June 2019 ... and who do not refuse the application, by means of the procedure provided for in this Act, of the amnesty provided for in this section, shall be released from criminal liability and [any] sentence, [including] a suspended sentence.

(2) The amnesty provided for in this section also applies to individuals who ... attempted [to carry out such a] criminal offence or [who were involved in] the planning of [such an offence].

(3) An individual to whom the amnesty ... is applied shall not have a criminal record. ...”

Section 2

“The amnesty provided for in section 1 of this Act shall not apply to criminal offences under Articles 117 [intentional infliction of serious harm to health] and 1441-1443 [torture, threat of torture, humiliating or inhuman treatment] of the Criminal Code.”

Section 3(3)

“If criminal proceedings have ended, the first-instance court which delivered the judgment may, after assessing the circumstances provided for in sections 1 and 2 of this Act, take a decision regarding the application of the amnesty ... by means of an oral hearing or written proceedings.”

Section 4

“(1) Criminal proceedings shall continue in respect of an individual to whom the amnesty provided for in this Act is not applied. That individual shall exercise his or her right to a fair trial. ...

(2) An individual who was convicted at first instance shall have a right to withdraw, at any time and in writing, his or her [prior] written refusal to have the amnesty provided for by this Act applied to him or her.

(3) If an individual withdraws, in writing, his or her refusal to have the amnesty provided for in this Act applied to him or her

...

(d) after the termination of the criminal proceedings against [him or her], the decision to release [him or her] from the [obligation to serve his or her] sentence ... shall be taken by the regional (city) court which delivered the initial judgment, by means of oral or written proceedings.

...”

4. CIVIL CODE AND GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

5. The relevant part of Article 1005 of Georgia’s 1997 Civil Code, entitled “Liability of the State for damage caused by its officials”, reads as follows:

“1. If [an official] breaches his or her official duty to other persons, [either] intentionally or by gross negligence, the State ... or the body for which the official works shall compensate the damage caused. ...”

199. Article 408 §§ 2 and 4 of the Civil Code, which governs, in particular, the payment of monetary compensation in respect of a loss of capacity to work, reads as follows:

“2. If, as a result of bodily injury or harm to health, the victim’s ability to work is lost or is reduced, or his or her needs increase, the victim must be compensated for the damage by way of monthly payments.

...

4. If there are significant grounds for doing so, the victim may request [lump-sum] compensation instead of [periodic] payments.”

5. The relevant parts of Article 208 of Georgia’s 1999 General Administrative Code, entitled “Special procedure for the liability of the State or a municipality”, read as follows:

“1. The State shall be liable for damage caused by a State administrative body, and by its officials or other State employees or public servants of this body (except for a public servant defined under paragraph 2 of this Article) when discharging their official duties.

2. A municipality shall be liable for the damage caused by a municipal body, and by its officials or other public servants when discharging their official duties.

...”

RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL

1. ON KINETIC IMPACT PROJECTILES

   1. United Nations
      1. Human Rights Guidance on Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement

2. In 2020 the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights published the “United Nations Human Rights Guidance on the Use of Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement”, in which it outlined the international standards on the use of such weapons in different scenarios and with regard to the specificities of each of the weapons in current use. The relevant passages (on pages 23-24), which set out the standards with respect to the use of such weapons to police assemblies, read as follows (footnotes omitted):

“6.3.2. In an assembly in which certain individuals are behaving violently, law enforcement officials have a duty to distinguish between those individuals and other assembly participants, whose individual right to peaceful assembly should be unaffected. If it is decided that less-lethal weapons are an appropriate means of addressing individual acts of violence, due care should be given to the likely proximity of third parties and bystanders.

6.3.3. The use of less-lethal weapons to disperse an assembly should be considered a measure of last resort. Before approving dispersal, law enforcement agencies should seek to identify any violent individuals and isolate them from the other participants. This may enable the main assembly to continue. If these targeted interventions are ineffective, law enforcement officials may employ weapons that target groups rather than individuals (such as water cannon or tear gas) after having issued an appropriate warning, unless giving the warning would cause a delay that would either risk causing serious injury or, in the circumstances, be futile. In addition, participants in the assembly should be given time to obey the warning and a safe space or route for them to move to shall be ensured.

6.3.4. The use of firearms to disperse an assembly is always unlawful. In situations where some force is necessary, only less-lethal weapons may be used. In such situations, less-lethal weapons that can be individually aimed shall target only individuals engaged in acts of violence. Weapons such as chemical irritants dispersed at a distance (tear gas) should be targeted at groups of violent individuals unless it is lawful in the circumstances to disperse the entire assembly. Such use should accord due consideration to the impact on other non-violent participants or bystanders. In addition, when the use of any less-lethal weapons or related equipment against assembly participants is envisaged, due attention should be paid to the potential for panic in a crowd, including the risk of a stampede. Only weapons that meet international standards of accuracy may be used.”

202. The relevant passages (on pages 35-36), which set out the standards for the use of kinetic impact projectiles, read as follows (footnotes omitted):

“UTILITY AND DESIGN

7.5.1. A range of kinetic impact projectiles are used by law enforcement officials to tackle violent individuals, including as a less-lethal alternative to lethal ammunition discharged by firearms. Various names are used to describe kinetic impact projectiles, such as rubber bullets, plastic bullets, impact rounds, baton rounds or bean bags.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF POTENTIALLY LAWFUL USE

7.5.2. Kinetic impact projectiles should generally be used only in direct fire with the aim of striking the lower abdomen or legs of a violent individual and only with a view to addressing an imminent threat of injury to either a law enforcement official or a member of the public.

SPECIFIC RISKS

7.5.3. Targeting the face or head may result in skull fracture and brain injury, damage to the eyes, including permanent blindness, or even death. The firing of kinetic impact projectiles from the air or from an elevated position, such as during an assembly, is likely to increase their risk of striking protesters in the head. Targeting the torso may cause damage to vital organs, and there may be penetration of the body, especially when projectiles are fired at close range. The calibre and velocity of the projectiles, as well as the materials they are composed of, will also affect the likelihood and seriousness of injury.

7.5.4. Certain projectiles are highly inaccurate. To meet international standards, impact projectiles should be capable of striking an individual to within a 10-centimetre diameter of the targeted point when fired from the designated range. Skip-firing projectiles off the ground causes an unacceptable risk of serious injury due to their inaccuracy.

CIRCUMSTANCES OF POTENTIALLY UNLAWFUL USE

7.5.5. Kinetic impact projectiles should not be fired in automatic mode.

7.5.6. Multiple projectiles fired at the same time are inaccurate and, in general, their use cannot comply with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Metal pellets, such as those fired from shotguns, should never be used.

7.5.7. Kinetic impact projectiles must be tested and authorized to ensure that they are sufficiently accurate to strike a safe area on a human-sized target from the required distance, and without excessive energy, which could cause injury.

7.5.8. Kinetic impact projectiles should not be targeted at the head, face or neck. Rubber-coated metal bullets are particularly dangerous and should not be used.”

2. General Comment No. 37 of the Human Rights Committee

3. In paragraph 88 of its 2020 General Comment No. 37 on the right of peaceful assembly under Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR/C/GC/37), the United Nations Human Rights Committee stated, among other points, that in the light of the threat that rubber-coated metal bullets posed to life, their use in the context of assemblies had to be limited to targeted individuals in circumstances in which it was strictly necessary to confront an imminent threat of death or serious injury.

4. Council of Europe

   1. Resolution CM/Res(2016)2116 of the Parliamentary Assembly

5. In point 7.3 of its Resolution CM/Res(2016)2116 on the urgent need to prevent human rights violations during peaceful protests, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called on the member States to “regulate the use of tear gas and other ‘less-lethal’ weapons more strictly in order to include more adequate and effective safeguards to minimise the risk of death and injury resulting from their use and abuse and from avoidable accidents”.

6. The relevant parts of the May 2016 report of the Assembly’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights which served as a basis for that resolution (doc. 14060) read as follows (footnotes omitted):

“70. While it is commendable that States appear to strive to avoid the use of lethal force, there have been numerous reports of severe injuries or even deaths caused by the use of incapacitating weapons considered as non-lethal, such as batons, water cannons, pepper spray, handguns, tasers, rubber bullets, stun guns and shock grenades. Any weapon can become lethal if used in a certain manner.

71. Some member States appear to be widening the range of such equipment and the scope of their use against protesters. While law-enforcement authorities need to be provided with a range of less lethal tactical options to allow for a differentiated use of force and firearms, including non-lethal incapacitating weapons, the ‘development and deployment of non-lethal incapacitating weapons should be carefully evaluated in order to minimize the risk of endangering uninvolved persons and the use of such weapons should be carefully controlled’ (Principle 3).”

72. Venice Commission Guidelines on Peaceful Assembly

73. The relevant parts of paragraphs 182-85 of the third edition of the Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly (CDL‑AD(2019)017rev) – which deal specifically with the use of force to police assemblies – read as follows (footnotes omitted):

“182. ... States should comply with international standards concerning the use of force, including those regulating the use of potentially harmful techniques or tools of assembly management such as batons, tear gas or other chemical agents, water cannons, less lethal projectiles (rubber bullets) as well as horses and dogs. Given the extensive harm that such techniques may cause, water cannons, chemical agents, or less lethal projectiles should only applied following a decision taken at the highest level of command, and by police officers who have received extensive prior training on their proper use in circumstances where their negative effects for the health of the assembly participants can be kept to a minimum ...

...

184. ... All equipment and weapons should be fully functional and thoroughly tested prior to their use in the context of assemblies or protests. Necessary safeguards should be in place to prevent risks for third persons and misuse or abuse in practice.

185. ... The following good practice guidance relating to the specific means by which law enforcement officials may exercise, or seek to regain, control when an assembly becomes disorderly, draws on the developing practices of national policing institutions:

...

– The use of plastic/rubber bullets, baton rounds, attenuated energy projectiles (AEPs), or water cannons and other forceful methods of crowd control must be strictly regulated and recorded (how many rubber bullets/cans of tear gas/etc. discharged);

...

– Any use of force (including with batons, rubber bullets, etc.) should not be directed at peaceful demonstrators or by-standers, but only at persons engaged in violence.

– Police regulations should clearly exclude equipment or weaponry that is so inaccurate as to cause significant and indiscriminate injuries or that may cause disproportionate levels of harm.

...

187. ... The use of force should therefore be regulated by domestic law, which should in turn comply with international human rights law. Domestic law should set out the circumstances that justify the use of force (including the need to provide adequate prior warnings, law enforcement command structures and authorization procedures), as well as the level of force acceptable to deal with various threats. Adequate safeguards should be put in place at the state level to ensure that the use of force during public assemblies remains limited to exceptional cases. These should include ‘(a) implementation of mechanisms to prohibit, in an effective manner, the use of lethal force as recourse in public demonstrations; (b) implementation of an ammunition registration and control system; and (c) implementation of a communications records system to monitor operational orders, those responsible for them, and those carrying them out’.”

3. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

4. In its 2016 Human Rights Handbook on Policing Assemblies, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) stated the following in relation to the use of kinetic impact projectiles (“impact rounds”) in such situations (at pages 80-81):

“There is a wide range of less lethal energy projectiles or impact rounds being used across the world. These include wooden baton rounds, rubber rounds, plastic rounds with collapsible heads, foam rounds, rubber balls and bean bags. The velocity and calibre of these rounds vary greatly, and the scope of this handbook does not include advice on different types and make. There are, however, some considerations for their use in policing assemblies.

Energy projectiles are very high on the use of force continuum and next on the scale to the use of firearms. In light of this, police must understand that energy projectiles are less lethal, but if used incorrectly they can cause death or serious injury. Thus, risk-reducing measures must be observed.

Considerations for the use of impact rounds include:

– Only tested and approved types of projectiles should be used;

– Clear instructions should be established relating to distance of use and targets for aim;

– Officers should be aware of inherent risks and follow the instructions;

– Authority to deploy must be granted by the operational commander and authority to use granted by the tactical commander;

– Impact rounds should only be used where there is an immediate risk of serious injury or death to any person;

– These should only be used by trained personnel who are suitably equipped;

– Shots should only be aimed at individuals who pose an immediate threat of serious injury or loss of life;

– Impact weapons should never to be shot indiscriminately into a crowd;

– Impact rounds should only to be aimed at the lower torso or legs (except to counter an immediate threat of serious injury or loss of life);

– These should not intentionally be bounced off the ground before striking target;

– Use on the ground must be controlled by the operational commander;

– When the desired goal is achieved, their use and deployment must be reviewed by operational and tactical command;

– Adequate dispersal or exit routes must be available to enable people to move away safely;

– Medical care must be available to those who require it;

– Impact rounds should only be used after other methods have been tried and failed or would be unlikely to succeed if they were tried; and

– A warning should be issued before use, when possible.”

4. Organization of American States

5. In paragraph 120 of its 2019 Report on “Protest and Human Rights” (OEA/SER.L/V/II, CIDH/RELE/INF.22/19), the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted that the “production, procurement, and use of so-called ‘less lethal weapons’ [had] increased markedly, largely due to technological advances in this field” and that “there [was] today a huge variety of so-called ‘non-lethal’ or ‘less lethal’ weapons available on the market, which [were] acquired by States and used by police and security personnel”, including “different types of rubber bullets, tear gas, electric shock projectiles, rubber projectiles, hydrant trucks, and plastic bullets, sound and energy devices”. This development “ha[d] not been accompanied by regulations [for the oversight] and monitor[ing of] the production, acquisition, and use of these types of weapons”.

6. Paragraph 121 of the report went on to say that a “bright line [could not] be drawn between lethal and non-lethal weapons”, since “almost any use of force against the human person [could] under certain circumstances lead to loss of life or serious injury”, and that “[e]mpirical evidence show[ed] that in many cases harm to physical integrity ha[d] been caused by the misuse of these types of weapons”, for instance “rubber bullets fired at close range and into the upper part of the body”. Therefore, “consideration [had to] be given not only to the design or features of the weapon, but also to other factors relating to its use and control”.

7. Paragraph 122 of the report noted that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had “warned against the often indiscriminate impact of less lethal weapons in the context of social protests”, for instance, “devices that shoot repeatedly which, on occasion, [were] used to shoot rubber projectiles covered with hard rubber, plastic, or soft rubber”, and cautioned that the “use of such weapons should be considered ill-advised since it [was] impossible to control the direction of their impact”.

8. Paragraph 125 of the report reads as follows (footnotes omitted):

“States must implement specific training protocols and contents for officers aimed at the safe use of each particular weapon. The protocols should strengthen the prevention of inappropriate or abusive uses that could result in the injury or death of persons, and should provide examples of cases in which the use of these weapons is prohibited in certain contexts or against certain people where there are risks to physical integrity. For instance, tear gas should not be used in enclosed spaces or against people who have no way to disperse or evacuate. The use of non-lethal weapons should be preceded by formal warnings, which give people the opportunity to evacuate without causing panic or stampede situations. There should be an obligation to explicitly define who should authorize their use, and guidelines should be drawn up to assign liability for the incorrect use of each type of weapon or device in use.”

2. ON THE PROTECTION OF JOURNALISTS AND MEDIA ACTORS IN THE COURSE OF DEMONSTRATIONS

   1. Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe

3. In point 7 (i) of its Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 on the protection of journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe recommended that member States implement the guidelines appended to the recommendation. The relevant passages of those guidelines read as follows:

“14. Member States should take into account the specific nature and democratic value of the role played by journalists and other media actors in particular contexts, such as in times of crisis, during election periods, at public demonstrations and in conflict zones. In these contexts in particular, it is important for law enforcement authorities to respect the role of journalists and other media actors covering demonstrations and other events. Press or union cards, relevant accreditation and journalistic insignia should be accepted by State authorities as journalistic credentials, and where it is not possible for journalists or other media actors to produce professional documentation, every possible effort should be made by State authorities to ascertain their status. Dialogue between State authorities and journalists’ organisations is moreover encouraged in order to avoid friction or clashes between police and members of the media.

...

22. Unregulated and arbitrary action by State agents is incompatible with effective respect for human rights. This means that, as well as being authorised under national law, policing operations, including the policing of public demonstrations, must be sufficiently regulated by it, within a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force, and even against avoidable accident. This implies a need to take into consideration not only the actions of the law enforcement agents of the State who actually use force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the actions under examination. A legal and administrative framework should define the limited circumstances in which law enforcement officials may use force and firearms, in the light of the international standards which have been developed on this topic. In this respect, a clear chain of command, coupled with clear guidelines and criteria are required; specific human rights training can help to formulate such guidelines and criteria. ...”

23. Resolution 2532 (2024) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

24. In point 10.11 of its Resolution 2532 (2024) on guaranteeing media freedom and the safety of journalists, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called on member States to “implement adequate measures to protect journalists during public demonstrations and other public events, where they are most at risk, including awareness raising and tailored training programmes for police forces”.

25. Venice Commission Guidelines on Peaceful Assembly

26. The relevant parts of paragraphs 191-203 of the Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly cited in paragraph 206 above read as follows (footnotes omitted):

“191. ... Media professionals ... have an important role to play in providing independent coverage of public assemblies ...

...

194. ... [T]he media must be given full access by the authorities to all forms of public assembly and to the policing operations mounted to facilitate them. Media professionals may facilitate the police in the implementation of their tasks by clearly identifying themselves as members of the press. ...

195. ... Today, the production and distribution of news is widely dispersed, as technology has made it possible for a variety of people and organizations to perform journalistic acts and roles. The respect for and protection of journalists should therefore not be limited to those formally recognized as journalists, but should cover ‘community media workers and citizen journalists and others who may be using new media as a means of reaching their audiences.’ ...

...

197. ... During assemblies, law enforcement and other state representatives need to ensure the safety of media professionals to the maximum extent, regardless of whether they represent national or foreign media. This is a precondition for assuring these persons’ freedom of expression. Law enforcement need to protect media professionals from violence or harm emanating from third persons, but are also obliged to exercise restraint and refrain from interfering with the work of journalists and other media representatives. ...

...

201. [I]n the event that a media representative is not wearing special clothing or badges identifying him or her as a journalist, the representative should still be permitted to conduct his/her journalistic work without interference once his/her identity and profession are known to be police. In that case, the respective journalist should likewise receive the protection usually afforded to all other members of the media.

202. ... Journalists are not participants in, but rather observers of, an assembly. In principle, therefore, dispersal orders directed at assembly participants should not oblige journalists to leave the area (unless their individual safety is endangered). Media representatives should not be prevented from observing and recording the policing operation, unless (exceptionally) their continued physical presence will significantly hinder or obstruct law enforcement officers in doing their work. In such cases, media representatives should be given clear instructions, and sufficient time to disperse. Other opportunities should then be provided to them to enable them to continue to adequately cover the assembly. If media representatives refuse to comply with a lawful dispersal order, the police may respond in a proportionate manner.

203. ... In the case of violence against media representatives, as in all other instances of possible unlawful use of force, a thorough and independent investigation must be conducted and, if warranted, criminal charges should be sought – ultimately ‘to take all necessary steps to bring the perpetrators of crimes against journalists and other media actors to justice.’ In addition, states should establish, if they have not already, professional sanctions for police officers who commit violent acts against media actors.”

THE LAW

1. SCOPE OF THE CASE BEFORE THE GRAND CHAMBER

2. The Grand Chamber would begin by clarifying the scope of the present case. It is the Court’s settled case-law that the “case” that is referred under Article 43 of the Convention is the application as it has been declared admissible, together with the complaints which have not been declared inadmissible (see, among other authorities, Denis and Irvine v. Belgium [GC], nos. 62819/17 and 63921/17, § 98, 1 June 2021; Fedotova and Others v. Russia [GC], nos. 40792/10 and 2 others, § 83, 17 January 2023; and Fabbri and Others v. San Marino [GC], nos. 6319/21 and 2 others, § 51, 24 September 2024).

3. The Grand Chamber may thus examine complaints covered by the Chamber’s admissibility decision but not examined by the Chamber on the merits (see, among other authorities, Göç v. Turkey [GC], no. 36590/97, § 46, ECHR 2002‑V; Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, § 129, ECHR 2005-XI; and Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, §§ 224 and 240-82, 22 December 2020). If the complaints are covered by the Chamber’s admissibility decision, the Grand Chamber may examine them even when the Chamber has not specifically dealt with them in its reasoning (see Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, § 180, 28 November 2017).

4. The Grand Chamber may also examine complaints not declared inadmissible by the Chamber and not examined by it at all, which likewise fall within the scope of the case referred to it (see Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC], no. 47287/15, §§ 166-78, 21 November 2019). It may even deal with complaints raised before, but not addressed by, a Chamber (see Fu Quan, s.r.o. v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 24827/14, § 150, 1 June 2023).

5. It follows that all the complaints which the Chamber declared admissible and all those whose admissibility it did not examine fall within the scope of the case before the Grand Chamber: that is to say, the complaints under Article 3 (except those brought by two of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others, no. 20129/21, Mr Grigalashvili and Mr Bochikashvili, which were declared inadmissible by the Chamber), Articles 10 and 11 (except those brought by the applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov, no. 13186/20, and Svanadze, no. 16757/20 – see paragraph 6 (b) above), and Article 13 (see paragraph 7 (b), (e) and (g) above and paragraphs 190-91, 250 and 257 of the Chamber judgment).

6. The applicants’ allegation that the respondent State failed to comply with Article 38 of the Convention (see paragraph 451 below), already examined by the Chamber (see paragraph 7 (f) above and paragraphs 253-55 of the Chamber judgment), also falls within the scope of the case before the Grand Chamber (see, mutatis mutandis, Tahsin Acar v. Turkey [GC], no. 26307/95, § 252, ECHR 2004-III).

7. PRELIMINARY REMARKS: WHETHER IT IS OPEN TO THE COURT TO REFRAIN FROM DECIDING PARTS OF THE CASE

8. As noted in paragraph 7 above, the Chamber declared the complaints of twenty-four applicants under Article 3 of the Convention admissible (and the complaints of the other two applicants under that Article inadmissible) and found a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3. It then refrained from taking a decision regarding the merits of the complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3, and from taking a decision regarding the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention (see paragraphs 238-46 and 250 of the Chamber judgment). In light of this, the Grand Chamber considers it important to address first the question whether it is open to the Court to refrain from taking a decision in relation to those complaints.

9. General principle

10. Under Article 34 of the Convention, applicants have a right of individual application, subject to compliance with the formal and admissibility requirements laid down in the Convention and the Rules of Court, and to the Court having jurisdiction to deal with the matter(s) referred to it. Indeed, in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 122 in fine, ECHR 2005-I), the Court expressly recognised that “individuals now enjoy at the international level a real right of action to assert the rights and freedoms to which they are directly entitled under the Convention”. This is a right addressed also to the Court itself.

11. The corollary of the right of application is the Court’s duty to examine the application. By analogy with the right of access to a court under Article 6 of the Convention, which includes the right to obtain a determination of the dispute by that court (see, among other authorities, Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and Others v. Romania [GC], no. 76943/11, § 86, 29 November 2016; Regner v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 35289/11, § 33, 19 September 2017; and Verein KlimaSeniorinnen Schweiz and Others v. Switzerland [GC], no. 53600/20, § 629, 9 April 2024), the Court’s duty to examine the application is to be understood as comprising the duty to come to a final decision in relation to it.

12. Therefore, unless it applies a Convention provision which enables it to dispose of an application in some other way, the Court cannot refrain from deciding on its admissibility and, to the extent that one or more complaints are admissible, on its merits. The principles of subsidiarity and shared responsibility can have an impact on the Court’s duty in this respect, but cannot, on their own, override it.

13. The Grand Chamber will now analyse whether in the present case there is a valid basis and reason that could allow it to refrain from coming to a final decision on complaints raised under the substantive limb of Article 3 and those under Articles 10 and 11.

14. Non-examination of overlapping or peripheral complaints

15. It is open to the Court not to examine complaints which fully, or to some extent, overlap with complaints which it has already examined because they relate to the same facts, and concern issues which are part of – and are thus absorbed by – the broader issues already examined. Also, when faced with a complaint under two Convention provisions which, on the facts of the case before it, govern the same subject matter but differ in their level of specificity (lex generalis and lex specialis), the Court normally examines the complaint solely under the latter, sometimes construing it in the light of the former.

16. In this case, it is clear that the complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3 do not overlap with those under its procedural limb (see paragraphs 274 and 302 below), either in terms of the underlying facts or in terms of the nature and scope of the obligations concerned: the former concern the use of force to disperse the demonstration and the latter concern the effectiveness of the ensuing investigation, and the substantive and procedural obligations under Article 3, though linked, are distinct.

17. The same may be said regarding the complaints under Articles 10 and 11 (see paragraphs 354 and 404 below). Although they arise out of the same facts as those under the substantive limb of Article 3, they do not overlap with them, there being a difference in the nature of the interests safeguarded by those provisions: Article 3 protects physical and psychological integrity, whereas Articles 10 and 11 protect, respectively, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly and association. Nor can Article 3 be seen as a lex specialis in relation to Articles 10 and 11, or vice versa. Indeed, the Court has already examined concurrently complaints under Articles 3 and 10 in a similar case (see Najafli v. Azerbaijan, no. 2594/07, §§ 30-70, 2 October 2012). It has also examined concurrently complaints under Articles 3 and 11 in many cases relating to the use of force to disperse demonstrations (see, among many other authorities, İzci v. Turkey, no. 42606/05, §§ 43-91, 23 July 2013; Tahirova v. Azerbaijan, no. 47137/07, §§ 31-75, 3 October 2013; Mushegh Saghatelyan v. Armenia, no. 23086/08, §§ 135-56 and 213-55, 20 September 2018; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan v. Russia, nos. 35880/14 and 75926/17, §§ 34-91, 13 October 2020; and Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 15367/14 and 13 others, §§ 281-442 and 482-521, 21 January 2021).

18. It is also open to the Court to confine its examination to the main legal question(s) in an application and find that that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the remaining complaints (see Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014). In this case, however, the complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3 and those under Articles 10 and 11 (see paragraphs 302, 354 and 404 below) are all plainly central to the application.

19. The Court has also decided, exceptionally, to refrain from examining individualised complaints raising issues outside the core issue decided by it (see Turan and Others v. Turkey, nos. 75805/16 and 426 others, § 98, 23 November 2021). However, this case is to be distinguished since the present five applications are not part of a large group of applications whose full examination would risk overwhelming the Court, and the core issues in them are the substantive ones arising under Articles 3, 10 and 11.

20. Partial adjournment or partial striking out of the case

21. In the particular circumstances of this case, and in view of the approach taken by the Chamber, the Grand Chamber finds it appropriate to consider also whether it may limit itself to coming to a decision on some of the complaints, while dispensing with deciding on others on other grounds, in particular by way of a partial adjournment or a partial striking out.

22. Adjournment

23. The Court may adjourn the examination of a case as a whole for various reasons: for instance, to await the outcome of domestic proceedings or of another case pending before the Court itself, or in the context of a pilot-judgment procedure, pending the adoption of the domestic remedial measures required by the pilot judgment (see Rule 61 § 6 (a) of the Rules of Court).

24. The Court may also adjourn part of a case. This sort of adjournment concerns two different types of situations. In the first, the Court deals with the various issues arising in a case – admissibility, merits and just satisfaction – in discrete sequential steps. In the second type of partial-adjournment scenario, the Court, as a first step, deals with the admissibility of some complaints in an application, and then, as a second step, deals with the admissibility of the remaining complaints.

25. Although, thus far, this has not been done in a case originating in an individual application, but only in two inter-State cases (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) (dec.) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, § 9, 16 December 2020, and Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia (dec.) [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 2 others, § 11, 30 November 2022), it is furthermore open to the Court to examine the merits of some complaints as a first step (while adjourning the examination of the merits of the remaining complaints), and then to examine the merits of the remaining complaints as a second step. In this connection, it is of interest to note that the adjourned part of the case remains pending before the Court and is subject to all the safeguards applying to a pending case lodged in the exercise of the right to application – including the Court’s policies on the order of dealing with applications – until the Court disposes of it by way of a final decision or judgment.

26. Such two-step examination of the merits of a case – which prima facie runs counter to procedural economy, and can lead to a duplication of effort, delay, and needless procedural complexity – should, however, be contemplated only if truly required in the interests of the proper administration of justice.

27. In the present case, however, it is not appropriate to adjourn the examination of the complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3 and those under Articles 10 and 11 pending the completion of the domestic criminal investigation, for three reasons. First, the Court has before it all the material that it needs to determine all the substantive issues under Article 3 and those under Articles 10 and 11 in the light of its settled case-law in relation to such issues. Secondly, the substantive issues arising under those provisions are not limited to those capable of being determined in a domestic criminal case. They are broader, and concern not only upon the liability of specific State officials for the treatment to which the applicants were subjected, but also the liability of the respondent State under the Convention – which comprises also the quality of the domestic legal framework. Lastly, the alleged breaches are of a serious nature, both as regards the individual applicants and the overall situation in the respondent State.

28. Striking out

29. The Court may strike an application out of its list under Article 39 § 3 following a friendly settlement between the parties, or under Article 37 § 1 on any of the grounds set out in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c). Under the express terms of Article 37 § 1 and Article 39 § 1, both of those types of striking out are possible “at any stage of the proceedings” (see Pisano v. Italy (striking out) [GC], no. 36732/97, § 28, 24 October 2002). The power to strike out under Article 37 § 1 may be exercised not only with respect to an application as a whole, but also with respect to some of the complaints in it (see De Tommaso v. Italy [GC], no. 43395/09, § 133, 23 February 2017).

30. Noteworthy in the present context is sub-paragraph (c) of Article 37 § 1, which permits a striking out “for any other reason established by the Court”. The Court enjoys a wide discretion in identifying such a reason, the only limitation flowing from its case-law being that this reason must reside in the particular circumstances of the case (see, among other authorities, Association SOS Attentats and de Boëry v. France (dec.) [GC], no. 76642/01, § 37, ECHR 2006-XIV). For instance, that reason may be that proceedings which relate to the subject matter of the application are pending in a national court concurrently with the proceedings before the Court (see Kovačić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], nos. 44574/98 and 2 others, § 267, 3 October 2008). A further example, in circumstances which however bear no resemblance to the present case, is supplied by Burmych and Others v. Ukraine ((striking out) [GC], nos. 46852/13 et al., 12 October 2017).

31. The Grand Chamber would not exclude that, exceptionally, it could be open to the Court to strike out part of an application under Article 37 § 1 (c) so as to enable the appropriate domestic court to deal with that part of the case in the light of the Court’s findings in relation to the remainder. Such a step should only be taken with due care, and only in cases in which this would be clearly compatible with the proper administration of justice, and consistent with respect for human rights. Indeed, any decision to strike an application, or part of it, out of the Court’s list of cases is subject to the proviso, under Article 37 § 1 in fine, that it cannot be taken “if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto ... requires [the continued examination of the application]” (see also Article 39 § 1 in fine, which lays down the same requirement with respect to friendly settlements). Any such partial striking out would also have to be circumscribed by appropriate safeguards, such as the extent to which the authorities of the respondent State can be expected to cooperate with such an exercise, and the likelihood of attaining concrete and practical results.

32. In the present case, it is plain that the complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3 and those under Articles 10 and 11 cannot be struck out under the approach taken in Burmych and Others (cited above). Nor is it appropriate to strike them out under the exceptional scenario described in the previous paragraph, for three reasons. First, the alleged substantive breach of Article 3 and those of Articles 10 and 11 have already materialised (rather than being potential only, as would be the case with a removal or extradition from a Contracting State). Secondly, the alleged breaches are, as already noted, of a serious nature, both as regards the individual applicants and the overall situation in the respondent State. Lastly, the prospects of any enhanced dialogue with the authorities of the respondent State, and of attaining concrete and practical results, appear slim.

33. Conclusion

34. It follows from the above that the course adopted by the Chamber in refraining from examining the merits of the complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3 and the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Articles 10 and 11 is not open to the Grand Chamber. It is therefore required to examine them.

35. THE GOVERNMENT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION

36. The Government reiterated the two-pronged objection that they had already raised before the Chamber, submitting (a) that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies, referring to the available compensatory remedies, and (b) that the applicants’ complaints were premature, in view of the still ongoing criminal investigation.

37. The Chamber judgment

38. The Chamber dismissed the first limb of the objection, reasoning that when acts constituting serious offences were directed against an individual’s physical or psychological integrity, only efficient criminal-law mechanisms could ensure adequate protection. It pointed out that the criminal investigation had covered all the incidents which had occurred during the contested events, thus encompassing those relating to the applicants. Although they had not lodged formal criminal complaints, they had all been questioned during that investigation, which meant that the authorities had been made aware of the possibility that they had been ill-treated. The applicants had also shown their interest in the investigation by applying for victim status in it. In view of the foregoing, and since the complaints under Article 3 of the Convention related to the allegedly excessive use of force by the police during the dispersal of the demonstration and those under Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention were based on the same facts, the Chamber concluded that the applicants had not been required to use any other remedy.

39. The Chamber joined the second limb of the objection to the merits of the complaints under the procedural limb of Article 3. It accepted that when the applications had been lodged with the Court, it might have been too early to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the criminal investigation. However, referring to the Court’s consistent practice, the Chamber stated that it could take account of facts which had occurred after the lodging of the applications and relating directly to the facts of the case. It was therefore not prevented from examining the effectiveness of the investigation with reference to subsequent developments in it.

40. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

    1. The Government

41. The Government again submitted, with reference to the first limb of their objection, that some of the applicants could still file claims for damages under Article 1005 of Georgia’s Civil Code and Articles 207 to 208 of its General Administrative Code (see paragraphs 198-200 above) in relation to their complaints of ill-treatment and of a breach of their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Ten of them had already done so, and the proceedings in their cases were still under way (see paragraphs 147-156 above). That was an effective compensation mechanism which needed to be exhausted.

42. With reference to the second limb of their objection, the Government observed that the criminal investigation concerned not just the alleged use of excessive force by the police during the demonstration, but also the legal basis and proportionality of the measures taken by the police, including the means and methods used. It covered hundreds of incidents which had taken place during the demonstration and thousands of participants in it. Hundreds of investigative steps had been taken, and the investigation was still “in its active phase”. In June 2024 it had been assigned to the SIS (see paragraph 141 above).

43. The Government also argued that the applicants had not exhausted domestic remedies with respect to their complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, since (a) the criminal investigation had not been opened as a result of complaints by them but on the authorities’ own initiative, and (b) the applicants had applied to the Court when that investigation had been pending for only 22 months, during which time the authorities had taken a number of investigative steps relating to their allegations. The complaints were thus premature.

44. The applicants

45. The applicants submitted that it was well established that complaints of police ill-treatment could only be remedied through an effective criminal investigation, and that, in any event, those among them who had brought civil proceedings against the MIA were still awaiting a final, enforceable decision. In their view, that demonstrated the remedy’s ineffectiveness.

46. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

    1. Possibility for the applicants to seek compensation

(a) General principles

248. The general principles governing the requirement under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention for applicants to exhaust domestic remedies were set out in detail in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69-77, 25 March 2014). They were reiterated more recently in Duarte Agostinho and Others v. Portugal and 32 Others ((dec.) [GC], no. 39371/20, § 215, 9 April 2024) and Mansouri v. Italy ((dec.) [GC], no. 63386/16, § 84, 29 April 2025).

249. One of those principles is that to comply with the exhaustion requirement, the applicants are only required to use remedies which are sufficient, that is, capable of redressing the alleged violation or violations (see, specifically on that point, Stögmüller v. Austria, 10 November 1969, p. 42, § 11 in fine, Series A no. 9; De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium, 18 June 1971, § 60, Series A no. 12; and Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, § 19 (b), Series A no. 32).

250. The question whether the redress that a remedy can provide is adequate – and whether that remedy is thus sufficient and therefore effective – depends on the nature of the right under the Convention or its Protocols alleged to have been breached, as well as on the nature of the alleged breach (see Zlatanov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 53050/21, §§ 176-78, 30 January 2024, with further references).

(b) The complaints under Article 3

251. It is settled case-law that where an applicant has an arguable claim that deliberate use of force by State agents has resulted in ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 of the Convention, the notion of an effective remedy entails, inter alia, an investigation capable of leading to the identification and, if appropriate, punishment of those responsible (see, among other authorities, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 79, ECHR 1999-V; Egmez v. Cyprus, no. 30873/96, § 65, ECHR 2000-XII; and Đurđević v. Croatia, no. 52442/09, § 62, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). Civil or administrative remedies aimed solely at awarding compensation cannot in themselves suffice (see, among other authorities, Jeronovičs v. Latvia [GC], no. 44898/10, § 76, 5 July 2016; Lopes de Sousa Fernandes v. Portugal [GC], no. 56080/13, § 135, 19 December 2017; and Shmorgunov and Others, cited above, § 296). The rationale is that if the State’s response to ill-treatment by its agents were confined to the payment of compensation, without any effort to identify and punish those responsible, the absolute prohibition against inhuman and degrading treatment could be rendered illusory, and that it could become possible for State agents to torture or ill-treat with impunity.

252. In the present case, the Georgian prosecuting authorities opened a criminal investigation into the events of 20-21 June 2019 the following day, on 22 June 2019 (see paragraph 107 above). All 26 applicants gave evidence in the context of that investigation (see paragraph 109 above). They also applied for the procedural status of victim in it, which has so far been granted to 19 of them (see paragraphs 110-111 above).

253. The possibility to also file claims for compensation against the MIA, of which ten of the applicants also made use (see paragraphs 147-157 above), cannot therefore be held against them for the purpose of assessing whether they have exhausted domestic remedies in respect of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. Any compensation which they manage to obtain at domestic level can only have a bearing on their claims for just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention (see Sylla v. the Netherlands, no. 14683/03, § 56, 6 July 2006, and Saçılık and Others v. Turkey, nos. 43044/05 and 45001/05, § 69, 5 July 2011). The Court will revert to this point below.

254. It follows that the first limb of the Government’s objection, based on the availability of compensatory remedies, must be dismissed, in so far as it concerns the complaints under Article 3 of the Convention.

255. It also follows that the two applicants whose compensation claims against the MIA have, according to the information available to the Court, already been determined with final effect by the Georgian courts – Mr Kurdovanidze and Mr Sulashvili (see paragraphs 153-154 and 156 above) – can nonetheless still claim to be victims of a violation of Article 3 (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, §§ 116-19, ECHR 2010; Saçılık and Others, cited above, § 69; and Cestaro v. Italy, no. 6884/11, §§ 230-31, 7 April 2015). Compensation alone, without an effective investigation, does not suffice to deprive them of victim status in respect of that alleged breach (see Kaya and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 9342/16, §§ 41-46, 20 March 2018, and contrast K.P. v. Poland, no. 52641/16, §§ 107-12, 26 October 2023).

(c) The complaints under Articles 10 and 11

256. The Court will next consider the Government’s non-exhaustion objection with respect to:

(a) the complaints under Article 10 of the Convention that through the use of excessive force, the police unduly interfered with the journalistic activities of the applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Svanadze (no. 16757/20), Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) and Berikashvili (no. 39382/21); and

(b) the complaints under Article 11 of the Convention by the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) – with the exception of Mr Didberashvili, who was a bystander rather than a demonstrator (see paragraph 80 above) – and Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) that the police used excessive force to disperse the demonstration.

(i) Relevant practice

257. The Court has had occasion to hold, in cases in which the applicants complained both of ill-treatment under Article 3 and of a violation of their rights under Article 11 that, concerning the latter complaint, a remedy aimed solely at awarding compensation, rather than at identifying and if necessary punishing State agents who have used excessive force to disperse a demonstration, was not sufficient (see, for example, Saya and Others v. Turkey, no. 4327/02, § 35, 7 October 2008, and Biçici v. Turkey, no. 30357/05, §§ 22-23, 27 May 2010). Once an applicant has attempted a criminal remedy with respect to the allegedly excessive use of force by the authorities to bring a demonstration to an end, he or she is not required to also pursue a compensatory remedy in respect of complaints in relation to that same use of force under Articles 10 and 11 (see Brega v. Moldova, no. 52100/08, § 31, 20 April 2010).

258. The Court has also held that if applicants complaining under Articles 10 and 11 of a failure by the police to protect them from violent attacks by counter-demonstrators had attempted a criminal-law remedy, there was no need for them to also resort to a claim for compensation against the authorities (see Identoba and Others v. Georgia, no. 73235/12, §§ 85-87, 12 May 2015). Similarly, the criminal complaint brought by the applicants in Verzilov and Others v. Russia (no. 25276/15, 29 August 2023) concerning the violence used against them by Cossacks was found to be an appropriate remedy not only in relation to the applicants’ claim of ill-treatment under Article 3, but also in relation to their closely linked complaint under Article 10 of a violation of their freedom of expression. The Court observed that both complaints stemmed from exactly the same factual circumstances (ibid., § 100).

259. The Court’s and the former Commission’s case-law in relation to complaints under Article 10 about murders, attempted murders and threats of violence against journalists and civil-society activists contains similar considerations (see Kılıç v. Turkey, no. 22492/93, Commission decision of 9 January 1995, unreported; Yaşa v. Turkey, no. 22495/93, Commission decision of 3 April 1995, unreported; Tepe v. Turkey, no. 27244/95, Commission decision of 25 November 1996, unreported; and Gaši and Others v. Serbia, no. 24738/19, § 75, 6 September 2022).

(ii) Analysis in the present case

260. The Grand Chamber sees no reason to depart from the above practice. It is true that the nature of the rights under Articles 10 and 11 is not the same as that of the right under Article 3. This, however, is not a decisive consideration.

261. The overarching principle in the Court’s case-law in relation to the exhaustion of domestic remedies is that the question whether a remedy is effective must be answered with reference to the applicant’s complaint, the scope of the Convention obligations alleged to have been breached, the available remedies in the respondent State, and the specific circumstances (see Lopes de Sousa Fernandes, cited above, § 134).

262. The case-law further demonstrates that it is the nature of the alleged breach rather than the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed which is normally the leading consideration in the assessment of what sort of remedy would be sufficient for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 (see, among many other examples, Dumpe v. Latvia (dec.), no. 71506/13, § 75, 16 October 2018 (compensatory remedy sufficient in relation to a complaint under Article 2 of the Convention about inadequate medical care in a social-care institution allegedly resulting in death); Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, no. 16538/17, § 165, 20 March 2018 (compensatory remedy insufficient in relation to a complaint under Article 10 of the Convention about the ongoing detention of a journalist on account of articles that he had written); and Gherghina v. Romania (dec.) [GC], no. 42219/07, § 91, 9 July 2015 (compensatory remedy insufficient in relation to a complaint by a disabled student under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 about the inaccessibility of university buildings)).

263. In the present case, the facts alleged to have infringed Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention are the same as those alleged to have constituted a breach of Article 3 under its substantive limb – the excessive use of force by the police to disperse the demonstration, chiefly the indiscriminate firing of kinetic impact projectiles. The key issue under Articles 10 and 11 is therefore not simply the restriction of the relevant rights, but the claim that the means used to do so allegedly involved ill-treatment. The alleged breaches of those two Articles cannot therefore be put right solely with the provision of compensation, essentially for the same reason as that pertaining to the complaint under Article 3: that if the State’s response to interferences with the rights to freedom of expression and assembly of that sort were confined to the payment of compensation, without efforts to identify and punish those responsible, it could become possible for State agents to interfere with those rights by way of ill-treatment with impunity.

264. It should be emphasised in this connection that the applicants’ allegations concern not just isolated incidents of excessive use of force by individual police officers, but the indiscriminate, and possibly intentional, firing of kinetic impact projectiles by the police on a massive scale – including against peaceful demonstrators and journalists covering the demonstration. For the purpose of determining whether the applicants have exhausted domestic remedies, their allegations in that respect must be presumed, as a working hypothesis, to be well-founded (see Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 6 November 1980, § 27, Series A no. 40, and Zlatanov, cited above, § 181). The provision of compensation, without sufficient accountability measures to ensure that such practices do not become recurring, cannot be seen as sufficient redress – especially considering that the excessive use of force by the police to suppress a demonstration and the resulting injuries to demonstrators and journalists could have a considerable chilling effect on the future exercise of the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. In the circumstances, such accountability could hardly be ensured solely by means of individual claims for compensation against the MIA by the demonstrators and journalists who were injured in the course of the events.

265. Furthermore, it should be noted that the exhaustion rule must be applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism (see, among many other authorities, Cardot v. France, 19 March 1991, § 34, Series A no. 200; Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, § 69, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV; and Vučković and Others, cited above, § 76), and in comparable cases the former Commission dealt with non-exhaustion objections of this sort as a whole rather than on a complaint-by-complaint basis (see Kılıç; Yaşa; and Tepe, all cited above). More recently, in İzci (cited above), the Court, having dismissed a non-exhaustion objection based on the possibility of claiming compensation from the authorities in relation to a complaint under Article 3 about the use of force against demonstrators, declared the complaint under Article 11 about the same use of force admissible purely on the basis that it was “linked to the one examined above” (ibid., §§ 47 and 79). Since in the present case the complaints under Article 3 and those under Articles 10 and 11 arise out of the same facts, the Court considers that it would be unduly formalistic, and indeed artificial, to distinguish between them for exhaustion purposes.

266. In the Court’s view, this is not a case in which distinct domestic legal avenues ought to have been pursued separately in relation to the various Convention issues arising from the conduct of the police at the demonstration. On the contrary, both the criminal investigation and the separate civil proceedings brought by some of the applicants encompassed the issues arising under both Article 3 and Articles 10 and 11 (see paragraphs 107-108 and 149 above). There is therefore no reason to distinguish between those complaints for exhaustion purposes.

267. It follows that, in so far as it concerns the complaints under Articles 10 and 11, the first limb of the Government’s objection must also be dismissed.

268. It also follows from the above that the two applicants whose compensation claims against the MIA have, according to the information available to the Court, already been determined with final effect by the Georgian courts – Mr Kurdovanidze and Mr Sulashvili (see paragraphs 153-154 and 156 above) – can nonetheless still claim to be victims of a violation of Article 11 as well.

269. According to the Court’s settled case-law, an applicant can be deprived of his or her status as a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention when the national authorities have (a) acknowledged the alleged violation of the Convention, expressly or in substance, and (b) then afforded appropriate and sufficient redress for it (see, among many other authorities, Eckle v. Germany, 15 July 1982, § 66, Series A no. 51; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no. 36813/97, § 181, ECHR 2006-V; and Gäfgen, cited above, §§ 115-16). In the present case, the first of those conditions (acknowledgment of violation) is not in doubt in relation to Mr Kurdovanidze and Mr Sulashvili; in its judgments delivered pursuant to the compensation claims brought by them, the Tbilisi City Court examined their grievances under Articles 3 and 11 of the Convention, and found that there had been a breach of their rights under these provisions. The Tbilisi Court of Appeal upheld that court’s reasoning, as did the Supreme Court of Georgia (see paragraphs 149, 153 and 156 above). However, the second condition (appropriate and sufficient redress) is not – and indeed could not be – fully satisfied by the decisions given by the courts in those proceedings. The only form of redress that could be obtained through the proceedings brought was an award of compensation. According to the Court’s case-law, the redress which is appropriate and sufficient to remedy a breach of a Convention right at national level depends on all the circumstances of the case, having regard, in particular, to the nature of the alleged breach (see, among other authorities, Gäfgen, cited above, § 116; Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 260, ECHR 2012 (extracts); and Vazagashvili and Shanava v. Georgia, no. 50375/07, § 74, 18 July 2019). Although the granting of appropriate compensation is an important part of the redress that should be available in circumstances such as those under examination, it is not sufficient in itself. As stated above on the related question of the exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraphs 263-264 above), the alleged breach of Article 11 cannot be put right solely in that manner. If the State’s response to interferences with the right to freedom of assembly of the sort at issue here were confined to the payment of compensation, without efforts to identify and punish those responsible, it could become possible for State agents to interfere with that right by way of ill-treatment with impunity, which could in turn have a considerable chilling effect on its future exercise.

270. Ongoing nature of the investigation

271. As regards, first, the Government’s argument that the applicants had not formally sought the opening of a criminal investigation (see paragraph 246 (a) above), it suffices to note that the PGO opened the investigation on its own initiative just one day after the dispersal of the demonstration (see paragraph 107 above). The applicants were therefore not required to then make explicit requests to that effect, as this would not have led to a different result (see, among other authorities, Ekinci v. Turkey (dec.), no. 27602/95, 8 June 1999; Agdas v. Turkey (dec.), no. 34592/97, 19 June 2001; and Yildirim and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 56154/00, 1 December 2005). All of them subsequently gave evidence to that investigation and sought to be granted victim status (see paragraphs 109-111 above), thereby showing their active interest in it.

272. As to the question whether the ongoing criminal investigation into the steps taken by the authorities to disperse the demonstration is an effective remedy with respect to the applicants’ complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention and under Articles 10 and 11, it turns on whether that investigation was effective – in particular in terms of scope, speed, pursuit of obvious lines of inquiry and thoroughness. That, however, is a question which goes to the merits of the complaints under the procedural limb of Article 3 (see, among other authorities, Nafiye Çetin and Others v. Turkey, no. 19180/03, § 33, 7 April 2009; Buzilo v. Moldova, no. 52643/07, § 24, 21 February 2012; and Vasil Hristov v. Bulgaria, no. 81260/12, §§ 33‑34, 16 June 2015).

273. This is a matter which must be examined in the light of all the developments, up to the present day, in that investigation (see Enzile Özdemir v. Turkey, no. 54169/00, § 36, 8 January 2008; Y v. Bulgaria, no. 41990/18, § 68, 20 February 2020; Shmorgunov and Others, cited above, § 302; and Gribben v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28864/18, § 121, 25 January 2022).

274. This second limb of the objection must therefore be joined to the merits of the complaints under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention.

275. PROCEDURAL LIMB OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

276. The applicants in all five applications complained that no effective investigation had been carried out in respect of the force used by the authorities to disperse the demonstration on 20-21 June 2019. The applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) and Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) relied on Article 3 of the Convention, and the applicant in Svanadze (no. 16757/20) relied on Article 10 of the Convention.

277. The Chamber found, based in particular on the content of Mr Svanadze’s submissions in relation to this complaint, that he had in substance complained under Article 3 as well.

278. The Grand Chamber sees no reason to analyse the matter differently. Article 3 reads:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

1. The Chamber judgment

2. Having declared the complaints under Article 3 admissible – except those raised by two applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Ms Grigalashvili and Mr Bochikashvili, whose complaints it rejected as manifestly ill-founded owing to the absence of medical evidence of injury – the Chamber addressed separately two aspects of the investigation, one relating to the use by the police of kinetic impact projectiles and the other relating to physical ill-treatment by the police.

3. With regard to the first aspect, concerning kinetic impact projectiles, the Chamber noted that the investigation had been launched promptly, had at first proceeded swiftly, and was sufficiently broad. It also noted that the PDO had been given full access to the case material, which in the Chamber’s view had counterbalanced the impossibility for the applicants to access that material, and that most of the applicants had been granted victim status.

4. However, the investigation had at that time been ongoing for more than four and a half years without coming to any conclusions, which was to be taken into consideration in the context of the question whether it had been sufficiently thorough – a point to be assessed based on three elements: the complexity of the investigation; the extraordinary challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic; and the applicants’ complaints having been, at the time they were lodged, “somewhat premature”.

5. With that in mind, the Chamber considered that the investigating authorities (a) had made insufficient attempts to determine why it had not been possible to consider and take proper precautions to avoid a forceful police intervention or minimise its intensity and impact, and had given insufficient consideration to the question of superior responsibility; (b) had not analysed the events in a systematic way; (c) had not charged or treated anyone as a suspect apart from the three officers later granted amnesty, or tried to narrow down the circle of potential suspects (a step simplified by the fact that only some officers had been authorised to use projectiles and that all such use had been recorded, but complicated by the absence of insignia enabling the shooting officers to be identified); (d) had not carried out reconstructions of the circumstances in which each of the applicants had been injured; and (e) had not obtained evidence on the forensic characteristics of the wounds sustained by them. The Chamber found that there was no proper justification for the absence of progress in relation to such obvious lines of inquiry. The key evidence had been obtained already in 2019, and the authorities should have drawn appropriate conclusions from it. Any setbacks owing to the measures taken to contain the COVID-19 pandemic had been removed by March 2022 at the latest, and any problems faced by the State forensic institution could not account for the entirety of the delay in producing forensic reports. In any event, even when such reports had been received promptly, no further progress had been made.

6. In sum, the reasons cited by the Government could not justify the investigation’s failure to pursue key lines of inquiry for more than four and a half years. That was sufficient to conclude that it was ineffective, and it was therefore unnecessary to determine whether the 2021 Amnesty Act had, in and of itself, undermined it.

7. The Chamber accordingly dismissed the second limb of the Government’s preliminary objection (which it had joined to the merits) and found a breach of the procedural limb of Article 3 in respect of that part of the investigation.

8. With regard to the second aspect, relating to physical ill-treatment by the police, the Chamber noted that the investigation had reached no conclusions in respect of the allegations (by four applicants). Since those allegations did not concern the use of projectiles, many of the justifications cited by the Government for the delay were irrelevant. The thoroughness of that aspect of the investigation had been insufficient too. Despite an initial period of intense activity, the authorities had not put in enough effort to find out what had happened and identify possible suspects.

9. The Chamber accordingly found a breach of the procedural limb of Article 3 in respect of that part of the investigation as well.

10. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

    1. The applicants

11. The applicants submitted that although the investigation had been opened promptly, and had a wide ambit, it was ineffective. The serious delay in the investigation, taken together with the cumulative effect of other procedural failures, suggested the lack of any real intention to hold anyone accountable. The investigation’s failures were not mere missteps which could be rectified – they had hampered its capacity to establish the facts and those responsible.

12. Most of the investigative steps with regard to injuries caused by kinetic impact projectiles had been taken in 2019, and no conclusions had been reached in that respect in the years since then. No further suspects had been identified since August 2019, and those initially identified had been granted amnesty. Neither the investigation’s complexity nor any setbacks owing to the measures prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic could explain that delay. In particular, the delay in obtaining forensic medical reports – which had been crucial both for granting the applicants victim status and for establishing the exact nature and cause of their injuries – could not be justified.

13. The applicants also criticised: (a) the limited scope of the investigation, which had, in their view, precluded a systematic analysis of the events; (b) the failure to obtain expert evidence about the characteristics of the projectile injuries that they had sustained; (c) the way in which the offences under investigation had been characterised so far; (d) the absence of reconstructions of the circumstances in which each applicant had been injured; (e) the absence of reports by individual officers to their superiors about the injuries caused by kinetic impact projectiles; (f) the failure to obtain evidence about how exactly orders had been relayed to individual officers and about the identity of officers who had carried out arrests; (g) the failure to investigate why some officers had been subjected to disciplinary sanctions despite the apparent link to the offences under investigation; (h) the failure to look into superior responsibility, in particular that of the former head of the Special Assignments Department; (i) the impossibility of identifying officers on account of, in particular, the absence of insignia on their uniforms; (j) the applicants’ insufficient involvement in the procedure, that is, the delays and hurdles in granting them victim status, and the lack of access to the complete investigation file that had not been counterbalanced by the possibility for the PDO to have full access to that file and publish reports; and (k) the MIA’s involvement in the procedure even though its own officers were under investigation.

14. With regard to the investigation of physical ill-treatment by police officers, the applicants essentially agreed with the Chamber’s findings, and added that the video material produced in relation to one of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Mr Diasamidze, had been sufficient to identify the officers involved.

15. The applicants also took issue with the investigating authorities’ failure to take a number of steps that they had specifically sought, such as conducting fresh interviews with the Minister of Internal Affairs and his deputies, obtaining all documentation and MIA radio logs in relation to the dispersal, interviewing MIA officials about the orders they gave during the demonstration, and fully reviewing all CCTV footage. The applicants also pointed to a number of suggestions in the PDO’s interim report which had gone unfulfilled.

16. The applicants went on to argue that although the investigation was still technically open, the substantive steps that would be expected of an ongoing investigation had not been taken.

17. Lastly, the applicants submitted that the 2021 Amnesty Act had fatally undermined the investigation’s effectiveness. The possibility for the authorities to re-characterise the offences under investigation so as to place them beyond the scope of that Act was theoretical and illusory. The fact that this had not happened so far, despite requests by them and the state of the evidence, pointed to a lack of intention to do so. There was, in Georgia, a systemic failure or unwillingness to characterise offences involving State officials as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment – they were instead routinely downgraded to the offence of misuse of authority. That was also demonstrated by the cases of the three officers who had benefited from the amnesty. There was therefore a real risk that this would also happen in relation to the offences committed against the applicants.

18. The Government

19. The Government submitted that the investigation, which was still ongoing, was effective. It encompassed not only the alleged use of excessive force by the police, but also the legal basis and proportionality of the steps taken by them, in general and with regard to each individual applicant. The authorities were actively pursuing all leads to determine the circumstances in which the applicants had sustained their injuries. However, the case was complex. The defects that had been identified by the Chamber would be duly taken into account and corrected.

20. The Government pointed out that the investigation had been opened just one day after the events, and that the authorities had swiftly obtained a vast amount of material and had taken a significant number of adequate investigative steps. The amount of material obtained had required tremendous efforts and resources. The prompt analysis of that material had led to decisions to grant victim status to 19 of the applicants; that process was still under way with respect to the remaining seven. As to the three officers who had been granted amnesty, the Government considered that this had no bearing on the effectiveness of the investigation as regards the applicants, since none of those officers had caused injury to any of them.

21. The 2021 Amnesty Act had not fatally undermined the investigation. It did not cover the offences of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (the circumstances in which it had been passed showed that it had a different purpose), and the reclassification of charges in an ongoing investigation when required by the circumstances and the evidence was standard practice. The SIS had even developed and was using guidelines on when certain acts were to be characterised as torture or degrading or inhuman treatment or as misuse of authority. However, the applicants had not yet put forward evidence or coherent arguments which could require such reclassification. Moreover, the application of the Act presupposed the identification of the persons who had committed offences covered by the amnesty which it had instituted – since it could only be disapplied if an accused person declared that they did not wish to benefit from that amnesty. This meant that at the stage when a possible application of the Act would become relevant, all requisite investigative steps would already have been successfully taken.

22. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

23. The Grand Chamber sees no reason to assess the effectiveness of the investigation differently from the Chamber. All of the shortcomings identified by the Chamber with regard both to the investigation of the use of kinetic impact projectiles and to the physical ill-treatment (see paragraphs 280-281 and 283 above) appear to persist.

24. The Grand Chamber would reiterate in this connection that, to be effective for the purposes of Article 3, an investigation into a large-scale use of force by the police in circumstances such as those in issue in the present case needs to (a) involve a systematic analysis of the events, (b) encompass an evaluation of the legal basis, planning and execution of the police operation, and (c) determine whether any responsibility on the part of those in charge of that operation’s planning and control has been engaged (see paragraphs 214 and 220-21 of the Chamber judgment). None of this has happened so far.

25. The only noteworthy development since the Chamber judgment is the reassignment of the investigation to the SIS in June 2024 (see paragraphs 141-143 above). It does not appear that the SIS has made any tangible progress with it so far (see paragraphs 141-142 above), even though, at the time of the latest information from the parties in February 2025, eight months had passed since it had taken charge of the case. Although the investigation has been ongoing for more than five and a half years, it has so far neither resulted in a comprehensive assessment of all the relevant circumstances (compare Lutsenko and Verbytskyy v. Ukraine, nos. 12482/14 and 39800/14, § 44, 21 January 2021), nor led to findings about the circumstances pertaining to the applicants’ alleged ill-treatment or the identities of the State agents who used – or ordered the use of – allegedly excessive force against them (compare Shmorgunov and Others, cited above, § 357). Nor has it resulted in any relevant charges (compare Selmouni, cited above, § 78). It cannot therefore be regarded as effective.

26. The Grand Chamber also agrees with the Chamber (see paragraph 281 in fine above) that there is no need to make a definitive pronouncement on the extent to which the 2021 Amnesty Act (see paragraph 197 above) has affected the investigation.

27. As is made plain by the facts of Melia v. Georgia (no. 13668/21, §§ 61-63 and 67-68, 7 September 2023), that Act was not passed specifically in order to do away with the criminal liability of police officers for ill-treatment during the events on 20-21 June 2019; it was prompted by European Union mediation efforts between the ruling party and the opposition in Georgia.

28. More importantly, the question whether that Act would preclude the prosecution of State officials for the alleged ill-treatment in issue in the present case will depend on how any potential criminal charges against them are legally characterised – as misuse of authority in breach of Article 333 of the Criminal Code and unlawful interference with journalistic activities in breach of Article 154 of that Code, which are covered by the amnesty granted by the Act, or as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in breach of Articles 1441 and 1443 of the Code, which, by virtue of section 2 of the Act, fall outside the ambit of that amnesty (see paragraphs 176 and 197 above). The parties put forward competing arguments as to the likelihood of either scenario materialising (see paragraphs 291 and 294 above), but the fact remains that so far no relevant charges have been brought and so the issue is for now necessarily a matter of conjecture. As matters presently stand, however, the ongoing investigation relates to offences that come within the scope of the Act. Yet the Court has noted the Government’s comment that the reclassification of charges during an investigation in the light of the circumstances and the evidence is standard practice in Georgia. The Court will not enter into speculation about future developments. It would emphasise, however, that according to its case-law the granting of an amnesty to State agents in respect of acts involving torture or ill-treatment goes against the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention and should not be tolerated (see Marguš v. Croatia [GC], no. 4455/10, § 126, ECHR 2014 (extracts); Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09 and 2 others, § 326, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and Cestaro, cited above, § 208; see also, mutatis mutandis, Enukidze and Girgvliani v. Georgia, no. 25091/07, § 274, 26 April 2011). It further draws attention to the indications given under Article 46 regarding the fulfilment by the respondent State of its investigative obligation (see paragraphs 464-465 below).

29. In the light of the foregoing, the Grand Chamber concludes that there has been a breach of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention in relation to all 24 applicants whose complaints under that provision were declared admissible (see paragraphs 7 (b) and 277 above). It follows that the second limb of the Government’s preliminary objection, which was joined to the merits of the present complaint (see paragraph 273 above), must be dismissed.

30. SUBSTANTIVE LIMB OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION

31. The applicants in all five applications complained that they had been injured as a result of the excessive use of force by the police during the dispersal of the demonstration on 20-21 June 2019. As with the complaints in respect of the investigation (see paragraph 274 above), the applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) and Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) relied on Article 3 of the Convention, and the applicant in Svanadze (no. 16757/20) relied on Article 10 of the Convention.

32. The Chamber found, with regard to these complaints also, that the latter applicant had in substance likewise complained under Article 3.

33. The Grand Chamber sees no reason to analyse the matter differently. The text of Article 3 was set out in paragraph 276 above.

34. The Chamber judgment

35. The Chamber noted that the demonstration had started as a peaceful protest, but that the situation had escalated when some of the demonstrators had attempted to break through the police cordon to force their way into the Parliament building, and that the authorities had ultimately dispersed the demonstration by force. With regard to the injuries caused by kinetic impact projectiles, the Government did not dispute that the relevant applicants had been injured in that way, nor that all of them, with the exception of one of the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21), Mr Chikviladze, had behaved peacefully throughout the demonstration. Nor was it disputed, with regard to the allegations of physical ill-treatment by one of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Mr Diasamidze, and three of the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21), Mr Pochkhidze, Mr Khvadagiani and Mr Sharvashidze, that it was possible that they had sustained the relevant injuries during the dispersal of the demonstration.

36. However, the unusual turn of events and the chaos – including the attacks on law-enforcement officers, which had taken place after several hundred demonstrators had violently attempted to break through the police cordon and storm the Parliament building – could not be downplayed. That had indisputably posed a danger to public order, which the Court had no doubt the authorities could resort to force to restore. In view of the sheer scale of the disorder and the level of violence by some demonstrators, individual officers had to have been justified, in principle and in the heat of the moment, in resorting to the use of kinetic impact projectiles to contain the violent demonstrators and avert an honestly perceived danger to their own lives or those of others. The question before the Court was whether the applicants’ injuries had been an unintended consequence of a lawful and proportionate use of force against the backdrop of the chaotic events, or of an unjustified use of force. For that purpose, more facts had to be elucidated at the domestic level. Irrespective of how the use of kinetic impact projectiles was regulated under Georgian law, the assessment of the necessity and proportionality of the use of force in those circumstances was linked to the broader context of the events and went beyond the material available to the Court – which had to be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this was not rendered unavoidable. In that respect it was also important that the criminal investigation was still ongoing. The conclusion that it had been ineffective was based on the authorities’ lack of diligence in pursuing key lines of inquiry, even though they had already obtained the bulk of the evidence in a way which had not tainted its reliability. In those circumstances, the capacity of the investigating authorities to assess the facts and draw appropriate conclusions had not been irretrievably undermined.

37. It was therefore first for the national authorities rather than the Court to evaluate that evidence, and, in line with the spirit of shared responsibility between them to ensure respect for Convention rights, to come to appropriate conclusions on the issues raised by the case. It would thus be inappropriate and at odds with the Court’s subsidiary role to rely on the facts of the case to determine the extent of the State’s responsibility; such an exercise would duplicate the ongoing proceedings before the national authorities, which were better placed and equipped to accomplish that task. That finding was without prejudice to the potential liability of the State even in the absence of individual responsibility being established at the domestic level.

38. On that basis, the Chamber refrained from taking a decision in respect of the merits of the applicants’ complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3.

39. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

    1. The applicants

40. The applicants submitted that their injuries and the manner in which they had incurred them had been corroborated beyond reasonable doubt by substantial evidence – including medical reports, witness statements, photo and video material and, where available, forensic medical reports – and by the decisions to grant most of them victim status in the criminal investigation and the civil-court judgments awarding some of them damages in respect of those injuries. All of those injuries – ranging from minor to life-changing and severe – had been caused by kinetic impact projectiles or ill-treatment by police officers, and had attained the level of severity required to reach the threshold established under Article 3.

41. The applicants went on to argue that the use of force by the police which had caused those injuries was in breach of Article 3 on three broad grounds: (a) defects in the regulatory framework which governed it, in particular the use of “special means”; (b) the inadequate planning and control of the dispersal operation; and (c) the excessive and unnecessary actions of the authorities during that operation.

42. The safeguards laid down by Georgian law in relation to the use of “special means” – in particular kinetic impact projectiles – could be circumvented under vaguely defined conditions. That was the case with the requirements to notify superiors about injuries caused by such use, to give warnings before it, and not to use such means without the consent of a supervisor, against vulnerable people, or within 20 metres of anyone. All of the permitted exceptions had been relied upon in the case at hand, and the relevant assertions of the officials concerned had been accepted at face value, rather than subjected to proper scrutiny. Moreover, the regulations on the use of kinetic impact projectiles and other “special means” had not been specific enough to ensure that they would be deployed adequately and safely, in specific situations and in a sufficiently safe manner, and only against specific people. Although at the relevant time Georgian law had banned the simultaneous use of water cannons, kinetic impact projectiles and tear gas in relation to an assembly, that prohibition had been ambiguous and had apparently been construed by the authorities as solely barring such simultaneous use against specific groups of people within a demonstration. Furthermore, not all of those regulations had been properly accessible, and they had not laid down a requirement that equipment used for crowd control and the uniforms of officers using it be marked in such a way as to enable them to be identified.

43. The MIA’s plan in relation to the demonstration could not be reviewed accurately, given the degree to which the copy produced in the proceedings before the Court had been redacted. However, its unredacted parts suggested that it had been woefully inadequate. It contained no instructions on when protestors were to be warned before the use of force and the method for doing so, and did not set out safe routes for them to leave the scene, or the circumstances in which each “special means” could be used against them. Nor did it describe non-violent tactics, including de-escalation techniques, to be deployed before the use of force, or contain instructions to use minimum force commensurate with specific threats, for the safe use of “special means”, to minimise harm to non-violent protestors and vulnerable people, or to protect media representatives. Nor did it set out a proper chain of command. All those lacunae had led to a real risk of improper use of force during the dispersal operation, since in the absence of precise instructions on those issues, they had had to be resolved in the heat of the moment.

44. As a result of the vacuum of authority during the police operation, kinetic impact projectiles had been fired in an uncontrolled manner. Despite express instructions not to use them, senior MIA officials had failed to ensure that frontline officers complied. That had been due to a breakdown of communications within the police, and a failure to pass on those instructions to the relevant officers – resulting in a chaotic situation in which they had fired such projectiles indiscriminately and on a mass scale, including against peaceful protestors and journalists. Nor had the authorities given proper warning in that regard, despite having had ample time to do so. All of that also suggested that the police had not been adequately trained or instructed on how to use those projectiles, and had felt that the law gave them flexibility in that respect.

45. The use of “special means” had not been indispensable: it had not been necessary to resort to them to disperse the whole demonstration on account of the violent actions of a small part of it, and kinetic impact projectiles had been used not only against violent protestors but also against peaceful ones such as the applicants – in particular those among them who were journalists and had been clearly identifiable as such. The use of “special means” had moreover been excessive: kinetic impact projectiles had been fired alongside the use of tear gas and a water cannon, on a significant scale and indiscriminately, from elevated positions and close range, and at vital organs. In addition, tear gas had been used in an indiscriminate manner.

46. For their part, three of the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21), Mr Pochkhidze, Mr Khvadagiani and Mr Sharvashidze, had been attacked by police officers without warning, physically and verbally abused, and handcuffed despite the absence of any conduct warranting such treatment. The extent of their injuries indicated that the use of force had clearly been excessive. The same went for one of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Mr Diasamidze, who had likewise been physically and verbally abused while peacefully carrying out journalistic activities and despite being clearly identifiable as a journalist.

47. The Government

48. The Government submitted that since the criminal investigation was still “pending in its active phase”, and since crucial facts still needed to be elucidated in the course of it, it was still impossible and premature to rule on the complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3. They went on to say that Georgian law comprehensively regulated the use of “special means” (a term which covered kinetic impact projectiles) by the police during demonstrations. In particular, by law the police had to give warning before using such means, except in exigent circumstances, and only officers who had undergone special training could use them. That rule had been duly followed in the present case. Furthermore, the authorities had, as required by law, drawn up a plan on how to safeguard and restore public order in the course of the demonstration. That plan had envisaged the use of “special means” if necessary for that purpose. At this stage, it was evident that the decision to resort to kinetic impact projectiles had been made in view of the violent nature of the demonstration, and that the police operation as a whole had been planned and carried out adequately – including as regards warning the demonstrators before the use of “special means” and giving them a reasonable time to heed that warning. The Government pointed to two factors which were, in their view, of particular significance in that regard: that some of the demonstrators had tried to break into the Parliament building, and that the demonstration had, more generally, turned violent, and not in a merely isolated way. However, since the criminal investigation, which encompassed all aspects of the dispersal of the demonstration – in particular, the use of kinetic impact projectiles – was still ongoing, it was premature to assess the necessity of the use of force, in particular such projectiles, in each individual case.

49. The first third-party intervener (nine members of INCLO)

50. The submissions of the first third-party intervener – nine members of INCLO (see paragraph 10 above) – were based on a report which INCLO and another non-governmental organisation, Physicians for Human Rights, published in 2023 (“Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights”).

51. The intervener described the characteristics of kinetic impact projectiles, and noted that so far, no organisation, study or report had clearly and objectively defined what made a weapon lethal, less lethal, non-lethal, or safe.

52. They went on to describe the possible health impacts of those projectiles, pointing out, with reference to findings in systematic reviews of the relevant medical literature, that they could cause various sorts of injuries, including severe ones, through blunt or penetrating trauma – in particular ocular injuries and disability resulting from multi-projectile rounds.

53. They also described the international standards and guidelines on the use of less-lethal weapons and specifically kinetic impact projectiles: those published by the United Nations Human Rights Committee and High Commissioner for Human Rights, and those published by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (see paragraphs 201-202 and 208-211 above).

54. The intervener then outlined its views on the measures and regulations that States had to put in place before, during and after the deployment of less-lethal weapons – including kinetic impact projectiles – so as to minimise the risks created by their use. Accordingly:

(a) their use during mass protests had to be made an absolute last resort, when dealing with genuine and imminent threats to safety;

(b) they were to be used only against protestors engaging in violence or inciting others to do so, without infringing the rights of peaceful protestors;

(c) their use had to be based on the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination, and accountability, and had to be tested against the genuine threat faced and legitimate aim pursued; and

(d) injuries or deaths related to their use had to be investigated, so as to ensure accountability and better training of law-enforcement officials about their lethal and harmful effects.

322. The intervener also stated that it was incorrectly assumed that less‑lethal weapons could not cause death (and were thus, in particular, erroneously subject to less regulation and oversight), that their capacity to achieve safe crowd dispersal was limited, and that they were “misused as weapons for political repression rather than for legitimate crowd control purposes”.

323. The intervener also set out its views as to the duties incumbent on States in relation to (a) the design of, and trade in, such weapons, (b) their testing and legal review, (c) the regulations and procedures for their use, and the training of law-enforcement officials on their human rights-compliant use (in particular about the health risks of using specific weapons for crowd control), and (d) the principles governing their deployment.

324. On that latter point, the intervener argued, in particular, that:

(a) the planning of the use of less-lethal weapons should have clearly designated command roles, with authorisation coming from a senior officer present on the scene, able to assess the conditions in which the weapons would be used, and responsible for the manner and scope of their deployment;

(b) the authorities should avoid using such weapons against people who were particularly vulnerable to the harmful consequences of the use of force in general and to the effects of specific weapons (including children, pregnant or older people, and people with physical or mental impairments); and

(c) such weapons should not be used without a prior clear verbal warning and an adequate opportunity for protestors to comply with lawful orders to disperse or find safe shelter.

325. According to the intervener, kinetic impact projectiles, specifically, should never be fired indiscriminately into groups, should not be used solely for crowd dispersal, and should never be fired at close range or in a way targeting the head or other vital body areas. The use of multiple-projectile rounds and projectiles having a metal component had to be prohibited in relation to mass protests.

326. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

     1. General principles

(a) Use of force to disperse demonstrations or rallies

326. Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see, among many other authorities, Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, § 88, Series A no. 161; Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, § 79, Reports 1996-V; and Mocanu and Others, cited above, § 315).

327. The relevant principles of the Court’s case-law under Article 3 in relation to the use of force to disperse demonstrations may be summarised as follows:

(a) The use of force by the authorities to quell unrest in the course of a demonstration, or to carry out arrests in that connection, does not necessarily amount to treatment in breach of Article 3. However, where the use of such force results in treatment which attains a level sufficient to bring it within the ambit of that Article, it will be compatible with the absolute prohibition laid down therein only if it is indispensable and not excessive – or, in other words, only if the force is strictly necessary and proportionate to the aim for which it was used (see, among other authorities, Süleyman Çelebi and Others v. Turkey, nos. 37273/10 and 17 others, § 75 in fine, 24 May 2016; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan, cited above, § 70; Shmorgunov and Others, cited above, § 359; and Geylani and Others v. Türkiye, no. 10443/12, § 70 in fine, 12 September 2023).

(b) The key question in that assessment is not whether the use of force was necessary and proportionate in the situation in general, but whether that was so in relation to the individual applicant (see Muradova v. Azerbaijan, no. 22684/05, § 133, 2 April 2009; Özalp Ulusoy v. Turkey, no. 9049/06, § 44 in fine, 4 June 2013; Boris Kostadinov v. Bulgaria, no. 61701/11, § 53, 21 January 2016; and Kılıcı v. Turkey, no. 32738/11, § 37, 27 November 2018). That assessment must be guided by, in particular:

(i) the nature, characteristics and degree of the force used (see, for instance, Özalp Ulusoy, cited above, § 44 in fine);

(ii) the seriousness of any injuries resulting from it (see, for instance, Serkan Yılmaz and Others v. Turkey, no. 25499/04, § 23 in fine, 13 October 2009, and Rizvanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 31805/06, § 49, 17 April 2012); and

(iii) the exact circumstances in which those injuries were caused – in particular, whether the use of force against the applicant was rendered strictly necessary by his or her own conduct (see, for instance, Muradova, § 133 in fine; İzci, § 61; Tahirova, § 43; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan, § 71; Shmorgunov and Others, § 371; and Geylani and Others, § 88, all cited above).

(c) Another question which has a bearing on that assessment – especially with respect to large-scale policing operations in response to demonstrations – is whether steps have been taken to regulate and organise the operation in issue in such a way as to minimise to the greatest extent possible the risk of serious bodily harm to demonstrators, journalists covering the events, and bystanders (see Muradova, § 113 in fine; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan, § 50; and Geylani and Others, § 86 in fine, all cited above).

(d) A further relevant consideration is that unless the authorities have to react without prior preparation, they ought to display a degree of patience and tolerance before trying to disperse a crowd which does not present a danger to public order and is not engaging in violence (see Biçici, cited above, § 35; Pekaslan and Others v. Turkey, nos. 4572/06 and 5684/06, § 64, 20 March 2012; İbrahim Ergün v. Turkey, no. 238/06, § 50, 24 July 2012; and Zakharov and Varzhabetyan, cited above, § 64).

(e) Such policing operations – especially when they involve the use of less-lethal weapons, such as water cannons, tear gas, tear-gas grenades and kinetic impact projectiles – must be sufficiently delimited by domestic law, under a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrary action, misuse of force and avoidable accidents (see Abdullah Yaşa and Others v. Turkey, no. 44827/08, § 43 in fine, 16 July 2013; Kılıcı, cited above, § 33; Geylani and Others, cited above, § 84; Ali Güneş v. Turkey, no. 9829/07, §§ 40-41, 10 April 2012; and İzci, cited above, § 66).

(b) Proof in relation to such matters

328. The general principles in relation to matters of proof before the Court are well established. They have been set out in detail in, for instance, Merabishvili (cited above, §§ 310-15, with further references), and, specifically with reference to allegations of ill-treatment in the course of a demonstration, in Shmorgunov and Others (cited above, §§ 360-62). The principles of relevance to the present case can be summarised as follows:

(a) As a general rule, the burden of proof is not borne by one or other party because the Court examines all material before it irrespective of its origin, and because it can, if necessary, obtain material of its own motion. The Court has, however, relied on the concept of the burden of proof in certain particular contexts, and has recognised that a strict application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio – that the burden of proof in relation to an allegation lies on the party which makes it – is not possible, notably in instances when this is justified by specific evidentiary difficulties faced by the applicants.

(b) The standard of proof before the Court is proof “beyond reasonable doubt”, which is not, however, co-extensive with that of the national legal systems which employ it. Such proof can follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or similar unrebutted presumptions of fact. The level of persuasion required to reach a given conclusion is intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made, and the Convention right at stake.

(c) The Court is free to assess not only the admissibility and relevance but also the probative value of each item of evidence before it. When assessing evidence it is not bound by formulae and adopts the conclusions supported by the free evaluation of all evidence – including such inferences as may flow from the facts and the parties’ submissions. In this respect, the Court is also sensitive to any potential evidentiary difficulties encountered by a party.

329. In this case, it should simply be emphasised that under the Court’s case-law it is for the respondent Government to show that injuries sustained during a policing operation carried out in response to a demonstration, and attributable to the authorities, have resulted from a strictly necessary and proportionate use of force for a legitimate law-enforcement purpose (see, among other authorities, Balçık and Others v. Turkey, no. 25/02, §§ 30-31, 29 November 2007; Boris Kostadinov, cited above, § 53 in fine; Mushegh Saghatelyan, cited above, § 145; Shmorgunov and Others, cited above, § 361; and Geylani and Others, cited above, § 86 in fine).

330. That is fully in line with the Court’s general approach to the distribution of the burden of proof: that it is intrinsically linked to the specificity of the facts, the nature of the allegation made, and the Convention right at stake (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, ECHR 2005-VII; Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [GC], no. 23458/02, § 181, ECHR 2011 (extracts); and El-Masri v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [GC], no. 39630/09, § 151, ECHR 2012). It is in the nature of things that in relation to such matters – and especially when it comes to large-scale policing operations – the respondent State has far superior, or even exclusive, access to information and evidence capable of shedding light on why certain policing steps were taken and why the relevant law-enforcement authorities opted for a certain degree of force and for running the policing operation in the way that they did (see Elvan v. Türkiye, no. 64937/19, § 100, 7 February 2023).

331. Application in the present case

(a) Injuries caused by kinetic impact projectiles (20 applicants)

(i) Source and nature of the injuries

331. It is not in dispute that the demonstration on 20-21 June 2019 started as a peaceful civil and political protest. However, the situation escalated when some of the demonstrators attempted to break through the police cordon to force their way into the Parliament building, and the police eventually dispersed the demonstration by use of force. In that context, the Government did not contest that the injuries suffered by 20 of the applicants had been caused by kinetic impact projectiles fired by the police, and this appears to be fully confirmed by the available evidence. In the Grand Chamber’s view, all of the injuries suffered by the applicants, and not only the most serious, were sufficient to reach the threshold of Article 3 – on account also of the general risk to life and health posed by the improper use of such weapons.

(ii) Duty to account for the use of force resulting in the injuries

332. In those circumstances, under the Court’s well-established case-law, as summarised in paragraphs 327 (a) and (b) and 329 above, it was for the Government to show that the use of force which had caused the injuries had been strictly necessary and proportionate – not in general, but specifically with regard to each of the applicants in question.

333. However, the Government did not assert that any of them had been violent or had posed a threat to the police or members of the public. Nor is there any evidence of such conduct, except possibly in relation to one of the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21), Mr Chikviladze (see paragraph 92 above). In fact, in their submissions to the Grand Chamber the Government did not address the individual situation of each of those applicants – a fact that they justified by reference to the ongoing nature of the criminal investigation – but argued, in a general way, that it had been necessary for the police to fire kinetic impact projectiles on account of the violent nature of the demonstration, and that the dispersal operation as a whole had been adequate (see paragraph 316 above). In their earlier written submissions to the Chamber, the Government appeared to suggest that in isolated instances, individual officers had been compelled to fire the projectiles as a necessary and proportionate step in response to the violent escalation of the situation (see paragraphs 200-01 of the Chamber judgment).

334. Such broad-brush explanations do not suffice to permit a conclusion that the use of force which caused the injuries suffered by each of those 20 applicants, including Mr Chikviladze, was strictly necessary and proportionate, as required by the Court’s case-law.

335. It is true that the initially peaceful demonstration escalated into a violent confrontation between one part of the demonstrators and the police. It can also be accepted, as did the Chamber (see paragraph 240 of its judgment), that, in view of the scale of the disorder and the violent conduct of some of the demonstrators, individual officers might have been justified, in the heat of the moment, in firing kinetic impact projectiles to contain violent demonstrators and avert an honestly perceived danger to their own lives or those of others. There is, however, simply no evidence, or even assertions on the part of the Government, with detailed reference to the individual circumstances of each of those 20 applicants, that their injuries were the inevitable consequence of their own conduct or the use of such projectiles to contain violent demonstrators. Indeed, in the proceedings brought by some of the applicants against the MIA, the domestic courts held that the police were permitted to use force only against individuals who posed a threat, and that the force used against peaceful demonstrators such as the applicants in question had been unnecessary and disproportionate (see, for the judgments of the Tbilisi City Court, paragraph 149 above, for the judgments of the Tbilisi Court of Appeal, paragraph 153 (a) above and, for the decisions of the Supreme Court, paragraph 156 above).

336. It has therefore not been shown that the use of the kinetic impact projectiles which injured the applicants in issue was strictly necessary and proportionate.

(iii) Regulation of use by the police of kinetic impact projectiles in the course of demonstrations

337. There is, however, a further dimension of the matter which remains to be examined. As noted in paragraph 327 (e) above, according to the Court’s case-law, policing operations involving the use of less-lethal weapons must be sufficiently delimited by domestic law, under a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrary action, misuse of force and avoidable accidents.

(α) Relevant case-law of the Court

338. The Court has had the opportunity to examine, under Article 3 or Article 2 of the Convention, depending on the circumstances, the use of various types of less-lethal weapons in policing demonstrations and mass disorder:

(a) pepper spray (see Ali Güneş, cited above, §§ 37-43);

(b) tear-gas grenades (see Abdullah Yaşa and Others, cited above, §§ 38‑50);

(c) tear gas (see İzci, cited above, §§ 62-66);

(d) kinetic impact projectiles (see Kılıcı, cited above, §§ 32-35);

(e) water cannons (see Geylani and Others, cited above, §§ 84-86);

(f) paint bullets (see İşik v. Türkiye, no. 42202/20, §§ 51-62, 8 October 2024); and

(g) blast-effect grenades (see Fraisse and Others v. France, nos. 47626/21 and 22525/21, §§ 125-26, 27 February 2025).

339. In all of those cases the Court examined – alongside other matters and with reference to the specific characteristics of each of the weapons and their capacity to cause physical injury – whether domestic law adequately circumscribed their use. The following principles have emerged:

(a) The domestic legal framework must lay down clear and sufficiently detailed guidelines – tailored to the characteristics of the specific weapon at issue and the specific health risks associated with its use – about the circumstances in which such weapons may be used and the manner in which they may be used, consistently with international standards. In particular, the guidelines must provide that those weapons be used in a safe manner, and proscribe them being used in a way which could result in death or injury.

(b) The domestic legal framework must also contain adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrary action, misuse, and avoidable accidents in the use of such weapons.

340. The issue in many of the above-cited cases was that the domestic legal framework was too general and did not reflect the characteristics of the specific less-lethal weapon in issue and the health risks associated with its use (see Abdullah Yaşa and Others, § 49; İzci, § 65; Kılıcı, §§ 34-35; and Geylani and Others, §§ 85-86, all cited above). In particular, general provisions laying down broad proportionality requirements – as opposed to more specific guidelines – have been considered insufficient (see Fraisse and Others, cited above, § 126).

(β) Considerations arising from the technical characteristics of kinetic impact projectiles and their potential effects on human health

341. The technical characteristics of kinetic impact projectiles and the health risks that they pose – as set out in, for instance, the United Nations Human Rights Guidance on the Use of Less Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement (see paragraph 202 above) – demonstrate that their use can easily turn into a disproportionate use of force, especially in situations in which they are fired on a large scale. As noted by the ODIHR, they are very high on the use-of-force continuum, and, if used incorrectly, can cause death or serious injury (see paragraph 207 above). The Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has also noted that they can become lethal if used in a certain manner (see paragraph 205 above), which prompted the Assembly to call on member States to regulate their use “more strictly in order to include more adequate and effective safeguards to minimise the risk of death and injury resulting from their use and abuse and from avoidable accidents” (see paragraph 204 above).

342. In the light of all this, and the principles which have emerged from the Court’s case-law in this area (see paragraphs 338-340 above), the Grand Chamber reiterates that States must have in place rules and precautions ensuring that if kinetic impact projectiles are deployed by the police during a demonstration, their use is appropriately circumscribed. In 2016 and 2020 respectively, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the ODIHR of the OSCE made a number of recommendations in that connection (see paragraphs 201-202 and 207 above). The Venice Commission has also done so (see paragraph 206 above). One of the third-party interveners in the present case – the nine members of INCLO – also made detailed submissions on this point (see paragraphs 321-325 above). Informed by these standards, which largely coincide with the Court’s case-law, in the Grand Chamber’s view, domestic law must, at a minimum, lay down the following requirements:

(a) that kinetic impact projectiles be used only as a last resort, in response to genuine and imminent threats to life or limb (compare Abdullah Yaşa and Others, § 38; Kılıcı, § 32; and Geylani and Others, § 86, all cited above);

(b) that they be deployed only in a targeted manner, rather than as a means of general crowd control, and in such a way (having due regard to the technical characteristics of the model used) as to minimise the risk to the targeted person’s life and health (compare Abdullah Yaşa and Others, §§ 47 in fine and 48; Geylani and Others, § 87; and İşik, §§ 57 and 79, all cited above);

(c) that multiple projectiles (on account of their inherent imprecision) and projectiles containing metal (on account of their increased capacity to cause serious injury) not be used (compare Abdullah Yaşa and Others, § 48; Geylani and Others, § 87; and İşik, §§ 57 and 79, all cited above);

(d) that their use must follow an appropriate warning, unless such warning is clearly unfeasible (compare Alkhatib and Others v. Greece, no. 3566/16, § 127, 16 January 2024);

(e) that kinetic impact projectiles be deployed only by law-enforcement officers who have been properly instructed and trained, not only about the projectiles’ technical characteristics, but also about the risks that they may pose to life and health (compare Abdullah Yaşa and Others, § 49, and İşik, § 57, both cited above);

(f) that the deployment of kinetic impact projectiles be subjected, in so far as possible, to a strict chain of command and control (compare Kılıcı, § 35; Geylani and Others, § 86; and İşik, § 58, all cited above).

(γ) Assessment of the Georgian legal framework and its application in the present case in the light of those considerations

343. Considered in the light of the above requirements, the Court would make the following observations on the legal framework in Georgia at the relevant time, as it has been presented in the current proceedings:

(a) It notes that section 33(3)(c) of the Police Act 2013 permitted the use of kinetic impact projectiles, along with other “special means”, to repel attacks not only against police officers and other people, but in other situations too, including to repel attacks against a “protected facility”, and to “suppress a massive breach of legal order by a group” (see paragraph 180 above). It does not therefore appear that the use of kinetic impact projectiles was strictly limited to being a means of last resort to protect against genuine and imminent threats to life and limb.

(b) Section 31(1) of the Police Act 2013, section 4(4) of Order no. 1002, and section 4 of Order no. 1006 subjected the use of non-lethal weapons to strict proportionality requirements (see paragraphs 180, 184 and 194 above). Section 9(1)(c) of Order no. 1002 (see paragraph 189 above) laid down specific restrictions on the use of projectiles (minimum distance of 20 metres; no targeting of the most vulnerable parts of the body) while allowing exceptions where necessary to avoid damage to life and health or “another serious outcome”, the latter clause not being further defined.

(c) No provision appears to ban the use of multiple-projectile rounds.

(d) Section 4(2) of Order no. 1006 did require a warning before the use of “special means” (see paragraph 194 above), while also permitting an exception to be made to this requirement (“except in circumstances where a delay may result in damage to the life and health of a citizen and/or [an officer], another serious outcome, or if, in a given situation, it is impossible to issue a warning”).

(e) By section 31(2) of the Police Act 2013 and section 9(2) of Order no. 1002, police officers could use “special means” only if they had undergone “special training”. However, neither of those provisions specified whether that training also had to cover the risks that the “special means” in question could pose to life and health (see paragraphs 180 and 191 above), and no other provision or guideline appears to do so.

(f) With respect to the chain of command and control, the Court notes that section 8(1)(d) of Order no. 1002 specified that the use of “non-lethal weapons” required the existence of an order by a superior, even in exigent circumstances (see paragraph 188 above). It also notes, however, that section 31(4) of the 2013 Act and section 4(4) of Order no. 1006 appear to have given individual police officers a measure of discretion in choosing the kind of “non-lethal weapon” that they could use in a given situation (see paragraphs 180 and 195 above).

344. It is true that in proceedings originating in an individual application under Article 34 of the Convention, the Court’s task is not to review domestic law in the abstract but to determine whether the way in which it was applied to or affected the applicant gave rise to a breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Golder v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1975, § 39 in fine, Series A no. 18; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 116, ECHR 2012; and Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, § 136, ECHR 2015 (extracts)). In the present case, it appears to the Court that all of the issues with the legal framework that it has identified above had a bearing on the manner in which the demonstration was dispersed (compare Makaratzis v. Greece [GC], no. 50385/99, § 63, ECHR 2004-XI). Specifically:

(a) The police appear to have used kinetic impact projectiles as a general crowd-control weapon rather than a targeted one (see paragraph 130 in fine above). It is striking that about 800 such projectiles were fired over a period of about three to four hours, in the course of a demonstration comprising about 12,000 people and policed by about 5,000 officers (see paragraphs 15, 162 and 169 above).

(b) The officers often fired those projectiles in such a way that they hit people in the head and the upper body. Injuries to those areas were suffered by 17 applicants (see paragraphs 49-50, 70, 73, 75-78, 94-95, 97, 99, 101-104 and 106 above), and many other people reportedly also suffered such injuries (see paragraph 175 above).

(c) Many multiple-projectile rounds were reportedly fired (see paragraphs 116 and 170 in fine above).

(d) There is no indication that officers gave warning before firing kinetic impact projectiles – on the contrary, the Minister of Internal Affairs later stated in the course of the investigation that it had not been necessary in the circumstances to warn the demonstrators that they were about to be used (see paragraph 123 above).

(e) The above factors give rise to legitimate questions about the training provided on the correct use of less-lethal weapons, an issue that was raised at an early stage in the inquiry by the PGO (see paragraph 118 (c) above). It has not been shown in the present proceedings that the officers who fired kinetic impact projectiles had been specifically trained on the risks that they could pose to life and limb (see paragraphs 123 and 126 above).

(f) Frontline officers appear to have acted, overall, independently and on their own initiative with regard to the use of kinetic impact projectiles (see paragraph 126 above). This suggests uncertainty about whether their use was subject to a strict chain of command.

(iv) Conclusion

345. It follows that there has been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention with respect to each of the 20 applicants who were injured by kinetic impact projectiles.

(b) Alleged physical ill-treatment (four applicants)

(i) Source and nature of the injuries

346. One of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Mr Diasamidze, was injured when the police removed him from the courtyard of the Parliament building by force (see paragraph 66 above). The following day it was established that he had sustained bruises on his forearms, right shoulder and between the shoulder blades. The subsequent official forensic report noted that those injuries could have been inflicted by a blunt object, potentially on the date indicated by him (see paragraph 79 above).

347. For his part, one of the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21), Mr Pochkhidze, was injured while being arrested (see paragraph 85 above). A medical certificate issued the following day recorded superficial trauma to his chest wall (see paragraph 96 above).

348. Another applicant in the same application, Mr Khvadagiani, was likewise apparently injured when being arrested (see paragraph 87 above). Two days later he was admitted to hospital with pain in the right eye, redness and swelling, and the following day medical imaging revealed traumatic injury to his facial bones (see paragraph 98 above).

349. Another applicant in the same application, Mr Sharvashidze, alleged that the police had ill-treated him, and a medical certificate issued the following day recorded that he had a closed trauma to the chest, superficial trauma to the scalp and a contusion on an eyelid and in the eye area (see paragraphs 89 and 100 above).

350. The Government did not contest that those injuries had resulted – as plausibly alleged by the applicants – from force used by the police. Nor did they give any alternative explanation for the causes of those injuries, all of which were sufficiently serious to reach the threshold of Article 3 of the Convention.

(ii) Duty to account for the use of force resulting in the injuries

351. In these circumstances, under the Court’s well-established case-law, as summarised in paragraphs 327 (a) and (b) and 329 above, it was for the Government to show that the use of force which had caused those injuries had been strictly necessary and proportionate. However, they made no arguments to that effect – indeed, they did not specifically address the situation of any of those applicants.

352. Nor is there any evidence of conduct on the part of those applicants that would justify any use of force by the police against them. On the contrary, according to the applicants, all four of them had been the victims of unprovoked assaults by the police – in the case of Mr Pochkhidze, it had happened when he was already leaving the demonstration – who had subjected them to serious forms of ill-treatment (see paragraphs 66-67, 85, 87 and 89 above). It is true that Mr Pochkhidze, Mr Khvadagiani and Mr Sharvashidze were later charged with disorderly conduct and disobeying police orders, but that does not demonstrate that they had engaged in violence. Mr Pochkhidze and Mr Sharvashidze were acquitted, and Mr Khvadagiani was convicted on account of swearing and disobeying a police order to leave the area, not of any violent acts (see paragraph 82 above).

(iii) Conclusion

353. There has therefore been a breach of Article 3 of the Convention with respect to these four applicants as well.

354. COMPLAINTS UNDER ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION

355. The applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Svanadze (no. 16757/20), Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) (with the exception of one of the applicants in that application, Mr Diasamidze) and Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) complained that the police had deliberately targeted them during the dispersal of the demonstration on account of their being journalists, or, alternatively, that the use of excessive force by the police had interfered with their journalistic activities, in breach of Article 10 of the Convention.

356. One of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), Mr Diasamidze, complained that the police had removed him from the internal courtyard of the Parliament building and had ill-treated him while doing so.

357. The relevant parts of Article 10 read as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

3. The Chamber judgment

4. The Chamber noted that the criminal investigation was ongoing and could still come to a successful conclusion, and that it had refrained for that reason from taking a decision on the complaints under the substantive limb of Article 3. Noting that that investigation also covered issues relating to the complaints under Article 10, the Chamber concluded that it should refrain from examining the admissibility and merits of those complaints as well (see paragraph 250 of its judgment).

5. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

   1. The applicants

6. The applicants submitted that the complaints under Article 10 were a key part of their case, and that it was essential for the Court to examine them in addition to those under Article 3. In their view, the Chamber’s refraining from ruling on their admissibility and merits could not be justified. They pointed out that their injuries had been sustained while covering a demonstration on a matter of considerable public interest, and that the force used by the authorities had been aimed at, or had had the effect of, deterring them from carrying out their watchdog role, and had had a broader chilling effect on the willingness of journalists to cover demonstrations. In the context of increasing civil repression in Georgia, the Court had an important role to play through considering that country’s compliance with its obligations under Article 10.

7. The applicants went on to submit that they came within the protection afforded by Article 10, since during the events of 20-21 June 2019 they had been on duty as journalists, photographers or camera operators working for various media entities. They had been identifiable or had identified themselves to the authorities as such. Some had carried microphones with the logos of relevant media or a professional video-camera, others had been wearing T-shirts with the inscription “Press”, and others badges identifying them as journalists. One had been fired upon despite protesting that he was a journalist. Although some had not been carrying journalistic identification or logos, they had been covering the demonstration with professional cameras, smartphones or tablets, and had been among other identifiable media representatives. Since the media increasingly relied on amateur reporters who gathered material using semi-professional equipment or even smartphones, all media personnel covering a demonstration were to be treated with the same degree of respect by the police, and the presence or absence of formal accreditation could not determine whether they should be protected under Article 10.

8. The applicants further pointed out that they had suffered the effects of tear gas and been fired upon by State agents while peacefully carrying out their journalistic duties. That had interfered with their ability to continue their journalistic activities. The injuries that they had sustained, plus the legitimate fear of further injuries – arising from the continued indiscriminate use of “special means” by the police – had prevented them from reporting on the event safely and freely. They had either had to leave the protest immediately or shortly after being injured to obtain medical treatment, or had had to move away from the epicentre of the protest to avoid further potentially serious injury. Although some of them had remained at the protest or had been able to continue broadcasting, that did not mean that there had been no interference with their rights under Article 10. Even if the treatment to which some of them had been subjected did not reach the Article 3 threshold, it still amounted to interference under Article 10, since any injury, however minor, resulting from projectiles fired by the authorities, or even simply being fired upon itself, hindered the ability to continue reporting.

9. The applicants also submitted that there was evidence that the Special Assignments Department had in effect intended to interfere with their journalistic activities. They pointed to the large number of journalists injured during the event, and the evidence from journalists that they had been fired upon even after identifying themselves as such. The material gathered in the investigation showed that harming journalists had been a common practice of the Special Assignments Department. In any event, that was not decisive for whether there had been an interference. If unnecessary and excessive force had been used, it was irrelevant whether there had been an intention to interfere with journalistic activities.

10. The interference had not been justified under the second paragraph of Article 10. It had not been “prescribed by law”, since the use of force causing the applicants’ injuries had been in breach of Georgian law – in particular the provisions laying down the safeguards benefiting journalists in general and in the course of demonstrations. Nor had the interference pursued a legitimate aim, since the applicants had been peacefully conducting journalistic activities, and had not engaged in violence or posed a threat to anyone. The use of force against them could not be justified by the violence in which a small section of the demonstration had engaged. In any event, the way in which force had been used to disperse the protest more broadly belied any purported legitimate aim of safeguarding public safety or preventing disorder, given that many journalists had been targeted and injured.

11. Lastly, the interference had not been “necessary in a democratic society”. The authorities had needlessly dispersed the whole demonstration with kinetic impact projectiles and tear gas, and had failed to distinguish journalists from the minority of violent protestors. The large number of injured journalists suggested either that they had been directly targeted or that no attempt had been made to distinguish them from protestors. Specifically, the use of kinetic impact projectiles had been unnecessary and disproportionate, for the same reasons as those underpinning the breach of Article 3 of the Convention.

12. As regards specifically one of the applicants in Bagashvili and Others (no. 20129/21, Mr Diasamidze), his removal from the Parliament courtyard by unnecessary force and the brief seizing of his journalistic equipment (and the intentional damage to it, in an attempt to prevent him from reporting), despite his telling the police that he was a journalist and his wearing a badge that identified him as such, had likewise amounted to interference with his right to freedom of expression. That interference had not been justified either, since he had been acting lawfully and peacefully, and had not resisted the police.

13. The Government

14. The Government pointed out, first, that, unlike the other applicants, the applicant in Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) had been a participant in the demonstration. His complaint therefore fell to be examined under Article 11 rather than Article 10. In the alternative, they submitted that his rights under the latter Article had not been breached.

15. As concerned the applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Svanadze (no. 16757/20) and Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), there had been no interference with their right to freedom of expression. None of the police measures had been directed specifically against them or their journalistic activities, and the available evidence showed that the police had not prevented them from reporting. On the contrary, special areas had been created for them to ensure their safety during the use of “special means” to disperse the demonstration. There was evidence that one of them had been inadvertently hit by a ricochet, and that another had been helped by the police after his mobile telephone had been damaged by a projectile. Some applicants had managed to record and upload video material despite the violent turn of events.

16. The same went for the applicant in Berikashvili (no. 39382/21). He had himself confirmed that the police had not prevented him from carrying out his functions as a civil activist/reporter, and making and uploading video material. It had to be noted also that he had not been wearing any badge or insignia distinguishing him from the crowd; the mere fact that he had been recording a video could not require the police to treat him as a journalist.

17. In the alternative, the Government submitted that any interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been justified. They noted that various enactments in Georgia provided for restrictions on the rights to public assembly and freedom of expression. In view of the violent turn the demonstration had taken, the police had resorted to measures – including the use of tear gas and kinetic impact projectiles – to bring it to an end. Those measures had sought to restore public order, safety and security, prevent disorder or crime, and protect the rights of others. Their necessity and proportionality could not be assessed before the conclusion of the criminal investigation – which concerned, among other matters, the way in which the dispersal had been planned and executed, including the means and methods used for that purpose.

18. The second third-party intervener (PEN International, PEN Georgia and English PEN)

19. The second third-party intervener – PEN International, PEN Georgia and English PEN – described in some detail the Court’s case-law and other international material relating to the duties to prevent and to investigate conduct designed to restrict journalistic activity, in particular media reporting on demonstrations and protests. It went on to emphasise that under the Court’s case-law, any such interferences were to be subjected to strict scrutiny, taking account of the interests at stake, the review, if any, of the measure by the national courts, the conduct of the applicants, and the proportionality of the measure. The intervener then set out how, in its view, each of those four factors was to be assessed in circumstances such as those obtaining in the present case. Lastly, the intervener invited the Court to examine the present case, as it had done in other cases of this sort, in the light of the general situation in the respondent State. They referred in that connection to a “serious deterioration in the environment for freedom of expression in Georgia”, pointing to a December 2024 statement by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and various other materials and developments which in their view attested to that.

20. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

    1. The complaint in Berikashvili (no. 39382/21)

21. In so far as Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) is concerned, it must be noted that this applicant was not employed as a reporter, and that he said that he had been filming the events in his capacity as a participant in the demonstration. Since the core of his complaint relates to his participation in the demonstration, it falls to be examined solely under Article 11 of the Convention – which, although to be considered in the light of Article 10, is a lex specialis in such circumstances (see Navalnyy v. Russia [GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, §§ 101-02, 15 November 2018; see also, specifically with respect to the use of force to disperse demonstrations, Pekaslan and Others, §§ 67 and 69; İzci, §§ 76 and 78; Mushegh Saghatelyan, § 224; and Shmorgunov and Others, § 482, all cited above).

22. Analysis of the admissibility and merits of the complaints

(a) Admissibility

371. Since the Chamber did not examine the admissibility of these complaints, it falls to the Grand Chamber to do so (see Selahattin Demirtaş, cited above, §§ 224 and 241).

372. The complaints are not manifestly ill-founded or inadmissible on any other grounds. In particular, as already noted, they are not inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies or loss of victim status (see paragraphs 256-268 above). They must therefore be declared admissible.

(b) Merits

(i) Existence of an interference

373. The first question is whether the force that the police used against the applicants who raised these complaints – kinetic impact projectiles with respect to 13 applicants and physical force to remove one applicant from the courtyard of the Parliament building – amounted to an interference with their rights under Article 10.

(α) General principles

374. The gathering of information is an essential preparatory step in journalism, and therefore an inherent part of media freedom (see Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, § 128, 27 June 2017; Butkevich v. Russia, no. 5865/07, § 123, 13 February 2018; and Szurovecz v. Hungary, no. 15428/16, § 52, 8 October 2019).

375. The physical ill-treatment by State agents of journalists while they are carrying out their professional duties, irrespective of whether the agents intended to interfere with those duties, amounts to interference with the journalists’ right to freedom of expression (see Najafli, cited above, § 68). The same goes for the arrests of journalists covering a demonstration (see Pentikäinen v. Finland [GC], no. 11882/10, § 83, ECHR 2015), as well as for measures interfering with their journalistic equipment, for instance its seizure (see Hayk Grigoryan v. Armenia, no. 9796/17, §§ 61-63, 3 April 2025, and, mutatis mutandis, Mammadov and Abbasov v. Azerbaijan, no. 1172/12, §§ 60 and 62, 8 July 2021).

376. Measures impeding journalists who have identified themselves as such from recording and reporting on a public protest also amount to interference with the exercise of their right to freedom of expression (see Friedrich and Others v. Poland, nos. 25344/20 and 17 others, §§ 252-53, 20 June 2024, and Gevorgyan v. Armenia, no. 231/16, §§ 71-72, 22 May 2025).

377. More generally, measures which deprive journalists of access to a certain place, and thus prevent them from obtaining information, are to be seen as interfering with their right to freedom of expression (see Selmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 67259/14, § 61, 9 February 2017; Mándli and Others v. Hungary, no. 63164/16, § 45, 26 May 2020; and Drozd v. Poland, no. 15158/19, § 63, 6 April 2023). This is the case even where those journalists are not on a specific assignment from a media organisation and merely intend to collect information relating to a public event and impart it to the public (see Butkevich, cited above, §§ 131‑32).

378. The mere fact that the measures taken by the authorities are general rather than specifically targeting the journalist(s) in question does not exclude the existence of such interference (see Gsell v. Switzerland, no. 12675/05, § 49, 8 October 2009). That applies also to measures taken by the police in the course of a demonstration (see Pentikäinen, cited above, § 83).

379. In view of the important role played by the internet in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the dissemination of information, the function of bloggers and popular users of social media may be assimilated to that of journalists in that context (see, mutatis mutandis, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, § 168 in fine, 8 November 2016; Falzon v. Malta, no. 45791/13, § 57, 20 March 2018; and Timur Sharipov v. Russia, no. 15758/13, § 25, 13 September 2022). Indeed, professional journalists likewise often use social media to relay information. The role of bloggers and popular users of social media can, moreover, take on particular importance when the traditional media are hampered or restricted in their activities, for instance in fast-developing crisis situations or where their freedom and independence come under threat (see Ukraine and the Netherlands v. Russia [GC], nos. 8019/16 and 3 others, § 1345, 9 July 2025).

(β) Application of those principles

‒ Mr Diasamidze, one of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21)

380. The available video material – which Mr Diasamidze submitted to the prosecuting authorities already in 2019, and the authenticity of which has not been contested by the Government – confirms that the police used physical force to remove him from the courtyard of the Parliament building while he was transmitting live coverage of the events, and despite him telling them that he was a journalist (see paragraph 66 above). In the light of the principles in paragraphs 374-379 above, that can be seen as an interference with his rights under Article 10 (compare Pentikäinen, cited above, § 83).

‒ The ten remaining applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), and those in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), and Svanadze (no. 16757/20)

381. The ten remaining applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), and the three applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), and Svanadze (no. 16757/20) were all hit by kinetic impact projectiles while covering the events in their capacity as journalists (see paragraphs 47, 51 and 54-65 above). In the light of the principles in paragraphs 374-379 above, that can likewise be seen as an interference with their rights under Article 10.

382. It is true that the Chamber declared the Article 3 complaints of two of those applicants, Mr Grigalashvili and Mr Bochikashvili, inadmissible owing to the lack of medical evidence of injury (see paragraph 190 of the Chamber judgment). There is, however, video material showing that both of them were hit by projectiles (see paragraphs 57 and 61 above); the only missing element is medical evidence showing that their being hit resulted in injuries (since Mr Grigalashvili refused to undergo an examination and Mr Bochikashvili’s examination, carried out more than two weeks after the events, found no signs of injuries – see paragraphs 68 and 74 above). The Chamber’s conclusion under Article 3 does not therefore dispose of the question whether there has been an interference with their rights under Article 10. Even if the injuries that they suffered were not as serious, the very fact that they were hit by projectiles, which occurred while they were carrying out their journalistic activities, must be considered to have amounted to such interference.

383. For present purposes, there is no need to establish whether, as alleged by those applicants and denied by the Government (see paragraphs 361 and 366 above), they were deliberately targeted on account of their being journalists. In the light of the principles set out in paragraphs 374-379 above, any use of force by the authorities which affected their information gathering, and by implication their ability to report on the demonstration, amounted to an interference with the exercise of their right to freedom of expression (compare Pentikäinen, cited above, § 83). Nor is the existence of an interference negated by the fact that some of them were able to continue reporting even after being hit.

(ii) Justification for the interference

384. Such interference will constitute a breach of Article 10 unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in the second paragraph of that Article, and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of those aims.

(α) “Prescribed by law”

385. The Court’s case-law in relation to the various requirements flowing from the phrase “prescribed by law” in Article 10 § 2 is well established. For a recent restatement, see Sanchez v. France [GC], no. 45581/15, §§ 124-28, 15 May 2023.

386. In their submissions, the Government referred, in a general manner, to several Georgian enactments providing for restrictions on the rights to public assembly and freedom of expression, and argued that the measures taken by the police had been prompted by the violent turn the demonstration had taken (see paragraph 368 above). However, that leaves unanswered the question – pointedly raised by the applicants (see paragraph 362 above) – whether the force used by the police to disperse the demonstration, in particular the extensive use of kinetic impact projectiles, was in line with Georgian law.

387. Even if it could be accepted that in view of the violent turn taken by part of the demonstration, the decision to disperse it had a basis in Georgian law, serious questions remain about the lawfulness of the measures taken to put that decision into effect (which interfered with the applicants’ Article 10 rights). The Grand Chamber considers that it does not need to take a definitive stance on the latter point, and therefore leaves the question whether the interference was “prescribed by law” open (see, mutatis mutandis, Ibragim Ibragimov and Others v. Russia, nos. 1413/08 and 28621/11, § 86, 28 August 2018; Dareskizb Ltd v. Armenia, no. 61737/08, § 75, 21 September 2021; and Teslenko and Others v. Russia, nos. 49588/12 and 3 others, § 105, 5 April 2022; compare Najafli, § 69, and, mutatis mutandis, Mammadov and Abbasov, § 63, both cited above).

(β) Legitimate aim(s)

388. In view of the way in which the demonstration evolved, and in particular, the attempts of some of the demonstrators to break through the police cordon and enter the Parliament building, it could in principle be accepted that the dispersal measures were intended to prevent “disorder” and “crime”. There is, however, no need to come to a definitive conclusion on whether the interference – which consisted in the use of a significant amount of force by the authorities – pursued a legitimate aim (compare, mutatis mutandis, Kandzhov v. Bulgaria, no. 68294/01, § 73, 6 November 2008; Glukhin v. Russia, no. 11519/20, § 55, 4 July 2023; and Najafli, cited above, § 69).

(γ) “Necessary in a democratic society”

389. In the present case, the salient issue in relation to the complaint under Article 10 is the necessity of the interference (compare Najafli, § 69, and Gevorgyan, § 74, see, mutatis mutandis, Mammadov and Abbasov, § 63, all cited above).

‒ General principles

390. The general principles on whether an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression is “necessary in a democratic society” are well established. For a recent restatement, see Sanchez (cited above, § 145).

391. In the present case, it should further be emphasised that the media fulfil an essential function in a democratic society, in particular in providing information on the authorities’ handling of demonstrations (see Pentikäinen, §§ 88-89, and Najafli, § 66, both cited above). Their “watchdog” role is particularly important in such contexts, since their presence is a guarantee that the authorities can be held to account for the way in which they act towards demonstrators and the public at large – including the methods that they use to control or disperse demonstrations (ibid.; see also Selmani and Others, cited above, § 75).

392. More generally, a restriction on a journalist’s research or investigative activities always calls for the closest scrutiny, on account of the danger inherent in attempts to restrict such preparatory journalistic steps (see Dammann v. Switzerland, no. 77551/01, § 52, 25 April 2006; Amaghlobeli and Others v. Georgia, no. 41192/11, § 36, 20 May 2021; and Radio Broadcasting Company B92 AD v. Serbia, no. 67369/16, § 81, 5 September 2023). This applies especially to the use of force by State agents towards journalists while they are carrying out their professional activities (see Najafli, cited above, § 68). The same goes for other media actors.

‒ Application of those principles

▪ Mr Diasamidze, one of the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21)

393. The Government made no submissions in this connection, other than to note that the domestic criminal investigation was still ongoing (see paragraph 368 in fine above). There is therefore no basis on which to accept, irrespective of the tensions which developed during the demonstration, that it was justified and proportionate for the police to use force to remove Mr Diasamidze from the courtyard of the Parliament building.

394. There has therefore been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of him.

▪ The ten remaining applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21), and those in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20) and Svanadze (no. 16757/20)

395. There is no indication that any of these 13 applicants engaged in any conduct justifying the use of kinetic impact projectiles specifically against them (compare, mutatis mutandis, Selmani and Others, cited above, § 80).

396. In so far as it could be argued that their injuries were the inevitable consequence of the use of such projectiles to contain violent demonstrators, reference must be made to the analysis under Article 3 of the Convention, where it was noted that (a) such broad-brush explanations do not suffice to permit a conclusion that the use of force which caused the injuries suffered by any of the applicants was strictly necessary and proportionate (see paragraph 334 above), that (b) the police appear to have used such projectiles as a general crowd-control weapon rather than a targeted one, and that (c) numerous multiple-projectile rounds – which are inherently impossible to use in a targeted manner – were apparently fired (see paragraph 344 (a) and (c) above). These considerations also apply to the two applicants – Ms Grigalashvili and Mr Bochikashvili – whose complaints under Article 3 were declared inadmissible (see paragraphs 7 (b) and 277 above).

397. It is true that the strict-necessity test under Article 3 differs from the test of necessity in a democratic society under Article 10 § 2. Specifically, the former excludes any margin of appreciation for the national authorities (see, albeit in relation to the related strict-necessity test under Article 2 § 2, Ribcheva and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 37801/16 and 2 others, § 162 in fine, 30 March 2021). In the present case, however, this is of no consequence since, in the light of the above analysis, it cannot be accepted that the use of force against the applicants fell within any acceptable margin of appreciation available to the Georgian authorities. Indeed, it would be paradoxical to find that treatment falling foul of the absolute prohibition in Article 3 was nonetheless proportionate under Article 10 – the Convention must be read as a whole and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions (see, among other authorities, Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 48, ECHR 2005-X; Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, § 66, ECHR 2008; and Navalnyy, cited above, § 122 in fine).

398. In those circumstances, it cannot be said that the injuries inflicted on the applicants in question inevitably followed from their covering chaotic and violent events. Nor is there any basis to argue that they took unjustified risks which made them more susceptible to being injured while doing so.

399. Even if, as asserted by the Government (see paragraph 366 above), special zones had been created for journalists to ensure their safety during the demonstration (and it is open to question whether such arrangements were indeed in place), the applicants could not be expected to remain in those confined zones while covering a large-scale event which took several unexpected turns and unfolded over a large and relatively unpredictable area (see, mutatis mutandis, Pentikäinen, cited above, § 97). Their remaining in those zones would have hindered them reporting effectively not only on the demonstration itself, but also, more importantly in the present case, on the manner in which the authorities handled it, in particular the means and methods that they used do so, and thus carrying out their vital “watchdog” role (ibid., § 89).

400. There is also a further aspect to the necessity analysis. It appears that most of the applicants in issue were identifiable as journalists (see paragraphs 48 in fine, 54 in fine, 55 in fine, 56 in fine, 57, 58 in fine, 59 in fine, 60 in fine, 62 and 65 above). At least three of them specifically alleged that the police had targeted them deliberately for that reason (see paragraphs 55 in fine, 60 in fine and 62 above). Such allegations were also made in the course of the domestic criminal investigation (see paragraph 121 above). In the absence of an effective investigation into the actions of the police, it is difficult to ascertain whether they targeted some or all of those applicants because they were visibly journalists. This is, nonetheless, at least a plausible supposition, in view of the applicants’ arguments and the facts that (a) kinetic impact projectiles were fired indiscriminately, with apparent disregard for the safety of the journalists covering the demonstration, and that (b) many journalists were injured as a result (32 in total – see paragraph 175 in fine above).

401. It should be emphasised in this connection that, as noted by the second third-party intervener, PEN International, PEN Georgia and English PEN (see paragraph 369 above), the Contracting States have a duty under Article 10 to have in place an effective system of protection of journalists (see, albeit in other contexts, Dink v. Turkey, nos. 2668/07 and 4 others, § 137, 14 September 2010; Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, nos. 65286/13 and 57270/14, § 158, 10 January 2019; Tagiyeva v. Azerbaijan, no. 72611/14, § 78, 7 July 2022; and Gaši and Others, cited above, § 78). It should be noted in this connection that according to Recommendation CM/Rec(2016)4 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe and Resolution 2532 (2024) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (see paragraphs 212‑213 above), that system must encompass measures ensuring the safety of journalists in situations of large-scale violence erupting in the course of public protests. The Venice Commission has also made a number of recommendations in that respect (see paragraph 214 above).

402. In sum, since it cannot be accepted that the interference with these applicants’ right to freedom of expression was justified and proportionate, it follows that it was not “necessary in a democratic society”.

403. There has therefore been a breach of Article 10 of the Convention in respect of these 13 applicants as well.

404. COMPLAINTS UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION

405. The applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) – with the exception of one of the applicants in that application, Mr Didberashvili, who was a bystander rather than a demonstrator (see paragraph 80 above) – and the applicant in Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) complained that the police had dispersed the demonstration without prior warning and by means of excessive force, in breach of Article 11 of the Convention. The relevant parts of that Article read as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly ...

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of [this right] other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. ...”

3. The Chamber judgment

4. The Chamber’s reasoning and decision on the complaints under Article 11 were identical to those in relation to the complaints under Article 10 (see paragraph 357 above).

5. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

   1. The applicants

6. The applicants submitted that their Article 11 complaints were likewise a key part of their case, and that it was essential for the Court to examine them in addition to those under Article 3. In their view, the Chamber’s refraining from ruling on their admissibility and merits could not be justified. They pointed out that freedom of assembly was fundamental to democracy and that the disproportionate use of force against peaceful demonstrators was a systemic problem in Georgia, which had escalated in recent years alongside the increasing crackdowns on Georgian civil society. It was therefore essential for the Court to examine the complaints and uphold the importance of freedom of assembly for democratic participation and political pluralism.

7. The applicants also submitted that they should have benefited from the protection of Article 11. Only a small proportion of the demonstrators had been violent at certain times. This had not affected the peaceful character of the demonstration as a whole; it had not been aimed at overthrowing the government or at breaking into the Parliament building. There was no compelling evidence that its organisers or participants had intended to use or incite violence. Moreover, the applicants themselves had joined the demonstration with peaceful intentions and had behaved peacefully throughout. None of them, with the exception of one of the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21), had been found guilty of any offence in relation to the events. Even that applicant had had peaceful intentions, as demonstrated by his subsequent witness statements.

8. The excessive force used by the police against the applicants and the injuries sustained by them had amounted to an unjustified interference with their Article 11 rights. It had neither been “prescribed by law”, nor pursued a legitimate aim – in particular since the situation had not been characterised by mass violence, as asserted by the authorities. Nor had the interference been necessary. The authorities had needlessly dispersed the whole rally, even though only a small part of its participants had engaged in violence. They had failed to differentiate between demonstrators based on their individual conduct, which would have allowed the peaceful ones to keep on demonstrating or to disperse in a normal fashion. The means used for the dispersal had also been disproportionate. Since those means had violated the applicants’ rights under Article 3 of the Convention, they could not be seen as necessary for the purposes of Article 11, and their detrimental impact had clearly outweighed any benefit – in particular, the indiscriminate use of kinetic impact projectiles without warning had put all the demonstrators at risk of severe and life-changing injuries. The authorities had thus failed to take appropriate measures to ensure the peaceful conduct of the demonstration, and to try to resolve any tensions through communication, negotiation and de-escalation, even though they had had sufficient time to do so.

9. The Government

10. The Government submitted that Article 11 did not apply because the “assembly” had not been “peaceful”. It had amounted to an incitement to violence and to a rejection of the foundations of a democratic society, since its participants and organisers had intended to break into the Parliament building. The authorities had shown sufficient tolerance towards them, and had warned them many times. It was also noteworthy that the applicants had either arrived at the demonstration or had moved about after the first use of “special means”; they could not therefore claim that the police had used tear gas, a water cannon and kinetic impact projectiles without a sufficient warning or an attempt at negotiation. The complaints under Article 11 were therefore incompatible ratione materiae.

11. In the alternative, the Government submitted that any interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of assembly had been justified. They noted that various enactments in Georgia provided for restrictions to that right. In view of the violent turn the demonstration had taken, the police had resorted to measures – including the use of tear gas and kinetic impact projectiles – to bring it to an end. Those measures had sought to restore public order, safety and security, prevent disorder or crime, and protect the rights of others. Their necessity and proportionality could not be assessed before the conclusion of the criminal investigation – which concerned, among other matters, the way in which the dispersal had been planned and executed, including the means and methods used for that purpose. In any event, the obstruction of the entrances to the Parliament building by demonstrators had amounted to reprehensible conduct, and the authorities had had a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the need to take measures to counter it.

12. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

    1. Admissibility

13. Since the Chamber did not examine the admissibility of these complaints, it falls to the Grand Chamber to do so (see Selahattin Demirtaş, cited above, §§ 224 and 241).

14. In this case, many aspects of the question whether the “assembly” on 20-21 June 2019 was “peaceful” are closely intertwined with the manner in which that “assembly” was handled by the authorities. The Court therefore finds it more appropriate to address the question whether Article 11 applies as an issue going to the merits (see, mutatis mutandis, Laurijsen and Others v. the Netherlands, nos. 56896/17 and 4 others, § 38, 21 November 2023). It therefore joins the Government’s objection that the complaints under that Article are incompatible ratione materiae (see paragraph 409 above) to the merits of those complaints.

15. The complaints are not manifestly ill-founded or inadmissible on any other grounds. In particular, as already noted, they are not inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies or loss of victim status (see paragraphs 256-268 above). They must therefore be declared admissible.

16. Merits

(a) Applicability of Article 11 of the Convention

(i) General principles

414. The right to freedom of assembly under Article 11 of the Convention is one of the foundations of a democratic society. It should therefore not be interpreted restrictively (see Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC], no. 37553/05, § 91, ECHR 2015).

415. Article 11 protects only the right to “peaceful assembly” – a notion which does not cover rallies or demonstrations whose organisers and participants have violent intentions. The guarantees of that Article therefore apply to all gatherings except those where the organisers and participants have such intentions, incite violence, or otherwise reject the foundations of a democratic society (see, among other authorities, Kudrevičius and Others, cited above, § 92; Frumkin v. Russia, no. 74568/12, § 98, 5 January 2016; Navalnyy, cited above, § 98 in fine; and Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), cited above, § 1111 in fine).

416. The burden of proving the violent intentions of the organisers of a demonstration lies with the authorities (see Frumkin, § 98 in fine; Mushegh Saghatelyan, § 230; Laurijsen and Others, § 51; and Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea), § 1125 in fine, all cited above).

417. The occurrence of acts of violence during an “assembly” does not in itself suffice for a conclusion that its organisers had violent intentions (see Karpyuk and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 30582/04 and 32152/04, § 202, 6 October 2015; Mushegh Saghatelyan, cited above, § 231; and Lutsenko and Verbytskyy, cited above, § 113).

418. An individual does not cease to enjoy the right to freedom of peaceful assembly as a result of sporadic violence by others during an “assembly” if that individual remains peaceful in his or her own intentions and behaviour. Also, even if there is a real risk of an “assembly” resulting in disorder owing to developments outside the control of those organising it, it does not as such fall outside the scope of Article 11 § 1, and any interference with it must be in conformity with Article 11 § 2 (see, among other authorities, Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, nos. 8080/08 and 8577/08, § 103, ECHR 2011; Kudrevičius and Others, cited above, § 94; Frumkin, cited above, § 99; Laguna Guzman v. Spain, no. 41462/17, § 34, 6 October 2020; Navalnyy and Gunko v. Russia, no. 75186/12, § 74, 10 November 2020; and Geylani and Others, cited above, § 110). In other words, the possibility of extremists with violent intentions joining an “assembly” cannot as such remove the right under Article 11 § 1 of the other participants in it (see Schwabe and M.G., cited above, § 103, and Primov and Others v. Russia, no. 17391/06, § 155, 12 June 2014, with reference to Christians against Racism and Fascism v. the United Kingdom, no. 8440/78, Commission decision of 16 July 1980, Decisions and Reports 21, p. 138, at p. 148).

(ii) Relevant case-law with respect to Georgia

419. The Court recently had cause to reiterate and examine the above points in relation to a demonstration held in front of the Georgian Parliament in November 2019 – about five months after the demonstration in issue in the present case – in which the organisers and some of the participants had blockaded the building with a view to obstructing Parliament’s work (see Makarashvili and Others v. Georgia, nos. 23158/20 and 2 others, §§ 78-94, 1 September 2022). The Court held that even such an obstructive form of protest could not be seen as a rejection of the foundations of a democratic society, and was therefore still covered by Article 11 § 1 – with the caveat that the form of the protest would have implications for the assessment of the necessity of interfering with it (ibid., §§ 89-94).

(iii) Application of the general principles in the present case

420. The demonstration in issue in the present case began as a spontaneous protest on a matter of public interest (see paragraphs 14-15 above). However, it was dispersed by force after a group of the demonstrators kept on trying to break through the police cordon and storm the Parliament building (see paragraphs 20-32 above).

421. The parties’ submissions about the intentions behind the demonstration and the way in which it unfolded differed radically (see paragraphs 407 and 409 above). The available material does not permit a conclusion that the protest had clearly identifiable organisers before it started (see paragraph 15 above, and compare and contrast Makarashvili and Others, cited above, §§ 89 and 100). Nor does it appear that at its outset it was meant to be anything other than peaceful or that its participants – and the applicants in particular – had violent intentions when joining it. While some leaders appear to have emerged once the protest got under way, they made no explicit calls for violence, even if at least some statements could possibly have been interpreted as a call to break through the police cordon (see paragraphs 17-18 above). Nor did they show any signs of being prepared for violence (compare Yaroslav Belousov v. Russia, nos. 2653/13 and 60980/14, § 171, 4 October 2016).

422. The seriousness of the situation and the need to ensure the effective functioning of Parliament – which is a key value in a democratic society (see Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, § 141, 17 May 2016) – must be taken into account. It can also be accepted that the authorities were faced with a difficult task in preserving public order once some of the demonstrators had attempted to storm the Parliament building. However, even assuming that the statements made by some politicians present at the scene may have negatively affected the subsequent developments, this element – whether taken alone or together with the relatively limited group of protestors trying to storm the Parliament building – cannot deprive several thousand peaceful protestors, including ten of the 11 applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) and the applicant in Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) of their rights under Article 11 (compare Shmorgunov and Others, cited above, § 504).

423. There is no evidence that the three applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) who were arrested and charged with the administrative offences of disorderly conduct and disobeying police orders – Mr Pochkhidze, Mr Khvadagiani and Mr Sharvashidze – engaged in violence. Mr Pochkhidze and Mr Sharvashidze were acquitted, and Mr Khvadagiani was convicted on account not of acts of violence but of swearing and disobeying a police order to leave the area (see paragraph 82 above).

424. The only applicant in respect of whom there is evidence of violent conduct, Mr Chikviladze (see paragraph 92 above), did not by that fact lose the protection of Article 11 either. It should be noted in this connection that the violent conduct in which it was recorded he had engaged – holding a shield which he had apparently seized from a police officer, resisting the police with his hands, kicking an officer’s shield, and waving the shield that he had seized in the direction of that officer – apparently occurred after the beginning of the clashes, was sporadic and did not result in any officer getting injured (compare, mutatis mutandis, Gülcü v. Turkey, no. 17526/10, § 97, 19 January 2016; Barabanov v. Russia, nos. 4966/13 and 5550/15, §§ 69 and 74, 30 January 2018; Stepan Zimin v. Russia, nos. 63686/13 and 60894/14, §§ 72 and 77, 30 January 2018; Lutskevich v. Russia, nos. 6312/13 and 60902/14, §§ 94 and 100, 15 May 2018; Navalnyy and Gunko, cited above, § 75; and Çiçek and Others v. Türkiye, nos. 48694/10 and 4 others, §§ 138-40, 22 November 2022; contrast Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, nos. 75734/12 and 2 others, § 284, 19 November 2019).

425. Thus, rather than altogether exclude the applicability of Article 11, the circumstances to which the Government referred (see paragraph 409 above) and Mr Chikviladze’s conduct may have implications for the assessment of whether any interference with his rights under that Article was justified.

426. It can therefore be accepted that the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) and Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) enjoyed the protection of Article 11 of the Convention, and that their complaints under this provision are compatible ratione materiae with it.

427. The Government’s objection on this point, which was joined to the merits (see paragraph 412 above), must therefore be dismissed.

(b) Existence of an interference

428. Force used by the authorities to disperse an “assembly” amounts to an interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of assembly under Article 11 § 1 of the Convention (see Oya Ataman v. Turkey, no. 74552/01, § 30, ECHR 2006-XIV; Balçık and Others, cited above, §§ 41-42; Nurettin Aldemir and Others v. Turkey, nos. 32124/02 and 6 others, § 34, 18 December 2007; Saya and Others, cited above, § 39; Protopapa v. Turkey, no. 16084/90, § 104, 24 February 2009; Serkan Yılmaz and Others, cited above, § 31; Biçici, cited above, § 49; Akgöl and Göl, cited above, § 36; Pekaslan and Others, cited above, § 77; Disk and Kesk v. Turkey, no. 38676/08, § 22, 27 November 2012; İzci, cited above, § 82; Tahirova, cited above, § 66; Primov and Others, cited above, § 99; Mushegh Saghatelyan, cited above, § 234; Laguna Guzman, cited above, § 42; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan, cited above, § 88; Shmorgunov and Others, cited above, §§ 506-07; and Geylani and Others, cited above, § 112).

429. In the light of this consistent line of case-law, it is not in doubt that the use of force against those applicants during the demonstration and its dispersal – consisting in being hit by kinetic impact projectiles in the cases of eight applicants (see paragraphs 83-84, 86, 88, 91-93 and 105 above) and physical ill-treatment in the cases of three applicants (see paragraphs 85, 87 and 89 above) – amounted to an interference with the exercise of their right to freedom of assembly.

(c) Justification for the interference

430. Such interference will constitute a breach of Article 11 unless it was “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in the second paragraph of that Article, and was “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of those aims.

(i) “Prescribed by law”

431. For the same reasons as those given in relation to the corresponding issue under Article 10 (see paragraphs 385-387 above), the Grand Chamber leaves the question whether the interference was “prescribed by law” open (compare Schwabe and M.G., § 108 in fine; Annenkov and Others, § 130; Mushegh Saghatelyan, § 237; Laguna Guzman, § 47; Navalnyy and Gunko, § 87; and Shmorgunov and Others, §§ 513-14, all cited above; see also, mutatis mutandis, Bodalev v. Russia, no. 67200/12, § 73, 6 September 2022, and Laurijsen and Others, cited above, § 61).

(ii) Legitimate aim(s)

432. In view of the way in which the demonstration evolved, and in particular, the attempts of some of the demonstrators to break through the police cordon and enter the Parliament building, it could in principle be accepted that the dispersal measures were intended to prevent “disorder” and “crime” (see Geylani and Others, cited above, § 114). There is, however, no need to come to a definitive conclusion on whether the interference – which consisted in the use of a significant amount of force by the authorities – pursued a legitimate aim (compare Annenkov and Others, § 130; Mushegh Saghatelyan, § 237; Laguna Guzman, § 47; Navalnyy and Gunko, § 87; and Shmorgunov and Others, § 516 in fine, all cited above; see also, mutatis mutandis, Bodalev, cited above, § 74 in fine).

(iii) “Necessary in a democratic society”

433. In the present case, the salient issue in relation to the complaint under Article 11 is the necessity of the interference.

434. In assessing this issue, the Court must be particularly mindful of the fact that the demonstration took place around the Georgian Parliament building and involved attempts by some of the demonstrators to storm the premises. It emphasises in this connection the fundamental interest of ensuring the effective functioning of Parliament in a democracy. The Convention establishes a close nexus between an effective political democracy and the effective operation of Parliament, and there can be no doubt that the latter is a value of key importance for a democratic society (see Karácsony and Others, § 141; Mándli and Others, § 69; and Drozd, § 69, all cited above). This consideration will therefore be of significance in the examination of the necessity of interferences with the right to freedom of peaceful assembly intended to prevent disorder in or around parliamentary premises and to preserve the effective functioning of Parliament (see Makarashvili and Others, cited above, §§ 98-99).

(α) General principles on the necessity of the use of force by the authorities to contain or disperse an assembly

435. The general principles of the Court’s case-law in relation specifically to the assessment of the necessity of the force used by the authorities to contain or disperse an “assembly” are the following:

(a) An unlawful situation, such as the staging of an “assembly” without prior authorisation, does not in itself justify such measures; the enforcement of the rules governing assemblies cannot become an end in itself (see, among other authorities, Kudrevičius and Others, § 150; Annenkov and Others, § 131 (d); Mushegh Saghatelyan, § 244; and Laguna Guzman, § 50, all cited above).

(b) The mere fact that an “assembly” in a public place may somewhat disrupt everyday life does not justify such measures either; the authorities must display a degree of tolerance in relation to its holding. The appropriate degree of tolerance cannot be defined in the abstract; it depends on the specific circumstances, and in particular on the degree of disruption entailed by the “assembly” (see, among other authorities, Kudrevičius and Others, § 155; Annenkov and Others, § 131 (f); and Geylani and Others, § 111, all cited above).

(c) An intentional failure by the organisers of an “assembly” to comply with the rules governing those matters, and the structuring of an “assembly” or part of it in a way to cause disruption to everyday life or other activities to a degree exceeding that which is inevitable in the circumstances amounts to conduct which cannot enjoy the same degree of protection as the peaceful manifestation of opinions on questions of public interest. On the contrary, the authorities have a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the need to take measures to restrict such conduct (see, among other authorities, Kudrevičius and Others, § 156; Makarashvili and Others, § 86; and Bodalev, § 75 (c), all cited above).

(d) The means and methods used by the authorities to discourage the participants in an “assembly”, contain them in a given area, or disperse the “assembly” are also an important factor for judging the necessity of the interference (see, among other authorities, Primov and Others, § 119; Kudrevičius and Others, § 151; Süleyman Çelebi and Others, §§ 111 and 116; and Annenkov and Others, § 131 (e), all cited above).

(β) Application of those principles

436. Although the demonstration began peacefully, the situation escalated in the evening, as some of the demonstrators tried to break through the police cordon and storm the Parliament building. The tensions between them and the police continued for more than two hours, with varying degrees of intensity, and it was the persistent and violent conduct of the people in the front rows of the demonstration which apparently led to the authorities’ decision to disperse it (see paragraphs 15-43 above).

437. Those developments arguably justified the decision to disperse the demonstration – especially since it was taking place just outside the Parliament building (see, mutatis mutandis, Makarashvili and Others, cited above, §§ 98-101). As already noted in paragraph 434 above, the Court fully recognises the fundamental interest of ensuring the effective functioning of Parliament in a democracy.

438. Even accepting, however, that the dispersal decision itself was justified and proportionate, the way in which it was put into effect (resulting in an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of assembly) was not, irrespective of the wider margin of appreciation enjoyed by the Contracting States in such situations (see Gülcü, § 116, and Stepan Zimin, §§ 75 and 78, both cited above), for two reasons.

439. First, it appears that no order to disperse was issued at the scene of the demonstration itself, and that no clearly audible warning was given before the authorities resorted to “special means” – specifically kinetic impact projectiles – to disperse it. Since they had plainly anticipated that there was a risk that the demonstration might escalate and that force might have to be used to contain and disperse it (see paragraph 161 above), it cannot be said that they were overwhelmed or that operational reasons prevented them from communicating more clearly with the demonstrators (compare Chernega and Others v. Ukraine, no. 74768/10, § 250, 18 June 2019).

440. More importantly, as already found under Article 3 of the Convention, no proper justification has been put forward for the force used against the applicants (see paragraphs 333-335 and 351-352 above). It cannot therefore be accepted that that force was “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 (compare Özalp Ulusoy, § 78; Tahirova, § 72; Annenkov and Others, § 132; Mushegh Saghatelyan, § 247; Zakharov and Varzhabetyan, § 90; Laguna Guzman, § 54 in fine; Lutsenko and Verbytskyy, § 116; Shmorgunov and Others, § 519; and Geylani and Others, § 127, all cited above). That is the case even for the applicant in respect of whom there is some evidence of violent conduct, Mr Chikviladze, since no assertion was made or evidence submitted showing that the police used kinetic impact projectiles against him at a point when he needed to be contained, and that they had no other means of doing so (see paragraph 92 above).

441. In so far as it could be argued that the injuries of the eight applicants hit by kinetic impact projectiles (see paragraphs 83-84, 86, 88, 91-93 and 105 above) were the inevitable consequence of the use of such projectiles to contain violent demonstrators, reference must be made to the analysis under Article 3, where it was found (a) that such broad-brush explanations do not suffice to permit a conclusion that the use of force which caused the injuries suffered by any of the applicants was strictly necessary and proportionate (see paragraph 334 above), (b) that the police appear to have used such projectiles as a general crowd-control weapon rather than a targeted one, and (c) that numerous multiple-projectile rounds – which are inherently impossible to use in a targeted manner – were apparently fired (see paragraph 344 (a) and (c) above).

442. As to the three applicants who were physically ill-treated by the police (see paragraphs 85, 87 and 89 above), reference should likewise be made to the finding under Article 3 that there is no evidence of any conduct on their part that would justify the use of force against them (see paragraph 352 above).

443. It is true that, as already noted in relation to Article 10 § 2 (see paragraph 397 above), the strict-necessity test under Article 3 differs from the test of necessity in a democratic society under Article 11 § 2, in that, unlike the former, the latter permits the national authorities a margin of appreciation. In the present case, however, this is of no consequence since, in the light of the above analysis, it cannot be accepted that the use of force against the applicants fell within any acceptable margin of appreciation available to the Georgian authorities. Indeed, it would be paradoxical to find that treatment falling foul of the absolute prohibition in Article 3 was nonetheless proportionate under Article 11; as noted in paragraph 397 in fine above, the Convention must be read as a whole and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions.

444. In effect, in all cases of this sort – involving allegations that the use of force by the police to disperse a demonstration was in breach of both Article 3 and Article 11 – a finding of a breach of the substantive limb of the former has invariably led to a finding of a breach of the latter as well (see Balçık and Others, §§ 33-34 and 53-54; Saya and Others, §§ 22-23 and 47‑48; Serkan Yılmaz and Others, §§ 24, 26 and 35-36; Pekaslan and Others, §§ 65‑66 and 82-83; İzci, §§ 75 and 90-91; Tahirova, §§ 44-46 and 75; Mushegh Saghatelyan, §§ 145-48, 247-48 and 254-55; and Navalnyy and Gunko, § 85, all cited above). In some of those cases, the Court even expressly linked the two assessments (see Annenkov and Others, §§ 90-91, 132 and 141 (a); Zakharov and Varzhabetyan, §§ 74, 76 and 90-91; Shmorgunov and Others, §§ 371-72, 374, 396, 418-22 and 519-21; and Geylani and Others, §§ 87-89 and 127-29, all cited above).

445. There has therefore been a breach of Article 11 of the Convention in respect of:

(a) the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21), with the exception of one of the applicants in that application, Mr Didberashvili, who, being a bystander rather than a demonstrator, raised no complaint under that Article (see paragraphs 80 and 404 above); and

(b) the applicant in Berikashvili (no. 39382/21).

8. COMPLAINTS UNDER ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION

9. The applicants in all five applications complained that they had not had an effective remedy in respect of their complaints under Article 3 of the Convention. They relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

1. The Chamber judgment

2. In the light of its findings with respect to the complaints under Articles 3, 10 and 11 of the Convention (see paragraphs 277-284, 305-308, 357 and 405 above), the Chamber held that it was not necessary to examine the admissibility and merits of these complaints.

3. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

4. The applicants submitted that it was essential for the Court to examine these complaints as well, and that they had not been afforded an effective remedy in respect of their substantive complaints. In particular, the criminal investigation had been wholly ineffective. Under Georgian law, they could neither influence the legal characterisation of the criminal case nor challenge delays in its processing. Moreover, the 2021 Amnesty Act had undermined the prospect of any effective remedy, removing any reasonable likelihood that those responsible would be identified and punished.

5. The Government submitted that since the complaints concerned the same facts as those under Articles 3, 10 and 11 of the Convention, there was no need to examine them. In the alternative, they submitted that the complaints were manifestly ill-founded, since an effective criminal investigation which encompassed every aspect of the demonstration’s dispersal was ongoing. After being granted victim status in that investigation, the applicants could fully participate in it, and it could afford them sufficient redress. Moreover, the applicants could seek compensation for injury that had occurred during the dispersal of the demonstration and the allegedly unlawful restriction of their right to freedom of assembly, and several of them had done so.

6. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

7. These complaints, as formulated in all five applications, exclusively concern issues relating to the effectiveness of the criminal investigation. In the light of the findings under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 295-299 above), there is no need to examine their admissibility and merits (see, among other authorities, Jeronovičs, cited above, § 125).

8. ALLEGED BREACH OF ARTICLE 38 OF THE CONVENTION

9. In the Chamber proceedings, the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) and Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) alleged that the respondent State had failed to furnish all necessary facilities for the Court’s investigation, as required under Article 38 of the Convention, because it had (a) failed to inform the Court of the passing of the 2021 Amnesty Act, and (b) not produced before the Court an unredacted copy of the MIA’s plan in relation to the demonstration.

10. Article 38 of the Convention reads:

“The Court shall examine the case together with the representatives of the parties and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities.”

1. The Chamber judgment

2. The Chamber noted that the passing of the 2021 Amnesty Act had been public knowledge, and that even though the Government had only produced a redacted copy of the MIA’s plan in relation to the demonstration, it had been able to assess the substance of that plan with reference to the applicants’ complaints. On that basis, it found that Georgia had complied with its duty under Article 38 of the Convention.

3. Submissions before the Grand Chamber

   1. The applicants

4. The applicants submitted, with regard to the 2021 Amnesty Act, that the duty under Article 38 of the Convention extended beyond that to provide documents specifically requested by the Court; the provision of incomplete information – even if that information was not solely in the possession of the State – could also amount to a breach of that duty. The fact that the passing of the Act had been public knowledge had no bearing on that point. By deliberately omitting to mention it in their initial observations, or that three police officers charged in the course of the investigation had benefited from the amnesty instituted by the Act, the Government had failed to fulfil their duties under Article 38 – especially since the ongoing nature of the criminal investigation had been central to their prematurity argument, and since the role of the Act in relation to those officers had not been so widely known as to be obvious to all parties.

5. The applicants went on to submit, with regard to the MIA’s plan, that the Government had produced it with some delay, thus preventing the applicants from commenting on it in their observations. Moreover, in the absence of a proper domestic procedure for the review of that matter, there was no solid basis to accept, as the Chamber had done, that all redacted parts of the plan could not be disclosed. It was clear that the missing information – 31 out of the plan’s 42 pages had been partly or heavily redacted – went to the heart of the planning of the dispersal.

6. The Government

7. The Government pointed out, with regard to the applicants’ allegation relating to the 2021 Amnesty Act, that they had produced before the Court the full investigation file. There was no basis in the Court’s case-law for the proposition that a party’s omission to mention a publicly known fact which the opposing party could easily find out could amount to a breach of Article 38 of the Convention. As to the MIA’s plan, the Government had informed the Court, already in their initial observations, that the plan existed but was classified, and had then proceeded with a declassification procedure at the Court’s request, producing a redacted copy of it. They had also advised the Court that they were prepared to provide further clarifications. They had thereby sufficiently complied with their duty under Article 38.

8. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

   1. General principles

9. The relevant principles were set out in Janowiec and Others (cited above, §§ 202-06), Al Nashiri v. Poland (no. 28761/11, §§ 360‑66, 24 July 2014) and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland (no. 7511/13, §§ 352‑58, 24 July 2014). There is no need to repeat them here.

10. Application of those principles

11. The Grand Chamber sees no reason to call the Chamber’s assessment into question.

12. It should be noted, in particular, that when the Government were given notice of the five applications, they were not specifically asked to provide information about the 2021 Amnesty Act (see, mutatis mutandis, Emin Huseynov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), no. 1/16, § 75, 13 July 2023). In fact, at that time that Act was not yet in existence. Moreover, the Court was made fully aware of it in its examination of the Melia case (cited above, §§ 67 and 72). The Government’s omission to mention it in their initial observations before the Chamber, which the applicants promptly corrected in their observations in reply, cannot therefore be seen as a failure to “furnish all necessary facilities” to the Court.

13. As to the redactions made to the copy of the MIA’s plan in relation to the demonstration, they were not, and are not, of a nature to unduly hinder the Court’s examination of the case – owing to the distribution of the burden of proof. As noted in paragraph 329 above, under the Court’s case-law it is for the respondent State to show that injuries sustained during the dispersal of a demonstration, and attributable to the authorities, have resulted from a justified and proportionate use of force. The same goes for injuries sustained by journalists – such as the applicants in three of the five applications – covering a demonstration. The full unredacted content of that plan could thus be of importance for the case of the Government; it was not, and is not, indispensable for the applicants’ case. They were able to fully base their case on the unparticularised allegation that the force used against them had been disproportionate, without having to prove how exactly the authorities had planned and gone about the police operation.

14. There has therefore been no breach of Article 38 of the Convention.

15. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 46 OF THE CONVENTION

16. The relevant parts of Article 46 of the Convention read as follows:

“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.

2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.”

3. Under Article 46, a judgment in which the Court finds a violation of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on the respondent State a legal obligation to choose, subject to supervision by the Committee of Ministers, the general and/or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to that violation and redress so far as possible its effects. Moreover, it follows from the Convention, and from Article 1 in particular, that in ratifying it the Contracting States undertook to ensure that their domestic laws would be compatible with it (see, among other authorities, Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 47, ECHR 2004-I).

4. Individual measures

5. Like the Chamber, the Grand Chamber finds it appropriate to indicate individual measures for the execution of its judgment under Article 46, consequent on its findings under the procedural limb of Article 3 (see paragraphs 295-298 above).

6. The requirement to complete an effective investigation is a natural consequence of, in particular, the finding of a breach of the procedural limb of Article 3. The investigative obligation under that provision is a continuing one, subsisting even after the Court’s judgment or decision disposing of the case (see Jeronovičs, cited above, § 118). To be effective, the investigation required under Article 3 must be capable of, inter alia, identifying and if appropriate punishing those responsible (ibid., § 103, with further references), including, in situations such as the one at issue in the present case, senior police officers (see İzci, § 98 in fine, and Süleyman Çelebi and Others, §§ 132 in fine and 133, both cited above; see also, mutatis mutandis, Ataykaya v. Turkey, no. 50275/08, § 75 in fine, 22 July 2014). As noted in paragraph 296 above, in circumstances such as those at hand such an investigation needs to (a) involve a systematic analysis of the events, (b) encompass an evaluation of the legal basis, planning and execution of the police operation, and (c) determine whether any responsibility on the part of those in charge of that operation’s planning and control has been engaged. The investigation should take all those steps without delay and be concluded as quickly as possible.

7. General measures

8. The Grand Chamber further considers it appropriate to indicate general measures consequent on its findings under the substantive limb of Article 3 in relation to the regulation of kinetic impact projectiles (see paragraphs 341-344 above). In its view, the respondent State should put in place adequate safeguards on the proper use of such projectiles, in such a way as to minimise the risks of death and injury stemming from their use, by laying down more detailed rules, in accordance with the principles set out under the substantive limb of Article 3 (see paragraph 342 above, and compare Abdullah Yaşa and Others, § 61; İzci, § 99; Ataykaya, § 73; and Süleyman Çelebi and Others, §§ 130 and 134, all cited above).

9. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

10. Article 41 of the Convention reads:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

1. Damage

   1. The applicants’ claims

2. In the proceedings before the Chamber four of the applicants – Mr Kurdovanidze, Ms Gomuri, Mr Sulashvili and Mr Chankseliani – pointed out that they had partly lost their eyesight as a result of having been hit by kinetic impact projectiles, and sought compensation in respect of the pecuniary damage resulting from the ensuing reduction in their earning capacity. They calculated that damage on the basis of their monthly earnings before the injury (they had been employed, respectively, as a courier, a supermarket cashier, a security guard and a construction worker), multiplied by the number of months until they would reach retirement age (65 years). They claimed the following sums:

(a) Mr Kurdovanidze: 129,069.60 euros (EUR);

(b) Ms Gomuri: EUR 77,479.20;

(c) Mr Sulashvili: EUR 81,764.64; and

(d) Mr Chankseliani: EUR 258,926.88.

469. In the Chamber proceedings, all of the applicants also sought compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage, in the following amounts:

(a) Mr Tsaava and Mr Kmuzov: EUR 20,000 each;

(b) Mr Svanadze: EUR 10,000;

(c) Ms Baghashvili and Mr Muradov: EUR 10,000 each, and Ms Nemsadze, Ms Vakhtangadze, Ms Khozrevanidze, Mr Grigalashvili, Mr Koshkadze, Mr Tchumburidze, Mr Bochikashvili, Ms Abashidze and Mr Diasamidze: EUR 5,000 each;

(d) Mr Kurdovanidze, Ms Gomuri, Mr Sulashvili and Mr Chankseliani: EUR 30,000 each; Mr Giorgadze and Mr Chikviladze: EUR 14,000 each; Mr Sharvashidze: EUR 10,000; Mr Pochkhidze and Mr Khvadagiani: EUR 9,000 each; and Mr Shekiladze and Mr Didberashvili: EUR 7,000 each; and

(e) Mr Berikashvili: EUR 25,000.

470. The applicants maintained those claims in the proceedings before the Grand Chamber.

471. The Government’s comments on those claims

472. The Government pointed out that the four applicants seeking compensation in respect of pecuniary damage had also made those claims (seeking lower sums) in the civil proceedings against the MIA, and, chiefly on that basis, invited the Court to dismiss them. As concerned the claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the Government submitted that they were unsubstantiated and excessive.

473. The Chamber’s decision on those claims

474. The Chamber declined to make any award in respect of pecuniary damage, for the reason that it had not found a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 3. It accepted, however, that the applicants had suffered non-pecuniary damage arising out of the violation of the procedural aspect of Article 3, and made the following awards:

(a) EUR 15,000 each to Mr Kurdovanidze, Ms Gomuri, Mr Sulashvili and Mr Chankseliani;

(b) EUR 5,000 each to Mr Tsaava, Mr Kmuzov, Mr Svanadze, Ms Baghashvili, Ms Nemsadze, Ms Vakhtangadze, Ms Khozrevanidze, Mr Koshkadze, Mr Muradov, Mr Tchumburidze, Ms Abashidze, Mr Diasamidze, Mr Shekiladze, Mr Pochkhidze, Mr Giorgadze, Mr Sharvashidze, Mr Didberashvili and Mr Berikashvili; and

(c) EUR 1,800 each to Mr Khvadagiani and Mr Chikviladze.

4. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

(a) Whether an award is called for

473. Ten of the 26 applicants sought compensation in the Georgian courts in respect of the damage suffered as a result of the breaches of Articles 3 (substantive limb), 10 and 11 established by the Court in the present case (see paragraphs 147-148 above). Three of those cases are still pending at first instance; in three, awards (not yet final) were made by the Tbilisi City Court; in two, awards (not yet final) were made by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal; and in two – in which the Supreme Court of Georgia did not admit the appeals on points of law for examination – the awards made by the Tbilisi Court of Appeal are already final (see paragraphs 149-156 above).

474. However, that does not in itself bar the Court from awarding the applicants just satisfaction under Article 41 in relation to these heads of damage, in particular in the light of the nature of the breaches found in this case (see De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp v. Belgium (Article 50), 10 March 1972, § 20, Series A no. 14, where the Court first laid down this principle, confirmed in numerous cases decided since then, such as Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 83, ECHR 2000-V, and Joannou v. Turkey, no. 53240/14, § 115, 12 December 2017). Nor does the fact that those domestic proceedings are still pending necessarily constitute a reason to reserve the question of the application of Article 41 (see Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain (Article 50), 13 June 1994, § 17, Series A no. 285-C; Molla Sali v. Greece (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 20452/14, § 38, 18 June 2020; and Moustakidis v. Greece (just satisfaction), no. 58999/13, § 21, 29 October 2020).

475. It is true that applicants should not be able to derive double compensation or unjust enrichment from the Court’s judgments (see Kavaklıoğlu and Others v. Turkey (revision), no. 15397/02, § 13, 14 June 2016; Molla Sali, cited above, § 46; Casarin v. Italy, no. 4893/13, § 89, 11 February 2021; and Văleanu and Others v. Romania (just satisfaction), nos. 59012/17 and 27 others, § 123, 7 January 2025). That is why the Court takes into account domestic awards of compensation already paid to the applicants up to the time when it deals with the question of just satisfaction (see, for instance, E. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 33218/96, § 124 in fine, 26 November 2002; Leonidis v. Greece, no. 43326/05, §§ 77-78, 8 January 2009; O’Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no. 35810/09, § 202, ECHR 2014 (extracts); V.K. v. Russia, no. 68059/13, §§ 201 and 204, 7 March 2017; Ghedir v. France (just satisfaction), no. 20579/12, § 20 in fine, 15 February 2018; and Tamazount and Others v. France, nos. 17131/19 and 4 others, § 178, 4 April 2024). There are, however, also other ways in which such double compensation can be avoided:

(a) As the Court has noted in an array of cases (see, among other authorities, Serghides v. Cyprus (just satisfaction), no. 44730/98, § 29, 10 June 2003; Mason and Others v. Italy (just satisfaction), no. 43663/98, § 31, 24 July 2007; Serrilli v. Italy (just satisfaction), no. 77822/01, § 17, 17 July 2008; Frendo Randon and Others v. Malta, no. 2226/10, § 77, 22 November 2011; Harakchiev and Tolumov v. Bulgaria, nos. 15018/11 and 61199/12, § 227, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and Wcisło and Cabaj v. Poland (just satisfaction), nos. 49725/11 and 79950/13, § 22, 6 August 2020), the easiest solution in respect of applicants whose domestic compensation claims are still pending when the Court’s judgment is delivered is for the domestic courts to take account of any awards made by the Court in respect of the same head of damage, and adjust their own awards accordingly.

(b) For applicants who have obtained final and enforceable domestic awards but the respective sums have not yet been paid by the time-limit for the payment of the awards made in the Court’s judgment, double compensation can be avoided by adjusting those payments, by appropriate means under domestic law, in such a way as to take account of the Court’s award in respect of the same head of damage.

(c) For applicants who have already received payment of the compensation awarded by the domestic courts by the time-limit for the payment of the awards made in the judgment at hand (see, on this latter point, O’Keeffe, cited above, § 202), double compensation can be avoided by deducting (as authorised in the Court’s judgment) those sums from any awards made by the Court in respect of the same head of damage (see Văleanu and Others, cited above, § 123).

476. In the present case, there is no indication that, despite the compensation proceedings that ten out of the 26 applicants brought in the Georgian courts, any applicants have already obtained full reparation for the pecuniary or non-pecuniary consequences of the breaches found in the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya Yukos v. Russia (just satisfaction), no. 14902/04, § 44, 31 July 2014). An award is therefore called for.

(b) Analysis of the applicants’ claims

(i) In respect of pecuniary damage

(α) Relevant principles

477. When it comes to pecuniary damage of the sort claimed here (loss of earning capacity resulting from an injury), the Court is guided by the following principles:

(a) There must be a direct causal link between the breach(es) found by the Court and that damage (see, for instance, İlhan v. Turkey [GC], no. 22277/93, § 109, ECHR 2000-VII; Mikheyev v. Russia, no. 77617/01, § 157, 26 January 2006; Alsayed Allaham v. Greece, no. 25771/03, § 40, 18 January 2007; Saçılık and Others v. Turkey (just satisfaction), nos. 43044/05 and 45001/05, §§ 37-39, 14 April 2015; Ghedir, cited above, §§ 7, 14-15 and 19; and, mutatis mutandis, Hasan Köse v. Turkey, no. 15014/11, § 55, 18 December 2018).

(b) As required by the overarching principle of full reparation (restitutio in integrum), the applicant should, as far as possible, be put in the position that he or she would have enjoyed had the breach(es) not occurred (see Papamichalopoulos and Others v. Greece (Article 50), 31 October 1995, § 36, Series A no. 330-B, and Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], no. 55707/00, § 111, ECHR 2009).

(c) A precise calculation of the sums necessary to make full reparation for future loss of this kind is prevented by its inherently uncertain character, but an award may still be made, irrespective of the imponderables involved in assessing that loss (see, specifically with reference to permanent bodily harm resulting from a breach of Article 3, Mikheyev, cited above, § 158, and Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704/04, § 166, 17 December 2009). That assessment will inevitably involve a degree of speculation; when carrying it out, the Court may be guided by, but is not bound by, the criteria adopted in the domestic system (compare, mutatis mutandis, Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland (Article 50), 31 January 1995, § 15, Series A no. 305-A; Z and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, § 120 in fine, ECHR 2001-V; Mifsud and Others v. Malta (just satisfaction), no. 38770/17, § 20, 25 November 2021; and N.M. and Others v. France (just satisfaction), no. 66328/14, § 68, 2 November 2023).

(d) Normally, the appropriate method is to estimate, in so far as possible, the sums that the applicant would have earned had it not been for the breach, and deduct from them the sums that he or she is likely to earn given the fact of the breach (compare Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, § 21, ECHR 2000-IX, and Kulykov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 5114/09 and 17 others, § 154, 19 January 2017).

(e) The degree and likely duration of the loss of earning capacity resulting from the injury are important factors in carrying out that estimation (compare, mutatis mutandis, Z and Others v. the United Kingdom, cited above, §§ 123, 125 in fine and 126; Ahmet Özkan and Others v. Turkey, no. 21689/93, § 491, 6 April 2004; and Akkoyunlu v. Turkey, no. 7505/06, § 47, 13 October 2015). The Court must also take account of other contingencies, such as unemployment or incapacity to work for reasons independent of the injury at issue in the case (see Sangariyeva and Others v. Russia, no. 1839/04, § 128, 29 May 2008; Karandja v. Bulgaria, no. 69180/01, § 76, 7 October 2010; and, mutatis mutandis, Kulykov and Others, cited above, § 154). It may, where appropriate, also factor in the likely evolution of the economic conditions in the relevant country (compare, mutatis mutandis, Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan (just satisfaction) [GC], no. 40167/06, § 50, 12 December 2017).

(f) The above points should normally be assessed on the basis of detailed information and evidence made available to the Court. In the absence of such information and evidence, and of an acceptable suggestion about the method of estimating the loss, the Court must deal with the claim on an equitable basis (see Mikheyev, cited above, § 162; Denis Vasilyev, cited above, § 169; and Tunikova and Others v. Russia, nos. 55974/16 and 3 others, § 136, 14 December 2021).

(β) Application of those principles

478. In this case, the Grand Chamber accepts that the injuries suffered by the four applicants claiming compensation in respect of pecuniary damage (Mr Kurdovanidze, Ms Gomuri, Mr Sulashvili and Mr Chankseliani), duly attested, are such as may indeed affect their earning capacity and thus cause them pecuniary loss. It also accepts that, owing to the circumstances in which the applicants sustained those injuries, there is a direct causal link between that loss and the substantive breach of Article 3.

479. As concerns the quantum of that damage, the Grand Chamber observes that the four applicants’ claims chiefly rest on the assumption that they will not be able to earn a living for the remainder of their active lives, and they have requested compensation corresponding to their projected loss of income. Yet their loss of earning capacity is partial, as reflected in the assessment of the competent domestic authorities and courts (see paragraphs 99, 102 in fine, 104 in fine, 150 (iii), (v) and (vii) and 154 above). The Grand Chamber does not accept as a general proposition that a partially sighted person cannot find employment, even if the range of occupations open to them may be narrower. It therefore considers that the assumption made by the applicants is not well founded.

480. The Government have, for their part, not suggested any alternative method or figures which they would regard as reasonable (compare Akdeniz and Others v. Turkey, no. 23954/94, § 129 in fine, 31 May 2001, and Hasan Köse, cited above, § 56 in fine). In the absence of reliable data or criteria enabling the Grand Chamber to proceed otherwise, and given the significant imponderables that are involved, it must then, inevitably, deal with those claims on an equitable basis (see the authorities cited in paragraph 477 (f) above).

481. Having regard to the relevant factors before it (in particular, the applicants’ respective ages, their personal situations in terms of previous and present employment and their possible future prospects to the extent that these have been documented in their submissions, as well as the general economic situation in Georgia in recent years), and ruling in equity and within the limitations flowing from the principle of ne ultra petitum (see Nagmetov v. Russia [GC], no. 35589/08, § 71, 30 March 2017; see also paragraph 7 of the Practice Direction on Just Satisfaction Claims), the Grand Chamber considers it appropriate to award the applicants the following sums:

(a) EUR 85,000 to Mr Kurdovanidze;

(b) EUR 75,000 to Ms Gomuri;

(c) EUR 75,000 to Mr Sulashvili; and

(d) EUR 85,000 to Mr Chankseliani.

482. Any sums already paid to those applicants pursuant to awards in respect of pecuniary damage made by the Georgian courts (see paragraph 150 (iii), (v) and (vii) and paragraph 154 above) by the date when the Court’s awards become due are to be deducted from the above sums (see, mutatis mutandis, Văleanu and Others, cited above, § 123).

(ii) In respect of non-pecuniary damage

(α) The 24 applicants who obtained awards under this head in the Chamber proceedings

483. The Grand Chamber considers that the applicants must have suffered non-pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of the various violations made in this judgment. The complications arising in relation to the question of pecuniary damage are not relevant for the claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage.

484. In determining the level of the awards, the Grand Chamber has taken account of the nature and severity of the various breaches of the applicants’ rights, and of the mental and physical suffering this caused to them. In particular, the severity of the injuries received – which range from permanent visual impairment, through serious and painful injuries, to relatively minor ones – has also been taken into account. Ruling on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41, and applying the principle of ne ultra petitum (see Nagmetov, cited above, § 71), the Grand Chamber considers it appropriate to award the applicants the following sums, plus any tax that may be chargeable:

(a) EUR 30,000 each to Mr Kurdovanidze, Ms Gomuri, Mr Sulashvili and Mr Chankseliani;

(b) EUR 21,000 to Mr Berikashvili;

(c) EUR 20,000 each to Mr Tsaava and Mr Kmuzov;

(d) EUR 14,000 each to Mr Giorgadze and Mr Chikviladze;

(e) EUR 10,000 each to Mr Svanadze, Ms Baghashvili, Mr Muradov and Mr Sharvashidze;

(f) EUR 9,000 each to Mr Pochkhidze and Mr Khvadagiani;

(g) EUR 7,000 each to Mr Shekiladze and Mr Didberashvili; and

(h) EUR 5,000 each to Ms Nemsadze, Ms Vakhtangadze, Ms Khozrevanidze, Mr Koshkadze, Mr Tchumburidze, Ms Abashidze and Mr Diasamidze.

485. Any sums already paid to the applicants pursuant to awards in respect of non-pecuniary damage made by the Georgian courts (see paragraphs 150 and 153 above) by the date when the Court’s awards become due are to be deducted from the above sums (see, mutatis mutandis, Văleanu and Others, cited above, § 123).

(β) The two applicants who obtained no award under this head in the Chamber proceedings

486. The Chamber declared the complaints of two applicants – Mr Grigalashvili and Mr Bochikashvili – under Article 3 inadmissible (see paragraph 218 and 382 above). Since it refrained from examining the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 10 (see paragraph 357 above), it made no awards to them. However, the Grand Chamber declared Mr Grigalashvili’s and Mr Bochikashvili’s complaints under Article 10 admissible and found a breach of that provision in relation to each of them (see paragraphs 372, 382 and 403 above). In those circumstances, an award is called for.

487. Ruling on an equitable basis, as required under Article 41, and taking into account the nature of the breach found with respect to each of those two applicants, the extent of the suffering that each of them must have endured on account of that breach, and the limitations flowing from the principle of ne ultra petitum (see Nagmetov, cited above, § 71), the Grand Chamber considers it appropriate to award each of them the full sum claimed (EUR 5,000), plus any tax that may be chargeable.

488. Costs and expenses

     1. Claims before the Chamber

489. Only the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) and in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) made claims in respect of costs and expenses in the Chamber proceedings. Both groups of applicants sought reimbursement of the sums incurred for the work of their United Kingdom-based lawyers, Mr Collis and Ms Gavron. The former claimed a total of 6,225 pounds sterling (GBP), and the latter claimed a total of GBP 6,247.16.

490. In support of these claims, the applicants submitted agreements with EHRAC (the organisation employing the lawyers) containing undertakings by the applicants to pay EHRAC’s fees and expenses if awarded by the Court. They also indicated that the hourly rate charged by each of the two lawyers was GBP 150. The applicants also submitted time sheets showing how many hours each of the two lawyers had spent working on the Chamber proceedings: 33.1 hours (Mr Collis) and 7.4 hours (Ms Gavron).

491. The Chamber’s decision on those claims

492. Noting that those applicants had submitted conditional-fee agreements with their lawyers, and taking into account the documents in its possession and the relevant criteria, the Chamber awarded EUR 6,000, covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that might be chargeable to the applicants.

493. Claim before the Grand Chamber

494. The applicants made an updated joint claim in respect of costs and expenses, which included also the costs and expenses referable to the Grand Chamber proceedings. Again, only the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) and Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) sought the reimbursement of costs and expenses in relation to the Chamber proceedings. As regards the Grand Chamber proceedings, the applicants noted that the joint submissions drawn up by their lawyers had been submitted on behalf of the applicants in all five applications.

495. They noted that the Chamber had only awarded EUR 6,000 under this head, and accordingly capped their claims in relation to the Chamber proceedings to that sum – while reiterating, for the sake of completeness, their original claims in that respect.

496. In relation to the Grand Chamber proceedings, the applicants sought the reimbursement of GBP 26,829 in respect of a total of 178.86 hours spent working on the case by Mr Collis, Ms Gavron and a third United Kingdom-based lawyer, Ms Alonzo (likewise employed by EHRAC – see paragraph 3 above), all at the hourly rate of GBP 150. They also sought GBP 150 in respect of administrative expenses.

497. The applicants requested that any sums awarded under this head be paid in euros and directly into EHRAC’s bank account.

498. In support of these claims, they re-submitted the documents that they had submitted to the Chamber (see paragraph 489 above), plus three time sheets showing how many hours each of the three lawyers had spent working on the Grand Chamber proceedings: 112.86 hours (Mr Collis), 58 hours (Ms Alonzo) and 8 hours (Ms Gavron).

499. The Government’s comments on the claims

500. According to the Government, the applicants had not demonstrated that the costs claimed by them had been necessary. Moreover, their claim in that respect appeared excessive. Since the applicants had been able to secure the services of lawyers based in Georgia, the need to also retain United Kingdom-based lawyers had not been shown. On that basis, the Government invited the Court to reject the claims or to award a reasonable sum.

501. The Grand Chamber’s assessment

502. It is settled case-law that only costs and expenses which have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum are recoverable under this head (see, among many other authorities, McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom, 27 September 1995, § 220, Series A no. 324; Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08, § 243 in fine, ECHR 2012; and Merabishvili, cited above, § 370).

(a) Costs and expenses in the Chamber proceedings

498. The applicants capped their claim in respect of the Chamber proceedings to the sum awarded by the Chamber – EUR 6,000 (see paragraphs 490 and 492 above). The Grand Chamber sees no reason to depart from that sum.

(b) Costs and expenses in the Grand Chamber proceedings

499. The claim in respect of the Grand Chamber proceedings appears to have been made on behalf of all 26 applicants (see paragraph 491 in fine). However, no retainer agreements between EHRAC and the applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Svanadze (no. 16757/20) and Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) have been produced (see paragraphs 489 and 495 above). It is therefore open to question whether those four applicants have actually incurred costs and expenses in relation to the Grand Chamber proceedings. The lawyers engaged by the applicants in the other two applications could have been acting pro bono with respect to those four applicants; however, under the Court’s case-law, lawyers’ fees have been actually incurred only if the applicants have either paid them or are liable to pay them (see McCann and Others, cited above, § 221; Merabishvili, cited above, § 371; and Mamasakhlisi and Others v. Georgia and Russia, nos. 29999/04 and 41424/04, § 453, 7 March 2023).

500. The applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Svanadze (no. 16757/20) and Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) cannot therefore be awarded any costs and expenses.

501. By contrast, in so far as the 22 applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) and Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) are concerned, the conditional-fee agreements and time sheets produced in support of their claims are sufficient to show that they have actually incurred the lawyers’ fees and the related expenses whose reimbursement they are seeking (see Kukhalashvili and Others v. Georgia, nos. 8938/07 and 41891/07, §§ 166-67, 2 April 2020).

502. No doubt arises regarding the necessity of those fees and expenses. Moreover, the applicants’ additional recourse to specialist lawyers based abroad cannot be criticised (see Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, § 179, Reports 1998-III; Aktaş v. Turkey, no. 24351/94, § 369, ECHR 2003-V (extracts); and Nada, cited above, § 244).

503. It can also be accepted that the amount of those fees and expenses is reasonable:

(a) The hourly rate charged (GBP 150) is towards the lower end of those accepted by the English courts for cost-assessment purposes. Although the Court is not bound by such domestic scales, it may derive assistance from them (see, among other authorities, Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 13 July 1995, § 77, Series A no. 316; Assanidze v. Georgia [GC], no. 71503/01, § 206 in fine, ECHR 2004-II; and Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. 48939/99, § 175, ECHR 2004‑XII).

(b) The total number of hours spent by the three lawyers working on the case (178.86) does not appear unreasonable, given that the case was before the Grand Chamber and that, as a result of the manner in which the Chamber dealt with it, it took an unusual turn and required submissions on additional issues as well. The number of hours can also be explained by the high number of applicants, which no doubt required additional work (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 265, ECHR 2009).

504. The Grand Chamber therefore allows the claim in full, and awards jointly to the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) and Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) a total of EUR 32,414.99 – that being the equivalent of their claim, as expressed in GBP (GBP 26.829 in respect of lawyers’ fees, plus GBP 150 in respect of administrative expenses), converted at the GBP/EUR exchange rate on 26 November 2024, the date when they submitted the claim.

(c) Manner of payment

505. As requested by the applicants (see paragraph 494 above), the above sums are to be paid into the bank account indicated by their lawyers.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Dismisses, by fifteen votes to two, the first limb of the Government’s preliminary objection, of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies;
2. Joins, unanimously, the second limb of the Government’s preliminary objection to the merits of the complaints under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention;
3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention with respect to all twenty-four applicants whose complaints under that provision were declared admissible, and dismisses the second limb of the Government’s preliminary objection (previously joined to the merits);
4. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of the substantive limb of Article 3 of the Convention with respect to all twenty-four applicants whose complaints under that provision were declared admissible;
5. Declares, by a majority, the complaints under Article 10 of the Convention in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Svanadze (no. 16757/20) and Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) admissible;
6. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention with respect to the applicants in Tsaava and Kmuzov (no. 13186/20), Svanadze (no. 16757/20) and Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21);
7. Joins, unanimously, the Government’s objection that the complaints under Article 11 of the Convention are incompatible ratione materiae to the merits of those complaints;
8. Declares, by a majority, the complaints under Article 11 of the Convention by two of the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) – Mr Kurdovanidze and Mr Sulashvili – admissible;
9. Declares, by a majority, the complaints under Article 11 of the Convention by the nine remaining applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21) and by the applicant in Berikashvili (no. 39382/21) admissible;
10. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention with respect to the applicants in Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21)[3] and Berikashvili (no. 39382/21), and dismisses the Government’s objection that the complaints under that Article are incompatible ratione materiae (previously joined to the merits);
11. Holds, by sixteen votes to one, that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 13 of the Convention;
12. Holds, unanimously, that the respondent State has not failed to comply with its duty under Article 38 of the Convention;
13. Holds, unanimously,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date of this judgment, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) in respect of pecuniary damage:

– EUR 85,000 (eighty-five thousand euros) to Mr Kurdovanidze;

– EUR 75,000 (seventy-five thousand euros) to Ms Gomuri;

– EUR 75,000 (seventy-five thousand euros) to Mr Sulashvili;

– EUR 85,000 (eighty-five thousand euros) to Mr Chankseliani;

(ii) in respect of non-pecuniary damage:

– EUR 30,000 (thirty thousand euros) each to Mr Kurdovanidze, Ms Gomuri, Mr Sulashvili and Mr Chankseliani;

– EUR 21,000 (twenty-one thousand euros) to Mr Berikashvili;

– EUR 20,000 (twenty thousand euros) each to Mr Tsaava and Mr Kmuzov;

– EUR 14,000 (fourteen thousand euros) each to Mr Giorgadze and Mr Chikviladze;

– EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) each to Mr Svanadze, Ms Baghashvili, Mr Muradov and Mr Sharvashidze;

– EUR 9,000 (nine thousand euros) each to Mr Pochkhidze and Mr Khvadagiani;

– EUR 7,000 (seven thousand euros) each to Mr Shekiladze and Mr Didberashvili; and

– EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros) each to Ms Nemsadze, Ms Vakhtangadze, Ms Khozrevanidze, Mr Grigalashvili, Mr Koshkadze, Mr Tchumburidze, Mr Bochikashvili, Ms Abashidze and Mr Diasamidze,
plus any tax that may be chargeable on those sums;

(iii) in respect of costs and expenses, jointly to all the applicants in Baghashvili and Others (no. 20129/21) and Kurdovanidze and Others (no. 20175/21), EUR 38,414.99 (thirty-eight thousand four hundred and fourteen euros and ninety-nine cents), plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, to be paid into the bank account indicated by their lawyers;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

14. Dismisses, by sixteen votes to one, the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.

Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 11 December 2025, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

John Darcy Arnfinn Bårdsen
Deputy to the Registrar President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following are annexed to this judgment:

(a) Partly dissenting opinion of Judge Serghides;

(b) Statement of partial dissent by Judge Eicke.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGHIDES

1. As indicated in the introduction to the judgment, the present case stemmed from the dispersal of a public demonstration held in front of the Georgian Parliament in June 2019. The applicants, most of whom were participants in that demonstration or journalists covering it, all sustained injuries during the dispersal. They all participated in the subsequent criminal investigation – still ongoing – concerning the use of force by the police in breaking up the protest. The applicants lodged complaints under both the substantive and procedural aspects of Article 3 of the Convention. Most applicants also relied on Article 10, while the remaining ones relied on Article 11. In addition, they raised complaints under Article 13, and some further alleged a violation of Article 38.

2. I voted in favour of all points of the operative provisions, except for two: (i) point 11, which holds that there is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 13 of the Convention; and (ii) point 14, dismissing the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction. I inevitably voted against point 14 because of my disagreement with point 11.

3. The applicants in all five applications complained that they had not had an effective remedy in respect of the complaints under Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraph 446 of the judgment). The majority of the Court decided that there was no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the complaints under Article 13 (see paragraph 450 of the judgment, to which point 11 of the operative provisions corresponds). They did so, as they said, in the light of their findings under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention (see paragraphs 295-301 of the judgment), in particular that there had been a violation of the procedural limb of that provision resulting from the absence of an effective investigation in respect of the force used by the authorities to disperse the demonstration on 20-21 June 2019.

4. My disagreement with the majority lies in the fact that the content and scope of the procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation under Article 3 – arising from the development of the Court’s case-law on positive obligations[4] – are conceptually and functionally distinct from those of Article 13 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to an effective remedy. The two rights share only the adjective “effective”, which, however, denotes distinct legal concepts in each context. Unlike the said procedural obligation, the right under Article 13 is a stand-alone and autonomous right. By declining to examine the complaint under Article 13, we risk conflating two distinct protections: one tied to Article 3, founded on the principle of effectiveness[5], and the other ensuring effective remedies under Article 13. Such an approach undermines the cornerstone of the Convention, namely the right of individual application under Article 34, which secures the Convention’s effectiveness and the very essence of the rule of law.

5. This approach equally undermines the principles of subsidiarity and the exhaustion of domestic remedies. Article 13 gives concrete effect to the subsidiarity principle enshrined in the Preamble to the Convention. By failing to take account of this connection, the Court missed a crucial opportunity to offer States clarification as to the nature and scope of “effective remedies” and what such remedies should entail in practice. In this regard, the Court’s reasoning in Kudła v. Poland ([GC], no. 30210/96, § 152, ECHR 2000-XI), is particularly instructive:

“... Article 13, giving direct expression to the States’ obligation to protect human rights first and foremost within their own legal system, establishes an additional guarantee for an individual in order to ensure that he or she effectively enjoys those rights. The object of Article 13, as emerges from the travaux préparatoires (see the Collected Edition of the ‘Travaux Préparatoires’ of the European Convention on Human Rights, vol. II, pp. 485 and 490, and vol. III, p. 651), is to provide a means whereby individuals can obtain relief at national level for violations of their Convention rights before having to set in motion the international machinery of complaint before the Court. From this perspective, the right of an individual to trial within a reasonable time will be less effective if there exists no opportunity to submit the Convention claim first to a national authority; and the requirements of Article 13 are to be seen as reinforcing those of Article 6 § 1, rather than being absorbed by the general obligation imposed by that Article not to subject individuals to inordinate delays in legal proceedings.”

6. Lastly, a right emerging from the Court’s case-law, such as the right we examined in the present case under Article 3, cannot displace or diminish a right expressly anchored in the text of the Convention. Relying on a procedural breach of Article 3 of the Convention to avoid an Article 13 review would mean that some rights will have stronger de facto remedial protection than others – which is not a coherent remedial architecture. On the basis of the above, it must therefore be recognised that the two rights, being distinct in both scope and function, may give rise to different legal consequences when it comes to assessing an alleged violation. Consequently, the issue is not only of great conceptual importance but also of significant practical importance.

7. In the light of the foregoing, if I had not been in the minority, I would have examined the complaint under Article 13. A blanket practice of saying “there is no need to examine the Article 13 complaint”, or “no separate issue arises under Article 13”, risks making Article 13 illusory and undermines the Court’s own standard.

STATEMENT OF PARTIAL DISSENT BY JUDGE EICKE

I voted against point 8 of the Operative Provisions as I consider that, in application of the Court’s consistent jurisprudence, the two applicants concerned had lost their victim status in relation to their complaint under Article 11 (but not under Article 3). After all, as the judgment records at paragraphs 149-156, the domestic civil courts, in proceedings brought by these applicants, had acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and afforded redress in the form of awards of compensation for non-pecuniary damages for, the alleged breach of Article 11 of the Convention.

APPENDIX – TABLE OF THE TWENTY-SIX APPLICANTS

[1] A report produced by one of the third-party interveners in the case, INCLO (see paragraph 10 above and paragraphs 321-325 below), explains that kinetic impact projectiles are bullet-like missiles used in various law-enforcement contexts as a deterrent through the pain of impact. Shot from firearms, they were developed to offer the deterrent power of being struck with a hand-held baton from greater physical distances. Their variety has led to an abundance of common and trade names for what are often referred to as “baton rounds”. They are most commonly called “rubber bullets” regardless of their composition: modern ones are most often made of plastic, metal, or other materials such as wood or rock salt. Some are designed to be fired as a single missile, while others are fired as a group of small projectiles. The latter are sometimes known as “pellets”, “scatter shot”, or “multiple projectile rounds”, where many small to medium-sized spheres are fired at a broad target. “Bean bag rounds” also consist of small metal pellets that are stitched into a synthetic cloth bag designed to expand on impact and therefore behave as a single projectile. Newer weapons include projectiles with a hard outer shell encasing chemical irritants that explode upon impact, or “attenuated energy projectiles”, where a hollow tip can limit the risk of ricochet or penetration by crushing into itself on impact (see International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations and Physicians for Human Rights, “Lethal in Disguise 2: How Crowd-Control Weapons Impact Health and Human Rights”, 2023, pp. 28-29).

[2] In accordance with the GEL/EUR exchange rate on 18 June 2020, when the claim was brought. All subsequent currency conversions in this paragraph and in paragraphs 150 and 153 below have been made using the GEL/EUR exchange rate on the date of the relevant event (filing of the claim or first-instance or appellate judgment).

[3] Except in respect of the eighth applicant in that application, who raised no complaint under Article 11 of the Convention – see paragraph 445 (a) above.

[4] Originating in 1968 in Case “relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” (merits), 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6.

[5] It is this principle which, in my view, affords holistic protection of the rights guaranteed, operating through both substantive and procedural limbs. This dual approach reflects the need for States to respect negative obligations, by refraining from unjustified interference, and to fulfil positive duties, by taking measures to secure the effective enjoyment of those rights.