CASE OF KHADIJA ISMAYILOVA v. AZERBAIJAN (No. 4)

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF KHADIJA ISMAYILOVA v. AZERBAIJAN (No. 4)

(Applications nos. 71556/16 and 74112/17)

JUDGMENT

Art 7 • Nullum crimen sine lege • Nulla poena sine lege • Applicant’s conviction for illegal entrepreneurship for her work as a freelance journalist with foreign media without accreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs • Relevant legislative provisions extensively and unforeseeably construed to the applicant’s detriment, in a manner which did not constitute a development consistent with the essence of that offence • Application of domestic law in such an arbitrary manner unforeseeable

Art 6 § 1 (criminal) • Fair hearing • Applicant’s conviction for illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion arbitrary • Domestic courts’ decisions fundamentally flawed and manifestly arbitrary • Fairness of criminal proceedings undermined in such a fundamental way that other criminal procedure guarantees rendered irrelevant

Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Not shown that the criminal proceedings against the applicant and convictions bore no relation to her journalistic activities • Impugned interference unlawful, grossly arbitrary, incompatible with rule of law principle and did not pursue any legitimate aim

Art 18 (+ Art 10) • Restriction for unauthorised purposes • Criminal proceedings brought against well-known investigative journalist and civil society activist to silence and to punish her for her journalistic activities

Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.

STRASBOURG

27 January 2026

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 4),

The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Ioannis Ktistakis, President,
Lətif Hüseynov,
Darian Pavli,
Úna Ní Raifeartaigh,
Mateja Đurović,
Canòlic Mingorance Cairat,
Vasilka Sancin, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the applications (nos. 71556/16 and 74112/17) against the Republic of Azerbaijan lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Azerbaijani national, Ms Khadija Rovshan gizi Ismayilova (Xədicə Rövşən qızı İsmayılova – “the applicant”), on the dates indicated in the appended table;

the decision to give notice to the Azerbaijani Government (“the Government”) of the complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b), (c) and (d) and Articles 7, 10 and 18 of the Convention and to declare the remainder of application no. 71556/16 inadmissible;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated in private on 30 September and 9 December 2025,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last‑mentioned date:

INTRODUCTION

1. The applications concern the alleged unfairness of the criminal proceedings against the applicant and the alleged breach of her right not to be convicted on account of acts which did not constitute the criminal offence of illegal entrepreneurship under domestic law. The applicant also complained that her prosecution and conviction had amounted to a restriction of her right to freedom of expression, which had been applied for a purpose other than those prescribed by the Convention. The applicant relied on Articles 6, 7, 10 and 18 of the Convention.

THE FACTS

2. The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Baku. She was represented by Mr P. Hughes and Mr F. Namazli, lawyers based in London and Azerbaijan respectively.

3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Ç. Əsgərov.

4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

5. BACKGROUND AND CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST THE APPLICANT

6. The applicant is a well-known investigative journalist and civil society activist. She is known for her strong criticism of the Azerbaijani government and was involved earlier in her career in numerous journalistic investigations relating, in particular, to cases of alleged corruption and the business activities of public officials (for more information, see Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, nos. 65286/13 and 57270/14, §§ 6-9, 10 January 2019, and Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), no. 30778/15, §§ 11‑12, 27 February 2020).

7. In November 2007 the applicant started to work as a freelance journalist for the Baku bureau of the Azerbaijani service (“Azadliq Radio”) of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (“RFE/RL”). RFE/RL is a non-profit international broadcasting corporation with its headquarters in Prague and funded by the United States Congress.

8. On 1 July 2008 the applicant was recruited to the Baku bureau as acting head of the bureau, based on a fixed-term employment contract. On 1 July 2009 the applicant was appointed as head of the bureau and her employment contract was further extended. On 1 October 2010 the applicant’s employment contract with RFE/RL was terminated and from then until December 2014 she worked for the bureau on a freelance basis.

9. On 20 October 2014 T.M., a former colleague of the applicant at Azadliq Radio, attempted to commit suicide. On 24 October 2014 the Prosecutor General’s Office instituted criminal proceedings under Article 125 (incitement to suicide) of the Criminal Code.

10. On 25 November 2014 T.M. lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General’s Office accusing the applicant of inciting him to commit suicide. On 5 December 2014 the applicant was charged with the criminal offence under Article 125 of the Criminal Code in the framework of the above-mentioned criminal proceedings and was detained on remand (for more detail, see Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, §§ 16-27).

11. On 13 February 2015 the applicant was charged with additional criminal offences under Articles 179.3.2 (high-level embezzlement), 192.2.2 (illegal entrepreneurship committed for the purpose of generating a large amount of income), 213.1 (tax evasion) and 308.2 (aggravated abuse of power) of the Criminal Code (ibid., § 36). In particular, she was accused of the following:

(i) The applicant had allegedly misappropriated State property and abused her power by illegally employing several individuals to work at the Baku bureau of Azadliq Radio on the basis of service contracts under the Civil Code (which were subject to a simplified low tax rate of 4%). In breach of the requirements of the Labour Code, the applicant had not signed employment contracts with those people (which would have been subject to personal income tax at a rate of 14%) and had therefore inflicted material damage on the State in the amount of 17,992.60 Azerbaijani manats (AZN), which represented a difference of 10% between the above rates;

(ii) In the applicant’s capacity as head of the Baku bureau of Azadliq Radio, which was a non-commercial organisation, she had allegedly engaged in illegal entrepreneurship by continuing the radio broadcasting activities of the Baku bureau despite the fact that the broadcasting licence given to the bureau by the National Television and Radio Council had expired on 1 January 2008 and had not been renewed thereafter, which amounted to conducting entrepreneurial activity without a licence within the meaning of Article 192 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore, since 1 October 2010 she had been working for Azadliq Radio without being accredited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a representative of the foreign media, as required by the Law on Media, which amounted to “entrepreneurial activity without State registration” within the meaning of Article 192 of the Criminal Code. Consequently, in the period between 1 July 2008 and 1 December 2014 the applicant had acquired profit through illegal entrepreneurship by receiving and paying money to herself and other employees of the Baku bureau “disguised as salaries and service fees” in the total amount of AZN 335,880.54 (including AZN 79,480 during the period after 1 October 2010);

(iii) While head of the Baku bureau of Azadliq Radio in the period between 1 July 2008 and 1 October 2010, the applicant had allegedly avoided paying profit tax in the amount of AZN 45,145.63.

2. THE APPLICANT’S CONVICTION AND APPEALS

3. On 1 September 2015 the Baku Court of Serious Crimes acquitted the applicant of the charge under Article 125 (incitement to suicide) of the Criminal Code for lack of evidence and convicted her under Articles 179.3.2, 192.2.2, 213.1 and 308.2 of the Criminal Code. It sentenced her to seven and a half years’ imprisonment and a ban on holding managerial and financial positions in public and local self-government bodies for a period of three years. In particular, as regards the charge of illegal entrepreneurship under Article 192.2.2, the court found her guilty on account of broadcasting without a licence and working without accreditation (as described in detail in paragraph 10 above). As regards the charge of tax evasion under Article 231.1 of the Criminal Code, it appears that the court mainly relied on an interim audit report by the Ministry of Taxes of 19 January 2015, issued at the request of the prosecuting authorities, and on a forensic accounting report of 13 February 2015, as well as testimony by the authors of those reports and a number of bank documents. The reports stated, inter alia, that, while during its operations Azadliq Radio made various payments in connection with the collection of information as well as other related expenses, it was not possible to identify the purpose and destination of some of those payments. Some money was paid to individuals who did not work for it and its bank statements did not indicate the purpose and destination of certain payments. Some of the documents confirming the purpose and destination of payments were missing from the documents obtained for audit. As a result of those payments being made for unknown purposes and to unknown destinations, it was determined that Azadliq Radio had engaged in activities not aligning with its main activity as defined in its charter. It appears that, therefore, the authors of the reports regarded the total amount received by Azadliq Radio from its head office for its activities as “profit” and calculated a 20% profit tax (mənfəət vergisi) from that amount. While the applicant was the head of the Baku bureau from 1 July 2008 to 1 October 2010, the unpaid profit tax calculated for that period corresponded to AZN 45,145.63. The court further held that, in accordance with Article 53.1 of the Tax Code, the applicant, as the head of the representative office, was responsible for the under-reporting and non‑payment of those taxes.

4. The applicant appealed against that judgment, arguing that she had been wrongfully convicted of criminal offences that she had not committed. Citing a number of examples of her investigative journalistic work, she submitted that because of this, she had faced extensive harassment in various forms. She further argued that the criminal proceedings against her formed part of the broader harassment she had already faced because of her investigative work and were intended to silence and punish her for her publications exposing high-level corruption. Moreover, in respect of the offence of illegal entrepreneurship in the part concerning her work without accreditation, she submitted that during the period between 1 October 2010 and 1 December 2014 she had not been an employee of Azadliq Radio (and thus, not a representative of foreign media), but had worked as a freelance journalist collaborating with various local and foreign media outlets on the basis of civil-law contracts. Moreover, under the relevant provisions of the Law on Media, accreditation of foreign journalists with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not a precondition for journalistic activity, but merely a right that granted access to more opportunities to receive information. The domestic law did not provide for any criminal or other form of liability for not obtaining accreditation and it was erroneous to characterise journalistic activity without applying for accreditation as illegal entrepreneurship. For that reason, it was also “legal nonsense” to conclude that her income from her journalistic work during the relevant period, namely AZN 79,480, had amounted to illegally obtained profit.

5. With regard to the offence of tax evasion, the applicant argued that the finding that Azadliq Radio had “engaged in activities not complying with its main activity as defined in its charter” had been vague and unclear as to what exactly it had meant. Previous tax audits of Azadliq Radio had not revealed any breaches of tax law. Azadliq Radio was a non-commercial organisation and its purposes did not include business activities. As such, it could not be subject to profit tax. Moreover, Azadliq Radio only received money from its parent entity in Prague and classifying the entire amount transferred to it during the period between 1 July 2008 to 1 October 2010 (amounting to AZN 1,354,368 in total for that period) as “profit” had been a “clear manifestation of prejudice” against the applicant. That amount had not been profit, rather it had merely represented the necessary and minimal expenses needed for Azadliq Radio to continue functioning (such as rent, employees’ salaries, fees to be paid to contract-based workers and repairs). Moreover, as head of the Baku bureau of Azadliq Radio, the applicant had not had financial tasks and had not been responsible for paying taxes or social contributions and, according to her employment contract, she had only had a coordinating role between the Baku bureau and the main office in Prague (see, for more detail, Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, §§ 8-9). The applicant also argued, in respect of the interim audit report of 19 January 2015, that the Tax Code did not provide for an “interim report” (aralıq aktı) and that the report and its contents had not been in compliance with the requirements of the Tax Code (the specific provisions relied on by the applicant are summarised in paragraphs 25-28 below). The report had not determined the issues of liability, nor had it specifically explained for what exactly the applicant had been responsible, and no decision had been made to hold her accountable for violating tax legislation. Neither that report, nor the forensic accounting report of 13 February 2015, which had been subsequently issued on its basis, could be considered lawful and accepted as evidence.

6. On 25 November 2015 the Baku Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance court’s judgment of 1 September 2015, repeating its reasoning. In particular, in respect of the offence of illegal entrepreneurship, it held that, as the head of the Baku bureau of Azadliq Radio, the applicant had continued broadcasting after its radio broadcasting licence had expired on 1 January 2008 and that, moreover, she had worked as a representative of the foreign media without obtaining the required accreditation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus engaging in “entrepreneurial activity without State registration” which constituted the criminal offence of illegal entrepreneurship. In respect of the offence of tax evasion, it found that, based on the available evidence, the applicant, as the head of the Baku bureau of Azadliq Radio during the period between 1 July 2008 and 1 October 2010, was responsible for the under-reporting and non-payment of profit tax in the amount of AZN 45,145.63. The court remained silent concerning the specific arguments raised by the applicant in her appeal.

7. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, repeating her arguments.

8. On 25 May 2016 the Supreme Court quashed the part of the appellate court’s judgment of 25 November 2015 relating to the applicant’s conviction under Articles 179.3.2 and 308.2 of the Criminal Code for lack of the constituent elements of the offence, as well as her conviction under Article 192.2.2 of the Criminal Code for the part concerning broadcasting without a licence, and upheld her conviction under Articles 192.2.2 (concerning her journalistic activity without being accredited) and 213.1 (tax evasion) of the Criminal Code. As to the latter two criminal offences, it repeated the lower courts’ reasoning and did not address any of her specific arguments in detail, dismissing them in general terms by stating that they could not be a basis for concluding that she had not committed those criminal offences. The Supreme Court reduced the applicant’s sentence to three and a half years’ imprisonment suspended on probation for a period of five years. She was released from detention. Her release was subject to her not changing her permanent place of residence without notifying the law-enforcement authorities in advance, which effectively amounted to a ban on international travel for the period of her probation.

9. FOLLOW-UP PROCEEDINGS

10. In the meantime, on 6 May 2016 Article 192.1 of the Criminal Code was amended and the words “tax registration” (vergi uçotuna) in parentheses were added to the Article after the words “State registration” (dövlət qeydiyyatına – see paragraph 22 below).

11. Subsequently, the applicant lodged an application with the Baku Court of Serious Crimes, asking for her criminal conviction under Article 192.2.2 of the Criminal Code to be quashed, submitting that the acts of which she had been convicted did not constitute a criminal offence under that provision following the above-mentioned amendment. She argued that the amendment clarified the meaning of the phrase “State registration” in the definition of the criminal offence of illegal entrepreneurship, by limiting it to tax registration only and, since she had been duly registered as a taxpayer, she could not have been held liable for conducting entrepreneurial activities without State registration.

12. By a decision of 8 August 2016, the Baku Court of Serious Crimes partly dismissed and partly granted the applicant’s request. It rejected her interpretation of the amended version of Article 192 of the Criminal Code, stating briefly that the addition of the words “tax registration” did not limit the original wider meaning of the words “State registration” as previously applied to the applicant’s case. The applicant could therefore not be acquitted. However, the court noted that the relevant law of 6 May 2016 on the amendments to the Criminal Code specified that the words “large amount” (külli miqdar) in Article 192.2.2 meant an amount larger than AZN 100,000. It further noted that, following the quashing by the Supreme Court of the applicant’s conviction for illegal entrepreneurship in the part concerning broadcasting without a licence (see paragraph 16 above), the relevant amount of the applicant’s income generated in relation to the remaining part of the criminal conviction was only AZN 79,480 (which constituted a “significant amount” (xeyli miqdar)). The court therefore re‑classified the offence under Article 192.1 of the Criminal Code and reduced the sentence imposed under that charge to four months’ imprisonment, as well as further reducing her total merged sentence from three and a half years’ imprisonment suspended on probation to two years and three months’ imprisonment suspended on probation.

13. Following a series of appeals, by a final decision of 16 February 2017 the Supreme Court upheld that decision. It held that the amendment to Article 192 of the Criminal Code could not be interpreted as limiting the definition of “State registration” to tax registration only, in particular in the context of activities of foreign media outlets or their representatives. It further noted in that regard that, under the Law on Media, the provisions of which remained in force and unchanged, foreign mass media outlets and their representatives were required to be accredited through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before they could operate within the country, and that therefore tax registration alone was insufficient for their activity. The court further noted that, contrary to the applicant’s argument, engaging in journalistic or business activity without such accreditation did not, by itself, entail criminal liability; such activity constituted illegal entrepreneurship if, in addition, it caused significant or large damage to citizens, organisations or the State, or generated a significant or large amount of income. In the applicant’s specific case, the court found that she had failed to obtain the required accreditation while she had been the head of the Baku bureau of Azadliq Radio and that, subsequently, from 2010 to 2014, she had conducted entrepreneurial activities generating income amounting to AZN 79,480. Since the income had exceeded the threshold set by Article 192.1 of the Criminal Code, and given the absence of legal accreditation, the court ruled that her conviction under Article 192.1 had been valid and that there were no grounds to annul her sentence.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

1. CRIMINAL CODE

2. Article 192 of the Criminal Code, before the amendments of 6 May 2016, provided as follows:

Illegal entrepreneurship

“192.1. Conducting entrepreneurial activity without State registration [dövlət qeydiyyatına alınmadan] under the procedure provided for by the legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, or without obtaining a special permit (licence) where such a permit (licence) is required, or with the infringement of licencing conditions, or by using objects whose use is restricted in the absence of special permission, where such activity causes significant damage to citizens, organisations or the State or generates significant income [xeyli miqdarda gəlir] –

is punishable by a fine equivalent to twice the value of the damage caused (or income generated) as a result of the criminal offence, or imprisonment for a period of up to six months;

192.2. The same acts:

...

192.2.2. committed for the purpose of generating a large amount of income [külli miqdarda gəlir];

...

are punishable by a fine equivalent to three times the value of the damage caused (or income generated) as a result of the criminal offence, or imprisonment for a period between one and five years. ...”

22. Following the amendments of 6 May 2016, Article 192 provided as follows (changes in bold):

“192.1. Conducting entrepreneurial activity without State registration (tax registration) [dövlət qeydiyyatına (vergi uçotuna) alınmadan] under the procedure provided for by the legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan, or without obtaining a special permit (licence) where such a permit (licence) is required, or with the infringement of licencing conditions, or by using objects whose use is restricted in the absence of special permission, where such activity causes significant damage to citizens, organisations or the State or generates significant income [xeyli miqdarda gəlir] –

is punishable by a fine equivalent to twice to four times the value of the damage caused (or income generated) as a result of the criminal offence, or imprisonment for a period of up to six months;

192.2. The same acts:

...

192.2.2. committed for the purpose of generating a large amount of income [külli miqdarda gəlir];

...

are punishable by a fine equivalent to three to five times the value of the damage caused (or income generated) as a result of the criminal offence, or imprisonment for a period between one and five years. ...”

23. Article 213, as in force at the material time, provided as follows:

Article 213. Tax evasion

“213.1. Evasion of payment of significant amounts of taxes or mandatory State social security contributions –

is punishable by a fine in the amount of one thousand to two thousand manats, or by correctional labour for a period of up to two years, or by imprisonment for a period of up to three years, with or without deprivation of the right to hold a certain position or to engage in a certain activity for a period of up to three years. ...”

24. On 6 May 2016 Article 213.1 was amended in the part relating to the penalties as follows (changes in bold):

“... is punishable by a fine in the amount of two to three times the damage caused by the crime, or by correctional labour for a period of up to two years, or by imprisonment for a period of up to three years, with or without deprivation of the right to hold a certain position or engage in a certain activity for up to three years.”

2. TAX CODE

3. According to the Tax Code, tax authorities may conduct either on‑site or off-site inspections of taxpayers (Article 36). An on-site tax inspection may cover the taxpayer’s last three calendar years of activity for profit, income, property, road, and land taxes. For all other taxes, it may include the year of the inspection and the preceding three years (Article 36.3). An off-site tax inspection is conducted without visiting the taxpayer’s premises and is based solely on documents and verifiable information already available to the tax authority regarding the taxpayer’s activities (Article 37.1). An on-site inspection can be scheduled or unscheduled (Article 38.1). An unscheduled inspection may be conducted if a court or law-enforcement authority issues a decision in accordance with criminal procedural law (Article 38.3.6).

4. After an on-site inspection, tax officials must prepare a tax inspection report in the prescribed format. This report must be signed by both the authorised tax officers and the head (or authorised representative) of the inspected entity, or by the individual entrepreneur. The taxpayer may add written comments or refuse to sign it, in which case a note must be added to the report (Article 39.1). The report must specify any confirmed violations of tax legislation, referencing the relevant provisions of the Tax Code or other laws, or clearly state that no violations were found (Article 39.2). A copy of the tax inspection report must be delivered or sent to the taxpayer within five days from the date of its preparation, using a method that confirms delivery (Article 39.4). If the taxpayer disagrees with the report or any part of it, they may, within thirty days from its receipt, provide a written explanation of why they refused to sign it or submit written objections to all or part of the report. Supporting documentation may be included (Article 39.5). Within fifteen days after this thirty-day period ends, the head of the tax authority (or deputy) must review the evidence obtained during the inspection, the taxpayer’s materials and the inspection report. They must then determine whether any violations occurred, whether corrective action is needed and whether sanctions should be imposed (Article 39.6).

5. Following an inspection, the head of the tax authority (or deputy) must issue one of the following decisions within ten days: to hold the taxpayer liable for violating tax legislation (49.1.1); to decline to impose liability (49.1.2); or to initiate additional inspection measures (49.1.3). The decision to impose liability must specify the circumstances of the violation and take into account supporting documents, the taxpayer’s defence and the evaluation of his or her claims. It must cite the specific legal provisions violated and the applicable penalties (Article 49.2). A notice must be sent to the taxpayer within ten days of that decision, identifying the amount owed in tax, interest, financial sanctions, administrative fines and the required actions to correct the violations (Article 49.3). Failure by tax officials to follow these procedures constitutes grounds for a higher tax authority or a court to annul the decision (Article 49.5).

6. Taxpayers, tax agents and their representatives as defined by the Tax Code, as well as tax authority officials, shall bear liability for violations of tax legislation in accordance with the Tax Code, the Code of Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and other laws (Article 53.1). If more than three years have passed since a tax violation occurred, the taxpayer may no longer be held liable, and no tax obligations may arise from that violation (Article 56.1).

7. LAW ON MEDIA OF 7 DECEMBER 1999

8. Articles 50 and 53 of the Law on Media of 7 December 1999, as in force at the material time, provided as follows:

Article 50. Accreditation (registration) of journalists

“Mass media outlets may accredit their journalists with State bodies, administrations, institutions, organisations and public associations, with the consent of those entities and in compliance with the accreditation procedures established by them.

Those entities must provide accredited journalists, except in the case of closed events, with advance information about meetings, consultations and other events, and must create conditions for the journalists to access transcripts, protocols and other relevant documents.

If a journalist or editorial office violates the accreditation rules, or if distorted, false or defamatory information about the accrediting organisation is disseminated, as confirmed by a legally binding court ruling, the accrediting organisation may revoke the journalist’s accreditation.

The accreditation of special correspondents of mass media editorial offices is also carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Article.

In areas under a state of emergency, the specific rules for journalist accreditation and their working conditions are determined by the leader of the state of emergency zone.”

Article 53. Activities of representatives of foreign mass media outlets in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan

“The legal status and professional activities of accredited foreign correspondents and other representatives of foreign mass media outlets in the Republic of Azerbaijan are regulated by the legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan and relevant inter-State agreements.

Representative offices of foreign mass media in Azerbaijan shall be established with the consent of the relevant executive authority, unless otherwise provided by inter‑State agreements.

The accreditation of foreign correspondents in the Republic of Azerbaijan is carried out by the relevant executive authority [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs] in accordance with Article 50 of this Law.

Accredited foreign correspondents in Azerbaijan are granted the same legal status as journalists under this Law.

Foreign correspondents who are not accredited in accordance with the established procedures in Azerbaijan are subject to the same rights and obligations as representatives of foreign legal entities.

In response to restrictions imposed by a foreign State on the professional activity of Azerbaijani mass media correspondents within that foreign territory, equivalent restrictions may be imposed on correspondents of that State’s mass media outlet in Azerbaijan.”

THE LAW

1. JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS

2. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment.

3. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE CONVENTION

4. The applicant complained under Article 7 that the acts of which she had been convicted had been lawful and had not constituted the offence of illegal entrepreneurship as set out in the applicable domestic law. Article 7 of the Convention reads as follows:

“1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.

2. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.”

3. Admissibility

4. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

5. Merits

   1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant

33. The applicant argued that the charge of illegal entrepreneurship was initially based on two factors: Azadliq Radio’s broadcasting without a licence and her lack of journalist accreditation, neither of which, she contended, had constituted a criminal offence on her individual part under domestic law at the time. Nonetheless, she accepted the Government’s submission that, following the partial acquittal and narrowing the charge to the period of her freelance work, her conviction had been based solely on working without accreditation.

34. The applicant maintained that, nevertheless, the narrowed scope of the conviction had lacked a legal basis and had violated Article 7 of the Convention. The applicant emphasised that the Government had failed to counter her claim that accreditation had not been a legal requirement for journalists, including those working with foreign media, under domestic law at the time. She argued that accreditation could not be equated with “State registration” or “licensing” under Article 192 of the Criminal Code owing to its fundamentally different function and nature.

35. The applicant also challenged the characterisation of her freelance journalistic work as “entrepreneurship” under Azerbaijani law. Even if the courts deemed it to be so, she argued that entrepreneurship was not illegal in itself. Rather, Article 192 criminalised engaging in entrepreneurship without proper State registration or tax registration, or, for activities subject to licensing, without a licence. The applicant’s tax registration had never been questioned, and journalism was not an activity requiring a licence under Azerbaijani legislation. The courts, however, had treated accreditation as equivalent to either State registration or licensing under Article 192 and that interpretation had lacked a legal basis.

36. She further pointed out that that understanding had contradicted the Law on Media. According to Article 50 of that Law, accreditation was a system by which State bodies granted journalists privileged access to information, rather than a mandatory prerequisite for engaging in journalism. Article 53 referenced accreditation for foreign correspondents but did not establish a distinct form of accreditation for them beyond what was outlined in Article 50. Furthermore, while Article 53 stated that only accredited foreign correspondents could benefit from journalist status under the Law on Media, it explicitly allowed for non-accredited journalists to operate, reinforcing that accreditation was not a requirement for lawful journalistic activity.

37. Even if accreditation for foreign correspondents was considered mandatory, the applicant argued that it could not fall under the scope of Article 192 of the Criminal Code, as doing so would effectively classify all foreign correspondents as entrepreneurs. She asserted that the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege required that the applicability of Article 192 to such cases be explicitly stated in law. Moreover, she contended that she was not a foreign correspondent and that no reasonable interpretation of the term could apply to her situation. As an Azerbaijani national working as a freelance journalist with both domestic and international media outlets, she argued that her case had not fallen within the scope of Article 53 of the Law on Media. She criticised the courts and the Government for failing to address those concerns, instead focusing on the scope of “State registration” under Article 192 of the Criminal Code.

38. As regards in particular the proceedings she initiated after the 6 May 2016 amendments to the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 17-20 above), the applicant argued that the domestic courts had misinterpreted the amendment to Article 192. She maintained that their interpretation had amounted to a continued overly broad and unforeseeable reading of the law. Contrary to the courts’ findings, she asserted that the bracketed phrase “tax registration” had been intended to clarify the meaning of “State registration”, not expand it. She contended that the domestic courts had overlooked both the grammatical construction of the amended Article and, more importantly, the legislature’s intention. During parliamentary discussions, lawmakers had emphasised that the proposed amendments had been designed to decriminalise certain economic offences and to reduce penalties for non‑violent crimes. The amendment had aimed to ease the burden on previously convicted individuals by narrowing the scope of criminal liability. However, the courts had failed to consider those policy goals and had treated the revision as if it had preserved or even widened the existing legal responsibility.

39. Ultimately, the applicant maintained that the legal basis for her conviction for illegal entrepreneurship had been absent, rendering it unforeseeable and unlawful.

(b) The Government

40. The Government argued that the applicant had engaged in illegal entrepreneurship from 2010 to 2014 by working without being accredited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a representative of a foreign media outlet. They contended that her failure to be accredited, combined with the profits she had acquired, had amounted to a criminal offence under domestic law. Furthermore, they rejected the applicant’s argument that an amendment to Article 192 of the Criminal Code had limited the scope of the offence to only tax registration, asserting that her interpretation was unsupported by any legal authority.

41. The Government noted that the amendment did not restrict the criminal offence but merely clarified that tax registration was also covered by the provision. They pointed to similar structural formulations in other legal provisions to illustrate how the applicant’s interpretation was, in their view, flawed. For instance, they noted that in Article 159 and subsequent Articles of the Criminal Code, the word “referendum” appeared in parentheses following the word “elections”, which did not imply that the provisions concerned only referendums and excluded elections. Similarly, in Article 174, the word “supervision” was included in parentheses after “guardianship”, meaning the provision applied to both concepts rather than just supervision. The Government further cited Article 200, where the word “services” appeared in parentheses after “goods”, reinforcing that the provision applied to both. They argued that the same logic applied to Article 192 – the addition of “tax registration” in parentheses did not replace or narrow the meaning of the provision but clarified that both State registration and tax registration fell within its scope. They argued that the law required State registration and tax registration when applicable, meaning that conducting business without either form of registration, when required, constituted illegal entrepreneurship.

42. Addressing the applicant’s argument that the legislature’s intention had been to alleviate penalties, the Government asserted that no express reference to Article 192 of the Criminal Code appeared in the parliamentary records – specifically, the official transcript of parliamentary hearings dated 6 May 2016. While some amendments adopted on that date had aimed to reduce criminal responsibility, others, including an amendment to Article 192, had increased penalties. For example, one amendment provided that a person who committed illegal entrepreneurship for the first time could be exempt from criminal liability if they compensated for the damage or transferred illegal income to the State budget. However, another amendment had increased the penalty from double the amount of the unlawful gain to between two and four times the amount, demonstrating that not all changes had been designed to ease punishments.

43. The Court’s assessment

(a) General principles

43. Article 7 of the Convention is not confined to prohibiting the retrospective application of the criminal law to an accused’s disadvantage. It also embodies, more generally, the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege) (see Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, § 52, Series A no. 260‑A). While it prohibits in particular extending the scope of existing offences to acts which previously were not criminal offences, it also lays down the principle that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused’s detriment, for instance by analogy (see Del Río Prada v. Spain [GC], no. 42750/09, § 78, ECHR 2013, and Advisory opinion on the applicability of statutes of limitation to prosecution, conviction and punishment in respect of an offence constituting, in substance, an act of torture [GC], request no. P16-2021-001, Armenian Court of Cassation, § 67, 26 April 2022; see also Yüksel Yalçınkaya v. Türkiye [GC], no. 15669/20, § 238, 26 September 2023).

44. The principle that offences and sanctions must be provided for by law entails that criminal law must clearly define the offences and the sanctions by which they are punished, such as to be accessible and foreseeable in its effects (see G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others v. Italy [GC], nos. 1828/06 and 2 others, § 242, 28 June 2018). This requirement is satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision, if need be with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it and after taking appropriate legal advice, what acts and omissions will make him criminally liable and what penalty he faces on that account (see Cantoni v. France, 15 November 1996, § 29, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V; Del Río Prada, cited above, § 79; and G.I.E.M. S.r.l. and Others, cited above, § 242). Even when a point is ruled on for the first time in an applicant’s case, a violation of Article 7 of the Convention will not arise if the meaning given is both foreseeable and consistent with the essence of the offence (see Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2), nos. 42757/07 and 51111/0, § 570, 14 January 2020, and Advisory opinion concerning the use of the “blanket reference” or “legislation by reference” technique in the definition of an offence and the standards of comparison between the criminal law in force at the time of the commission of the offence and the amended criminal law [GC], request no. P16-2019-001, Armenian Constitutional Court, § 62, 29 May 2020, and the references therein).

45. The Court must therefore verify that at the time when an accused person performed the act which led to his being prosecuted and convicted there was in force a legal provision which made that act punishable, and that the punishment imposed did not exceed the limits fixed by that provision (see Del Río Prada, cited above, § 80, and the references therein).

46. The Court reaffirms that in principle, it should not substitute itself for the domestic jurisdictions. Its duty, in accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. Given the subsidiary nature of the Convention system, it is not the Court’s function to deal with alleged errors of fact committed by a national court, unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention and unless that domestic assessment is manifestly arbitrary (see Kononov v. Latvia [GC], no. 36376/04, § 189, ECHR 2010, and Vasiliauskas v. Lithuania [GC], no. 35343/05, § 160, ECHR 2015). More generally, the Court points out that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation (see Rohlena v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 59552/08, § 51, ECHR 2015, and Jidic v. Romania, no. 45776/16, § 83, 18 February 2020). The Court also observes that it is not its task to substitute itself for the domestic courts as regards the assessment of the facts and their legal classification (see Rohlena, cited above, § 51), or to rule on the applicant’s individual criminal responsibility (see Kononov, cited above, § 187).

47. However, the Court points out that its powers of review must be greater when the Convention right itself, Article 7 in the present case, requires that there was a legal basis for a conviction and sentence. Article 7 § 1 requires the Court to examine whether there was a contemporaneous legal basis for the applicant’s conviction and, in particular, it must satisfy itself that the result reached by the relevant domestic courts was compatible with Article 7 of the Convention, even if there were differences between the legal approach and reasoning of this Court and the relevant domestic decisions. To accord a lesser power of review to this Court would render Article 7 devoid of purpose (see Kononov, cited above, § 198; Rohlena, cited above, § 52; and Vasiliauskas, cited above, § 161).

48. In short, the Court’s function is to consider, from the standpoint of Article 7 § 1 of the Convention, whether the applicant’s act, at the time when it was committed, constituted an offence defined with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability by domestic or international law (see Korbely v. Hungary [GC], no. 9174/02, § 73, ECHR 2008; Kononov, cited above, § 187; and Vasiliauskas, cited above, § 162).

(b) Application of the principles to the present case

49. In the present case, in addition to the offence of tax evasion, the applicant was ultimately convicted of the offence of illegal entrepreneurship committed for the purpose of generating a large amount of income under Article 192.2.2 of the Criminal Code, later re-classified as the offence of illegal entrepreneurship under Article 192.1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 19-20 above). The Court must verify whether the acts attributed to her fell within a definition of that criminal offence which was sufficiently foreseeable.

50. The Court notes at the outset that part of the applicant’s submissions and essentially the entirety of the Government’s submissions in respect of this complaint focused on whether or not the 2016 amendment to Article 192 of the Criminal Code limited the scope of the offence of illegal entrepreneurship by limiting the meaning of words “State registration” to tax registration only. The Court considers that resolving this disagreement is not crucial for the purposes of the present complaint because, even accepting the domestic courts’ and the Government’s position that the relevant amendment did not limit the scope of the offence, it considers, for the reasons it will set out below, that finding the applicant guilty under Article 192 of the Criminal Code was problematic from the standpoint of Article 7 of the Convention. The Government did not comment on the applicant’s other, broader arguments that accreditation as a journalist could not in any event be equated with “State registration” within the meaning of Article 192 of the Criminal Code and that the domestic law did not clearly provide that the acts attributed to her, namely working as a representative of a foreign media outlet without accreditation, were criminalised (see paragraphs 34-37 above).

51. The Court also notes that the Government have not produced any decisions of domestic courts, whether of the higher courts or courts of first instance, demonstrating that, prior to the judgments delivered in the present case, it had been explicitly held that working as a foreign journalist or representative of a foreign media outlet without accreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs constituted a criminal offence of illegal entrepreneurship, that is “conducting entrepreneurial activity without State registration” (compare, mutatis mutandis, Pessino v. France, no. 40403/02, § 34, 10 October 2006, and Dragotoniu and Militaru-Pidhorni v. Romania, nos. 77193/01 and 77196/01, § 42, 24 May 2007; and contrast Georgouleas and Nestoras v. Greece, nos. 44612/13 and 45831/13, § 63, 28 May 2020). Furthermore, even though, as noted above, the Government argued extensively that the amendment to Article 192 of the Criminal Code did not limit the scope of the criminal offence, no clear definition of the wider scope of the term “State registration” within the meaning of Article 192 was provided in the present case either by the courts or by the Government with reference to any other provisions of the domestic law or judicial decisions.

52. As to the lack of such “State registration” in the present case, the domestic courts held that the applicant had engaged in journalistic activity without being accredited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a representative of foreign media, as required by Articles 50 and 53 of the Law on Media. However, the Court notes in this regard, firstly, that the applicant consistently brought to the domestic courts’ attention the fact that, during the period in question, namely between 1 October 2010 and 1 December 2014, she had no longer been an employee of Azadliq Radio but had been a freelance journalist working with various media outlets, both domestic and foreign, on the basis of civil-law contracts. Accordingly, she had been an Azerbaijani journalist working in Azerbaijan on a freelance basis and had not represented any particular media outlet, either domestic or foreign. However, the courts did not at all address the applicant’s arguments in that regard and it is not clear on what basis they concluded that she should be considered as a “representative of a foreign media outlet” within the meaning of Article 53 of the Law on Media. That approach essentially meant that any domestic journalist who collaborated with a foreign media outlet in any non-exclusive way could be considered a foreign journalist or a representative of a foreign media outlet, which would amount to the arbitrarily extensive application of the law. The Court therefore considers that it could not have been sufficiently foreseeable for the applicant that, in her particular situation, her status would be equated in such an arbitrary manner to a “representative of a foreign media outlet”.

53. Secondly, the Court notes that the domestic courts held that the Law on Media “required” accreditation for foreign journalists and representatives of foreign media outlets. In other words, in the present case, the courts regarded accreditation as some form of precondition, akin to a work permit, for lawful journalistic activity for foreign correspondents. However, having had regard to the text of Article 53 of that Law, which regulated activities of representatives of foreign media, the Court notes that, in respect of accreditation, it merely referred back to Article 50 of that same Law, noting that accreditation of foreign correspondents was carried out under the same procedure as provided in that Article. It imposed no additional conditions on foreign correspondents other than specifying that accreditation of foreign correspondents was carried out by the “relevant executive authority” (which was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for this particular procedure). Turning to Article 50 of the Law on Media, the Court notes that, at the material time, it stated that “mass media outlets may accredit their journalists ...” with various bodies and explained that such accreditation entailed access to advance information about meetings, consultations and other events, as well as access to various relevant documents. In other words, the accreditation procedure was formulated in that provision as a possibility, and not a requirement, and specified that accredited journalists had thereby acquired a right of additional or privileged access to certain types of information. This is further confirmed by the provisions of the fifth paragraph of Article 53 of the Law on Media, which further regulated rights and obligations of “foreign correspondents who [were] not accredited in accordance with established procedures”, as well as by the lack in both the Law on Media, as well as any other domestic law, of any provisions expressly providing for any form of liability for not obtaining accreditation.

54. In such circumstances, the Court cannot but conclude that there was no clear legal basis for the domestic courts’ finding that accreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a requirement for foreign journalists. However, the domestic courts of all three levels of jurisdiction merely briefly held that the applicant had worked as a representative of a foreign media outlet without obtaining the required accreditation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus engaging in “entrepreneurial activity without State registration” which constituted a criminal offence of illegal entrepreneurship. They provided no further reasoning and did not attempt to give any plausible interpretation of the Law on Media to support their finding that accreditation was a “requirement”, and remained completely silent as to the applicant’s relevant objections and arguments in that regard.

55. The Court notes that only the Supreme Court, in its decision of 16 February 2017 in the follow-up proceedings (see paragraph 20 above), attempted to provide some form of extended legal reasoning. However, like the other courts, it provided no clear legal basis for its brief finding that foreign media outlets and their representatives were “required” to be accredited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to operate in the country, a finding which, as discussed above, was unsupported by the straightforward textual interpretation of the Law on Media. It then merely proceeded to state at more length that engaging in journalistic activity without such accreditation did not, by itself, entail criminal liability and that such activity constituted illegal entrepreneurship if, in addition, it caused significant or large public damage or generated a significant or large amount of income. The applicant’s income during the relevant period exceeded the “significant amount” threshold. The entirety of the applicant’s income as a journalist during the relevant period was taken into account as income generated through illegal entrepreneurship for the sole reason that she had no accreditation during that period, whereas there was no clear legal basis to hold that such accreditation was at all required in her situation. The Court notes that such circular reasoning by the Supreme Court is incompatible with Article 7 of the Convention.

56. Having regard to the above, the Court considers that, in the determination of the criminal charge against the applicant of the offence of illegal entrepreneurship, the provisions of Article 192 of the Criminal Code and the relevant provisions of the Law on Media, as in force at the relevant time, were extensively and unforeseeably construed to her detriment, in a manner which could not be said to have constituted a development consistent with the essence of the offence (compare, mutatis mutandis, Navalnyye v. Russia, no. 101/15, § 68, 17 October 2017). Even as a professional journalist who could seek appropriate legal advice, it would have been difficult – if not impossible – for the applicant to have foreseen that the domestic law would be applied to her situation in such an arbitrary manner and to have known that her work as a freelance journalist with both domestic and foreign media without accreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could result in a criminal sanction.

57. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 7 of the Convention as regards the applicant’s conviction for the offence of illegal entrepreneurship.

58. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION

59. The applicant complained that the domestic courts had delivered unreasoned judgments, in breach of the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”

1. Admissibility

2. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

3. Merits

   1. The parties’ submissions

4. The applicant submitted that the trial against her had been a sham. The charges against her had been baseless and politically motivated and “not a single piece of evidence [had] disclosed [her] involvement in any crimes”. The domestic courts’ judgments had lacked proper reasoning. It was evident from the judgments that the courts had failed to address any of the applicant’s arguments relating to the charges of illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion, that is the two charges of which she had ultimately been convicted.

5. The Government submitted that the complaint was unsubstantiated. They contended that the applicant had failed to produce any specific argument or evidence about the alleged unfairness of the criminal proceedings, but had merely stated that they had been unfair while asserting that she had not committed any criminal offences. All evidence, arguments and motions submitted by the applicant had been thoroughly examined by the domestic courts.

6. The Court’s assessment

7. The relevant case-law principles concerning the adequate reasoning in domestic judgments are summarised in Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2) (no. 919/15, §§ 205-10, 16 November 2017); Farzaliyev v. Azerbaijan (no. 29620/07, §§ 34-36, 28 May 2020); and Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), (no. 32734/11, §§ 76-83, 7 April 2022).

8. At the outset, the Court reiterates that in the Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2) judgment (cited above) it found, among other things, violations of Article 5 §§ 1 (c) and 4 of the Convention and a violation of Article 18 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 5, in respect of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention in the framework of the same criminal proceedings.

9. One of the main factors leading the Court to its conclusions was the finding of a prima facie lack of plausibility of the accusations against the applicant (see, in particular, Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, §§ 80‑82). The Court concluded in that judgment that, contrary to Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, the material put before it did not meet the minimum standard for the reasonableness of a suspicion required for an individual’s arrest and continued detention (ibid., §§ 83-84). In breach of the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the domestic courts in that case failed to verify the existence of a reasonable suspicion underpinning the applicant’s arrest and detention despite her repeated complaints to that end and, by using vague and standard wording, automatically endorsed the prosecution’s applications without any genuine and independent review of the “lawfulness” of her detention (ibid., § 91). Having also had regard to the combination of case-specific facts, the Court found that, contrary to the requirements of Article 18 of the Convention, the authorities’ actions had been driven by improper reasons: the actual purpose of the impugned measures was to silence and to punish the applicant for her journalistic activities (ibid., §§ 114-20).

10. The scope of the Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2) judgment (cited above) was limited, inter alia, to the issues of compatibility with Articles 5 §§ 1 (c) and 4 and Article 18 of the Convention of the applicant’s detention during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. In the present case, however, the Court is called upon to examine a different set of legal issues – namely, whether the criminal proceedings against the applicant as a whole were fair, as required by Article 6 of the Convention.

11. While the issues to be examined and the legal standards applicable under Article 6 of the Convention are different, both the previous case and the present case concern the same criminal proceedings against the applicant involving the same charges stemming from the same events. Although the applicant was eventually acquitted of the offences of incitement to suicide, embezzlement and abuse of power under Articles 125, 179.3.2 and 308.2 of the Criminal Code, she was ultimately convicted of the offences of illegal entrepreneurship under Article 192.2.2 (later re‑classified under Article 192.1) and tax evasion under Article 213.1 of the Criminal Code. As the Court held in the Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2) judgment (cited above), during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, those accusations against the applicant had also suffered from a prima facie lack of plausibility calling for a high level of scrutiny of the facts. The circumstances on which this previous finding of the Court was based remain unchanged in the present case as regards the charges of illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion. The Court will therefore proceed with analysing under Article 6 whether this deficiency has been compensated by the evidence presented at the trial and the reasons provided by the domestic courts (compare Ilgar Mammadov (no. 2), cited above, § 203).

12. Turning to the present case, the Court firstly refers to its analysis and findings in paragraphs 49-57 above in respect of the applicant’s conviction for the offence of illegal entrepreneurship and considers that they are equally relevant for the present complaint. In particular, the applicant raised before the domestic courts strong, pertinent and well-founded objections that the acts attributed to her had not fallen within the scope of the criminal offence of illegal entrepreneurship. An adequate examination of those objections would be decisive for the outcome of the case and, therefore, those arguments required a specific and express reply from the domestic courts. However, as the Court found above, the domestic courts did not provide any adequate response to them in their judgments, instead relying on very brief and manifestly arbitrary reasoning.

13. As regards the charge of tax evasion, the situation was very similar. The conviction under that charge was mainly based on two reports, which the applicant argued had been vague, unclear as to what had been meant by their conclusions and compiled in a manner which had not been compliant with the relevant domestic law. She further argued that Azadliq Radio was a non-commercial organisation which did not engage in business activities and was not liable to pay profit tax. She also argued that the manner in which the amount of “profit” had been determined and the profit tax calculated had been erroneous in view of the fact that Azadliq Radio had only received funds from its parent entity for the purpose of covering the necessary operational expenses. She also maintained that her particular role as the head of the Baku bureau of Azadliq Radio during the relevant period had not involved any responsibility for financial matters or payment of taxes and social contributions. In the Court’s view, the applicant’s arguments objecting to the charge of tax evasion were pertinent, strong and capable of influencing the outcome of the case if properly assessed. However, again the domestic courts either remained completely silent in respect of those arguments or dismissed them in a very general, stereotypically worded manner. Consequently, the decisions reached by them in respect of the charge of tax evasion were arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable.

14. The Court finds that the judicial examination of the applicant’s case and the reasoning in the domestic courts’ decisions were flawed with arbitrariness which was distinct from an incorrect legal classification or a similar error in the application of domestic criminal law. That undermined the fairness of the criminal proceedings in such a fundamental way that it rendered other criminal procedure guarantees irrelevant (compare, mutatis mutandis, Navalnyye, cited above, §§ 83-84).

15. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

16. Alleged violation of Article 10 of the Convention

17. The applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the charges on the basis of which she had been ultimately convicted were baseless and fabricated in order to prevent her from carrying out her investigative journalistic work, and to punish her for it. Article 10 provides as follows:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

3. Admissibility

4. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

5. Merits

   1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant

73. The applicant submitted that her criminal conviction had constituted an unjustified interference with her right to freedom of expression, and in particular her right to impart information and the public’s right to receive it. In addition to the criminal offence of tax evasion, she had been convicted under Article 192 of the Criminal Code for “illegal entrepreneurship,” specifically for carrying out journalistic activities without accreditation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She argued that the conviction had not only been unfounded but had been clearly aimed at punishing her for her investigative reporting, particularly her work exposing corruption involving the ruling elite.

74. She maintained that her trial and conviction had been a sham, and had formed part of a broader campaign of harassment and intimidation that began following her first publication on government corruption in 2010. Her case had unfolded against the backdrop of increasingly repressive measures targeting civil society and independent media in Azerbaijan. The charges brought against her had been fabricated and politically motivated, with the sole aim of silencing her critical voice.

75. The applicant further submitted that this interference had not met the requirements of Article 10, as it had not been prescribed by law, had not pursued a legitimate aim, and had not been necessary in a democratic society. She emphasized that the proceedings against her had been marred by serious procedural violations, including a lack of equality of arms, prosecutorial bias, and the courts’ refusal to consider exculpatory evidence or engage meaningfully with the defence’s submissions. She contended that the criminal proceedings had not been genuinely aimed at enforcing laws on entrepreneurship or taxation, but had instead been a retaliatory measure designed to punish her for her journalistic work.

76. Finally, the applicant highlighted the broader impact of her prosecution, noting the chilling effect it had on the press and public discourse in Azerbaijan. She argued that her case discouraged other journalists and citizens from engaging in public debate or expressing critical views, for fear of similar reprisals. In this regard, she submitted that the respondent State had failed to fulfil its positive obligation to create an enabling environment for journalists to express their opinions freely and without fear.

(b) The Government

77. The Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint was of a speculative nature and unsubstantiated. They maintained that there had been no interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 10 of the Convention and that she had been convicted by the domestic courts in accordance with the Criminal Code for the criminal offences committed by her.

78. The Court’s assessment

79. The Court must first ascertain whether the measures complained of amounted to an interference with the applicant’s exercise of freedom of expression. In order to answer that question, the scope of the measure must be determined by putting it in the context of the facts of the case and of the relevant legislation (see Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], no. 28396/95, § 43, ECHR 1999-VII; Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13, § 153, 19 October 2021; and Selishcheva and Others v. Russia, nos. 39056/22 and 9 others, § 41, 27 May 2025). Having regard to the facts of the present case and the nature of the allegations made, the Court considers that this issue should be examined in the light of the general principles emerging from its case-law on the assessment of evidence. It reiterates in this connection that in assessing evidence, it has adopted the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. However, it has never been its purpose to borrow the approach of the national legal systems which use that standard. The Court’s role is not to rule on criminal guilt or civil liability but on Contracting States’ responsibility under the Convention. The specificity of its task under Article 19 of the Convention – to ensure the observance by the Contracting States of their engagement to secure the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention – conditions its approach to the issues of evidence and proof. The Court adopts those conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow from the facts in their entirety and from the parties’ submissions. According to its established case‑law, proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria [GC], nos. 43577/98 and 43579/98, § 147, ECHR 2005-VII). It has been the Court’s practice to allow flexibility in this respect, taking into consideration the nature of the substantive right at stake and any evidentiary difficulties involved. In certain instances, only the Government have access to information capable of corroborating or refuting the applicant’s allegations; consequently, a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti, non neganti, incumbit probatio is impossible. Although these principles have mainly been applied in the context of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, the Court observes that there are examples in which they have been applied in respect of other Convention rights, including Article 10 of the Convention (see Baka v. Hungary [GC], no. 20261/12, § 143, 23 June 2016, with further references).

80. These principles are particularly relevant in the present case, where no domestic court ever examined the applicant’s allegations that she had been targeted because of the content of her publications. It is against this background that the Court considers that the facts of the case and the sequence of events have to be assessed and considered “in their entirety” (compare Ivanova v. Bulgaria, no. 52435/99, §§ 83-84, 12 April 2007, and Baka, cited above, §§ 145-48).

81. The Court notes at the outset that at least one of the charges on which the applicant was ultimately convicted directly concerned the modalities of her exercise of the journalistic profession. Thus, her conviction for “illegal entrepreneurship” was based on the charge that she had carried out journalistic activities as a “representative of foreign media” without obtaining the relevant accreditation. However, the applicant is an Azerbaijani journalist with a long record of reporting within the country. Such accreditation requirements, where they seek to regulate access to the profession or the terms under which journalistic work may be lawfully carried out, constitute “formalities” or “conditions” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 10 of the Convention. Therefore, restrictions or penalties imposed for non-compliance with such conditions, even if formally presented as economic or administrative in nature, amount in principle to an interference with a journalist’s ability to receive and impart information and ideas (see, mutatis mutandis, Mándli and Others v. Hungary, no. 63164/16, § 45, 26 May 2020; Gafiuc v. Romania, no. 59174/13, § 55, 13 October 2020). As such, the applicant’s conviction for “illegal entrepreneurship” did not have a merely incidental impact on her journalistic activity. It was related to her very ability to freely exercise her profession and amounted therefore to an interference with her rights under Article 10 of the Convention, irrespective of whether the criminal proceedings were pursued with an ulterior purpose.

82. The Court furthermore deems it necessary to note the sequence of events in the present case. In particular, it notes that between 2010 and 2013 the applicant wrote a number of investigative articles concerning the high‑level corruption in Azerbaijan (see Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, nos. 65286/13 and 57270/14, §§ 6-8, 10 January 2019, and Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, § 11). According to the applicant, as a result of her journalistic investigations and published articles, she was constantly threatened and harassed.

83. In particular, in 2012 intimate videos unlawfully recorded by a camera hidden in her bedroom were disseminated on the internet after she had received a threatening letter demanding that she refrain from continuing her journalistic activities (for further details concerning these events, see Khadija Ismayilova, cited above, §§ 10-20 and 119). The Court examined the applicant’s complaints relating to those events from the standpoint of the respondent State’s positive obligations under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention (ibid., §§ 83-132 and 151-66). It nevertheless emphasised that, while the identity of those who breached the applicant’s privacy was unknown, it “[had] concerns as regards the answer” to the “open” question whether those responsible were linked to State agents abusing their official power, in view of the applicant’s credible allegations in this regard, the contextual information provided by the third-party interveners in that case and the careful planning and execution of the covert surveillance operation (ibid., § 113). In addition, the Court also found that the respondent State had breached its negative obligation under Article 8 of the Convention through the public disclosure, by the investigating authorities, of an excessive amount of the applicant’s personal information obtained during the investigation, thereby further compounding the existing breach of the applicant’s privacy (ibid., §§ 133-50).

84. Moreover, during this time period, numerous articles about the applicant and other civil society activists and human rights defenders were published in the State media and in the media allegedly close to the government. In those articles, the applicant and the other persons were described as “spies for foreign interests” and “traitors” (see Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, § 14; see also, for examples of some of these comments, Rasul Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 69981/14, §§ 36-40, 17 March 2016). In some of those articles, the applicant’s professionalism and personal character were attacked (see Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan (no. 3), no. 35283/14, §§ 7-8 and 14-17, 7 May 2020). Two days before the applicant’s arrest, on 3 December 2014, State-owned news agencies published a sixty-page manifesto written by R.M., the then head of the President’s Office, in which, among other statements, he targeted the applicant personally by accusing her of spreading false information and engaging in activities “tantamount to working for foreign secret services” and treason (for the full quote, see Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, § 15).

85. In the context of the criminal case against the applicant, which was the subject of the Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2) judgment and the present case, the applicant was initially arrested on 5 December 2014 on the charge of incitement to suicide. Additional charges – embezzlement, illegal entrepreneurship, tax evasion, and abuse of power – were brought against her at a later stage (ibid., §§ 21-22 and 36). As noted above, in addition to the other findings, the Court found in the Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2) judgment that, contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant had been deprived of her liberty in the absence of a “reasonable suspicion” that she had committed a criminal offence (ibid., §§ 67-84). Moreover, it found that, contrary to the requirements of Article 18 of the Convention, the restriction of the applicant’s liberty had been imposed for a purpose other than prescribed by Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, namely to silence and to punish her for her journalistic activities (ibid., §§ 114‑20).

86. As previously stated, the present case concerns the entirety of the same criminal proceedings, including the trial stage. Although the applicant was ultimately acquitted of the charges of incitement to suicide, embezzlement and abuse of power, she was convicted of the offences of illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion. As the Court has found above, the domestic courts’ judgments convicting the applicant were fundamentally flawed and marked by arbitrariness (see paragraphs 67-70 above). The Court reiterates that the domestic courts failed to address a number of strong, pertinent and well‑founded arguments raised by the applicant, including her submissions that the charges against her had been fabricated with the aim of interfering with the exercise of her right to freedom of expression.

87. The Court also points out that in a series of cases concerning Azerbaijan it has noted a pattern of arbitrary arrest, detention or other measures taken in respect of government critics, civil society activists and human rights defenders, all occurring approximately during the same time period as the criminal proceedings against the applicant (see, inter alia, Rasul Jafarov, cited above, §§ 159-61; Mammadli v. Azerbaijan, no. 47145/14, §§ 99-101, 19 April 2018; Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, nos. 68762/14 and 71200/14, § 223, 20 September 2018; Rashad Hasanov and Others v. Azerbaijan, nos. 48653/13 and 3 others, §§ 122-25, 7 June 2018; Natig Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 64581/16, § 64, 7 November 2019; Ibrahimov and Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, nos. 63571/16 and 5 others, §§ 153-57, 13 February 2020; and Ayyubzade v. Azerbaijan, no. 6180/15, §§ 48-49, 2 March 2023). The Court considers that the proceedings against the applicant clearly fell within this broader pattern.

88. As noted above, one of the charges against the applicant was directly connected to her practice of journalism. The Court, taking moreover into account the sequence of the related events in their entirety, rather than as separate and distinct incidents, considers that there is prima facie evidence of a causal link between the applicant’s exercise of her freedom of expression and the criminal proceedings against her resulting in her conviction for illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion. Once there is prima facie evidence in favour of the applicant’s version of the events and the existence of a causal link, the burden of proof should shift to the Government. However, having had regard to the entirety of the case material and the Government’s submissions, the Court is of the view that the Government failed to show convincingly that the impugned measures bore no relation to the applicant’s journalistic activities.

89. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the applicant’s criminal prosecution and conviction for a number of offences, including illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion, constituted an interference with her exercise of her right to freedom of expression.

90. The interference will not be justified under the terms of Article 10 of the Convention unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursues one or more of the legitimate aims set out in paragraph 2 of that Article and is “necessary in a democratic society” for the achievement of that aim or aims.

91. The Court recalls at the outset that each member of Council of Europe has undertaken to accept the principle of the rule of law and the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the present case the Court observes that the applicants’ criminal prosecution was not formally related to the content of the articles she had written as a journalist (compare Ibrahimov and Mammadov, cited above, § 173). In retaliation for her journalistic activity, the authorities chose to initiate criminal proceedings against the applicant on a number of criminal charges and ultimately convicted her of the offences of illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion. The Court considers that such interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression was not only unlawful but also grossly arbitrary and incompatible with the principle of the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the Preamble to the Convention and is inherent in all its Articles (see, mutatis mutandis, Baka, cited above, § 117; compare also Ibrahimov and Mammadov, cited above, § 173). Moreover, it goes without saying that such interference could not have served any of the legitimate aims set out in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.

92. There has been accordingly a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.

93. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 18 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION

94. The applicant complained under Article 18 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention that her right to freedom of expression had been restricted for purposes other than those for which they were prescribed and that the sole purpose of her detention during the trial and her ultimate conviction had been to hinder and punish her for her investigative work as a journalist. Article 18 provides:

“The restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed.”

1. Admissibility

2. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be declared admissible.

3. Merits

   1. The parties’ submissions

(a) The applicant

94. The applicant argued that the criminal proceedings brought against her had not been pursued for the legitimate purposes prescribed by law, but rather for ulterior motives aimed at silencing her critical journalism. She maintained that the sole purpose of her detention during the trial and her ultimate conviction had been to punish her for exposing corruption involving the ruling party and to prevent her from continuing her investigative work.

95. She submitted that her case had lacked any “healthy core” and had instead been part of a broader pattern of politically motivated repression. Her publications revealing government corruption were followed by escalating harassment and intimidation, culminating in her arrest and conviction on fabricated charges. She emphasized that two of these charges had formed the basis of her final conviction, despite the absence of credible evidence.

96. The applicant contended that her prosecution should be viewed in the context of a wider crackdown on dissent in Azerbaijan, during which numerous journalists, activists, and government critics had been similarly prosecuted on spurious charges. She argued that this pattern had drawn international condemnation and highlighted the authorities’ systematic efforts to suppress independent voices.

97. She further argued that the national courts had demonstrated clear prosecutorial bias and had failed to uphold basic standards of fairness. They had refused to consider exculpatory evidence, ignored the absence of proof supporting the prosecution’s case, and interpreted criminal provisions in an arbitrary and unforeseeable manner. This was a strong indication that the authorities’ true aim had not been to enforce the law, but to punish her for her reporting and deter others from engaging in similar journalistic activity.

98. In sum, the applicant asserted that the measures taken against her had been politically motivated and intended to prevent her from exposing corruption at the highest levels of government. She argued that her case exemplified the misuse of legal proceedings to achieve illegitimate objectives, in violation of Article 18 of the Convention.

(b) The Government

99. The Government reiterated that no restrictions had been imposed on the applicant’s rights under Article 10 of the Convention and argued that, therefore, in the absence of any restrictions, no issue could arise under Article 18 of the Convention.

100. The Government further argued that, even assuming that the applicant’s Article 10 rights had been restricted (which they expressly refused to admit), the mere fact that a restriction of a Convention right or freedom did not meet all the requirements of the clause that permits it did not necessarily raise an issue under Article 18. According to the Court’s case-law, separate examination of a complaint under that Article was only warranted if the claim that a restriction had been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention appeared to be a fundamental aspect of the case. With reference to Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia (nos. 75734/12 and 2 others, § 305, 19 November 2019), and Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev v. Russia (no. 2) (nos. 51111/07 and 42757/07, § 622, 14 January 2020), the Government pointed out that, where an applicant’s submissions under Article 18 were essentially the same as their arguments regarding the alleged interference with the applicant’s rights under the relevant substantive provisions of the Convention, the Court found no grounds to conclude that the complaint under Article 18 represented a fundamental aspect of the case. Thus, before embarking on the analysis of a complaint under Article 18, the Court should first ascertain whether the crux of it had already been examined under the relevant substantive provision.

101. In connection with the above, the Government argued that, in the present case, the complaint under Article 18 of the Convention did not constitute a fundamental aspect of the case. The applicant’s submissions under Article 18 were essentially the same as her submissions regarding the alleged interference with her rights under Article 10 of the Convention.

102. Moreover, no measures were applied for any purpose other than that for which they were prescribed. The applicant was convicted by the domestic courts in accordance with the Criminal Code for the criminal offences committed by her. The applicant failed to demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt the existence of any ulterior purpose and to substantiate her complaint under Article 18.

103. The Court’s assessment

104. The Court refers to the general principles concerning the interpretation and application of Article 18 of the Convention, in particular as set out in its judgments in Merabishvili v. Georgia ([GC], no. 72508/13, §§ 287-317, 28 November 2017), and Navalnyy v. Russia ([GC], nos. 29580/12 and 4 others, §§ 164-65, 15 November 2018) (see also Selahattin Demirtaş v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 14305/17, §§ 421-22, 22 December 2020).

105. At the outset, the Court reiterates that, in the Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2) judgment, it has already found that, in violation of the requirements of Article 18 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 5, the applicant’s arrest and pre-trial detention were carried out for the ulterior purpose of silencing and punishing her for her journalistic activities (see Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, §§ 114-20).

106. In the present case, the applicant’s complaint under Article 18 of the Convention is raised in conjunction with Article 10. The Court has found above that the criminal proceedings against the applicant, resulting in her ultimate conviction for the criminal offences of illegal entrepreneurship and tax evasion, amounted to an unjustified interference with her right to freedom of expression, in violation of Article 10 of the Convention (see paragraphs 88-91 above). Accordingly, the scope of the present complaint under Article 18 differs from that examined in Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2) in that, in addition to having been raised in conjunction with a different Convention provision, it relates not only to the applicant’s pre-trial detention in the framework of those proceedings, but to the entirety of the criminal proceedings against her, which is to be seen as a continuation of the events that were the subject of the Court’s examination in Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2).

107. As the Court has found above, the criminal proceedings against the applicant resulting in her conviction constituted an interference with her right to freedom of expression, which was unlawful and did not pursue any legitimate aims set out in Article 10. Therefore, no issue arises in the present case with respect to the plurality of purposes where a restriction is applied both for an ulterior purpose and a purpose prescribed by the Convention (compare Merabishvili, cited above, §§ 318-54).

108. However, the mere fact that a restriction of a Convention right or freedom does not meet all the requirements of the clause that permits it does not necessarily raise an issue under Article 18. Separate examination of a complaint under that Article is only warranted if the claim that a restriction has been applied for a purpose not prescribed by the Convention appears to be a fundamental aspect of the case (ibid., § 291). In this connection, the Court notes that the applicant’s submissions concerning the complaints under Articles 10 and 18 of the Convention were indeed substantially similar in essence (see paragraphs 73-76 and 94-98 above). However, in view of the particular circumstances of the present case, as discussed in paragraphs 81‑86 above, it nevertheless considers that the applicant’s complaint under Article 18 of the Convention represents a distinct and fundamental aspect of the case (contrast Razvozzhayev v. Russia and Ukraine and Udaltsov v. Russia, cited above, §§ 304-05). Therefore, it remains to be seen whether there is proof that the authorities’ actions were actually driven by an ulterior purpose.

109. In Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), the Court’s finding of the existence of the ulterior purpose was based on a number of contextual factors, including the applicant’s status as a prominent investigative journalist critical of the government, the use of coerced and false accusations leading to her arrest, the escalation of charges once prosecutorial misconduct risked exposure, the stigmatising public statements by high-ranking officials equating her work with “treason”, and the broader context of similar retaliatory prosecutions against civil society activists and human rights defenders, all of which pointed to an ulterior purpose behind the interference (see Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, §§ 113-18). The Court considers that all of these factors are equally relevant to the present complaint. Moreover, the manner in which the criminal proceedings against the applicant unfolded – being marred by a significant degree of arbitrariness and by the domestic courts’ failure to adequately examine the applicant’s strong, pertinent and well-founded arguments (see paragraphs 67-69 above) – indicates that the ulterior purpose evident at the initial stages of the proceedings remained unchanged throughout their entirety.

110. In this latter respect, the Court recalls that in a system governed by the rule of law, judicial review represents the ultimate safeguard for the fundamental rights of individuals and their protection from abuse of power. This includes protection from malicious or otherwise ill-founded prosecution, or similar encroachments of the executive branch. And given the role of a free press in a democratic society, prosecution of journalists or other government critics on spurious charges must attract the closest scrutiny of the courts. It is therefore of grave concern that the national courts failed to apply such scrutiny in the circumstances of the present case.

111. Thus, the totality of the above circumstances indicates that the authorities’ actions were driven by improper reasons and that the actual purpose of the criminal proceedings against the applicant, which constituted the interference with her right to freedom of expression, was to silence and to punish her for her journalistic activities. In the light of these considerations, the Court finds that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression pursued a purpose other than that prescribed by Article 10 of the Convention.

112. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 18 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 10.

113. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION

114. The applicant also complained under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention of the alleged breaches of her rights to adversarial proceedings and equality of arms, her right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of her defence, her right to effective legal assistance and her rights to be able to examine witnesses against her and to obtain the attendance of witnesses on her behalf.

115. Having regard to the facts of the case, the submissions of the parties, its findings above in respect of the complaint under Article 7 of the Convention and the applicant’s main complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 56-57 and 69-70 above), the Court considers that there is no need to give a separate ruling on the admissibility and merits of these complaints (compare Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [GC], no. 47848/08, § 156, ECHR 2014).

116. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

117. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”

1. Damage

2. The applicant claimed 42,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage, corresponding to the loss of income during the period of her eighteen-month detention as well as the subsequent loss of income opportunities after her conviction and release from detention (during which period she was subjected to a ban on international travel), in the form of average monthly fees (honoraria) she had earned previously, which she estimated at EUR 1,589 per month, as well as being forced to turn down a teaching fellowship position abroad (the payment offer of which had been EUR 12,500).

3. In respect of non-pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed EUR 30,000 euros in relation to the main set of criminal proceedings and 20,000 Azerbaijani manats (AZN) in relation to the follow-up proceedings.

4. The Government submitted that the claim in respect of pecuniary damage did not fully correspond to reality as the applicant was still able to work after her release and receive honoraria under lawfully concluded contracts, and that the claim as a whole was not supported with sufficient evidence. As to the claims in respect of non-pecuniary damage, the Government argued that they were excessive.

5. The Court notes that the applicant has already been awarded just satisfaction for the pecuniary damage suffered as a result of her pre-trial detention in the framework of the same criminal proceedings (see Khadija Ismayilova (no. 2), cited above, § 128). Moreover, as regards the part of the claim in respect of pecuniary damage sustained during the period after her conviction, when she was banned from traveling abroad, it is noted that she has lodged separate applications, nos. 44031/17 and 41494/20, concerning the imposition of the travel ban, which are pending before the Court. In the proceedings relating to those applications, she has submitted substantially the same or similar claims which will be examined by the Court in due course. For these reasons, the Court rejects the applicant’s claim in respect of pecuniary damage submitted within the framework of the present applications.

6. The Court considers, however, that the applicant has suffered non‑pecuniary damage which cannot be compensated for solely by the finding of violations, and that an award should therefore be made on that account. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, as required by Article 41 of the Convention, the Court awards the applicant the sum of EUR 12,000 under this head, plus any tax that may be chargeable on that amount.

7. Costs and expenses

8. The applicant also claimed AZN 14,301.90 in total for the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts and for those incurred before the Court, consisting of legal fees to be paid to her lawyers in connection with both sets of domestic proceedings and certain administrative expenses.

9. The Government argued that the claim was excessive and that the amount claimed was not reasonable, nor had it been actually and necessarily incurred.

10. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the total sum of EUR 4,000 covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT

1. Decides, unanimously, to join the applications;
2. Declares admissible, unanimously, the complaints under Articles 6 § 1 and 7 of the Convention and, by a majority, the complaints under Articles 10 and 18 of the Convention;
3. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 7 of the Convention;
4. Holds, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
5. Holds, by four votes to three, that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;
6. Holds, by four votes to three, that there has been a violation of Article 18 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention;
7. Holds, unanimously, that here is no need to examine the admissibility and merits of the remaining complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b), (c) and (d) of the Convention;
8. Holds, by four votes to three,

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the Respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:

(i) EUR 12,000 (twelve thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 4,000 (four thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

9. Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 January 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Milan Blaško Ioannis Ktistakis
Registrar President

APPENDIX

List of cases:

No.| Application no.| Case name| Lodged on| Applicant
Year of birth
Place of residence
Nationality| Represented by
---|---|---|---|---|---
1.| 71556/16| Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan| 23/11/2016| Khadija ISMAYILOVA
1976
Baku
Azerbaijani| Padraig HUGHES
2.| 74112/17| Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan| 11/10/2017| Khadija ISMAYILOVA
1976
Baku
Azerbaijani| Fariz NAMAZLI